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Abstract 
      
 
 
The objective of this research is to understand what risk management processes 
are currently in place amongst active European equity asset managers, and to 
determine which practises are most effective.  The focus of this research is on 
active equity portfolios within the European markets.  The thesis is divided in five 
chapters: 1) Introduction, 2) Introduction and literature of risk management in 
financial institutions, 3) How risk management is currently used in European funds; 
a survey of 200 asset managers and hedge funds is undertaken to identify current 
approaches to risk management, and identify what might need to be improved, 
chapter, 4) using a unique survey, a comprehensive analysis of the level of risk 
that pension fund clients (Board Members, Chief Financial Officers, and upper 
management of organisations with pension funds under third-party management), 
family offices that invest in hedge funds and Intermediate Financial Advisors (IFAs 
in UK) are willing to accept, and 5) Conclusions. This will cover the financial crisis 
and the on-going subsequent recovery.  The key findings from Chapter 2 are that 
there is limited literature in this subject, from Chapter 3 that there is significant 
issues within the risk management systems utilized by the various asset managers 
and that there is a need to improve considerably these systems and from Chapter 
4 using a unique survey we gather a comprehensive analysis of the level of risk 
that pension fund clients (Board Members, Chief Financial Officers, and upper 
management of organisations with pension funds under third-party management), 
family offices that invest in hedge funds and Intermediate Financial Advisors (IFAs 
in UK) are willing to accept. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study of current risk 
management practices within active European equity asset managers.  
 
  
 16 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The motivation for this study is to understand the involvement between the active 
European equity asset managers and the risk management processes and 
systems. After the last two crises in the financial markets, the dotcom bubble 
(2000-2003) and the credit crisis (2008-2009), the last few years were marked by a 
deep change in fundamental paradigms and beliefs of the industry and investors. 
In the most recent credit crisis, there was a lack of transparency and feasibility in 
the quantitative tools used to compute the value of portfolios and risk management 
within the asset management industry. Questions were raised about the 
effectiveness of risk management and economic uncertainty, the convergence of 
risk factors and regulations boosted the complexity of risk management. The 
motivation for this research comes from the lack of comprehensive study on the 
current state of risk management within the European equity portfolios and the 
findings that there is a clear need to understand and improve the area under 
discussion. 
 
This research will focus on three different subjects and is structured as follows. In 
Chapter 2, it will answer broad questions regarding risk management within 
portfolio management, such as: 
• What is risk and what is the role of risk management?   
• Why is risk management important and what are current and historical 
attitudes to risk management in the asset management industry? 
 
To answer these questions the researcher will review many of the key theories and 
discuss important papers and the most up-to-date research on these matters.  This 
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section will aim to give a taste of current thinking about risk and risk management 
and will provide an exhaustive study of most relevant literature. It will attempt to 
highlight key theories and thinkers and shed some insight into risk and risk 
management rather than giving a chronological history of the whole debate 
surrounding risk.  
 
The main conclusion from Chapter 2 is that it clearly shows the gaps in the 
available literature within the subject. We identify that the definition of risk 
management is not clear and that little is known about the current state of risk 
management within the active European equity asset managers. 
 
In Chapter 3, the researcher will analyze how risk management is currently used in 
European funds, through a survey of 200 asset managers and hedge funds in 
order to identify the current approaches to risk management, how it has changed, 
the areas that might need to be improved and expectations of how it will change in 
the immediate future. Moreover, in Chapter 3, the researcher analyzes the 
influence of risk measure in each fund’s performance. The questions in the survey 
try to answer several key themes in order to reveal many important issues for the 
industry: 
• What are the consequences of past financial crises? 
• Is risk management taken seriously inside financial organizations? 
• Are funds with fewer assets under management expected to spend 
(proportionally) less on risk management? 
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In Chapter 3, we find that there are significant issues within the risk management 
systems utilized by the various asset managers (traditional asset managers with a 
bias towards long only products and hedge fund managers with an absolute bias) 
and that there is a need to improve these systems. Moreover, we identify that 
change is now being considered: companies are currently more aware of problems 
regarding the lack of risk processing and monitoring and they are taking risk more 
seriously.  Asset managers are willing to spend more on resources and give risk 
departments more power inside their organizations.  
 
In Chapter 4, the researcher will make a comprehensive analysis of the level of risk 
that different managers are willing to accept, namely Pension Fund clients (Board 
Members, Chief Financial Officers, and upper management of organizations with 
pension funds under third-party management), Family Offices that invest in Hedge 
Funds and Intermediate Financial Advisors (IFAs in the UK). In Chapter 4 we find 
evidence suggesting that there are different levels of risk acceptance between 
pension fund clients, family offices and IFAs. 
 
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the results and concludes the study.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study of current risk 
management practices within active European equity asset managers.  
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Chapter 2: Literature review and introduction to risk management in portfolio 
management 
 
1. Introduction 
In Chapter 2 we will review the literature within risk management in portfolio 
management. The objective is to answer broad questions regarding risk 
management such as what are the various definitions of risk and the role of the risk 
management within the portfolio management. 
 
2. Risk Management Literature Review 
In order to investigate risk management within the European asset management 
industry, we must first assess and review relevant literature to answer a number of 
questions:  What is risk and the role of risk management?  Why is risk 
management important and what are current and historical attitudes to risk 
management in the asset management industry? 
 
To answer these points, in the first sections below, I will review many of the key 
theories regarding these questions and I will discuss important papers and the 
most up-to-date research on these matters.  These sections will aim to give a taste 
of current thinking about risk and risk management and will provide an exhaustive 
survey of most relevant literature.  It will also not be an attempt to give a 
chronological history of the whole debate surrounding risk, but rather, it will attempt 
to highlight key theories and thinkers and shed some insight into risk and risk 
management.  In the first of these sections below, I will ask what risk is, in fact, and 
highlight some of the key issues as highlighted by the experts in the field. 
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2.1. What is risk? 
While there are many sources of financial risk, within this chapter we concentrate 
on market risk or price risk, i.e. the risk of unexpected changes in prices or rates 
(Duffie and Pan, 1997).  The reason why we focus on market risk is that we believe 
it to be the most relevant to equity portfolios.  According to Kuriyan and Rossi 
(2010), there are various risk factors: market risk, credit risk, operational risk, 
macroeconomic risk, strategic risk and integrated risk.  There are specific risk 
challenges when trying to model these specific risk factors, i.e.: 
 
Table 1 – Risk Factors / Challenges 
Risk Factor Challenges 
Market Risk  Impact of market valuation factors across all assets 
 Accounting for correlation across risk portfolios 
 Integrating credit risk in the trading book (i.e. counterparty risk) 
Credit Risk  Default probabilities and expected loss assumptions 
 Valuation impact of macroeconomic factors on credit risk  
(accrual book) 
Operational Risk  Historical scenario data to model operational risk 
 Quantifying economic impact of operational risk 
 Integrating operational risk in aggregate stress test risk reporting 
Macroeconomic Risk  Defining appropriate macroeconomic factors 
 Algorithms to translate macroeconomic changes into  
specific risk factors 
Strategic Risk  Developing pro-forma financials to model impact of  
strategic assumptions 
 Integrating results in stress test reporting 
Integrated Risk  Methodology to account for liquidity risk (funding vs. trading) 
 Feedback loops 
Source: Kuriyan, Vikram; Rossi, Cliff, GARP Leadership Series – Stress Testing and Scenario Analysis, May 2010 
 
In this research chapter we will focus on market risk as defined by Resti and Sironi 
(2007) - i.e. the risk of changes in the market value of an instrument or portfolio of 
financials instruments, connected with unexpected changes in market conditions 
(stock prices, interest rates, exchange rates, and volatility of these variables).  
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Interestingly, much of what we know about risk in finance comes from the ground 
breaking work done by Harry Markwowitz and others studying portfolio theory as 
far back as in the 1950s and 1960s.  In the process of considering how 
diversification affects portfolio risk, they considered the relationship between 
expected returns on investments and their risk and their work is still seen as being 
seminal despite it being put together decades ago. 
 
Another interesting point about this debate is that when we try to quantify risk in 
equity portfolios, we are quickly drawn to statistical measures of risk (Damodoran, 
2003).  The standard deviation or variance of actual returns around an expected 
return has become the most widely accepted measure of risk within the asset 
management industry.  Here, expected returns measure reward and the standard 
deviation measures risk and, therefore, equity portfolios that generate higher 
expected returns with lower standard deviations are the investors optimal choice, 
or on the “Efficient Frontier” as defined by Markowitz (1952).  Damodoran (2003) 
points out that there are limitations when using variance as the only measure of 
risk - the first is that it is calculated using variations from the mean and is thus a 
function of both upside and downside variations - i.e. a stock that went up 
significantly in the recent past can therefore look just as risky, based upon 
standard deviation, as a stock that has gone down significantly.  Additionally, when 
investors are assessing the desirability of investments, they may consider more 
than just the expected return and variance (Damodaran, 2003). 
According to Elton et. al. (2007), Portfolio Theory tells us that “risk” in the sense of 
expected volatility of returns, can be reduced by adding more securities to a 
portfolio provided that the returns of new securities are:  
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a) less than perfectly correlated with the returns of the original holdings  
 
If an investor’s entire portfolio is invested in just one stock, they are not only highly 
vulnerable to the firm specific risk, and they take on market risk as well.  As 
mentioned above, by expanding our portfolio to include other assets or stocks, one 
is diversifying, and by doing so, there is a reduction of firm specific risk.  There are 
two main reasons why diversification reduces, or, at the limit, eliminates firm 
specific risk.  The first is that each investment in a diversified portfolio is a much 
smaller percentage of that portfolio than would be the case if the portfolio were not 
diversified.  Therefore, any action that increases or decreases the value of only 
that investment or small group of investments will have only a small impact on your 
overall portfolio.  The second reason is that the effects of a firm specific action on 
the prices of individual assets in a portfolio can be either positive or negative for 
each asset for any period (Damodaran, 2003).  DeMiguel et al (2010) state that 
portfolio performance is measured in terms of four metrics: volatility, Sharpe ratio, 
certainty-equivalent return, and turnover.  They determined that prices of stock 
options contain information that can be used to improve the out-of-sample 
performance of portfolios. 
 
Although it is commonly believed financial markets are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated in pricing, isolating, repackaging, and transferring risks it is worth 
examining such assumptions in light of the recent financial crisis.  Tools such as 
derivatives and securitization contribute to this process, but they pose their own 
risks.  The failure of accounting and regulation to keep abreast of developments 
introduces yet more risks, with occasionally significant consequences (Holton, 
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2004).  One can quickly see how difficult it is to assess the risk of investing in, for 
instance, the equity of a bank which is a significant player in securitisation and 
derivatives, when even their auditors and regulators have difficulty quantifying the 
risk within the firm. 
 
According to Holton (2004), practical applications (including risk limits, trader 
performance-based compensation, portfolio optimization, capital calculations) all 
depend on the measurement of risk, but it is unclear exactly what these 
measurements reflect.  Due to this lack of clarity, debates are arising on trading 
floors, asset management companies, in academia and in industry journals about 
meaningful risk measurement.  A search of financial literature yields many 
discussions of risk but few definitions accepted and agreed on by all.  To 
understand risk one needs to consider two main streams - one is subjective 
probability, the other is operationalism.  Where these two main factors meet, 
according to Holton (2004) we can understand risk.  
 
The most common definition of risk is that provided by Frank Knight (1921), who 
wrote during the period of active research into the foundations of probability.  His 
research really touched upon the concepts of “known unknowns” and “unknown 
unknowns” in the field of risk, which would seem well ahead of his time.  Other 
research in the same period includes well-known pieces by John Maynard Keynes 
(1921), Richard von Mises (1928), and Andrew Kolmogrov (1933).  One key 
debate from this period relates to subjective versus objective interpretation of 
probability.  According to objective interpretations, probabilities are real.  We may 
discover them by logic or estimate them through statistical analyses.  According to 
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subjective interpretations, probabilities are human beliefs.  Holton (2004) argues 
that Knight’s definition is, in fact, not a definition of risk.  Holton details how risk 
entails both uncertainty and exposure and possible consequences.  Knight’s 
distinction addresses only uncertainty.  His definition is based on a particular 
objectivist interpretation of probability.  To Knight, probability is intrinsic to a 
proposition and depends only on necessary ignorance.  It is interesting to compare 
Knight’s (1921) and Keynes’ (1921) theories regarding probabilities.  According to 
Keynes, probabilities apply not to propositions but to pairs of propositions:  
 
 One proposition is not known to be true or false, 
 The other is the evidence for the first. 
 
A probability, then, is a relationship between two propositions. 
 
For economists, Knight’s distinction parallels divisions between types of economic 
activity.  His notion of risk (measurable uncertainty) conforms to many 
contingencies that are used by insurers.  His notion of uncertainty (un-measurable 
uncertainty) conforms to many contingencies that confront entrepreneurs or 
speculators.  Accordingly, economists have found it useful to embrace some form 
of distinction between measurable and un-measurable uncertainty.  The validity or 
usefulness of such a distinction continues to be a topic of debate among 
economists.  In another context, however, Knight’s distinction is less relevant.  In 
finance, according to Holton 2004, it has essentially played no role. 
 
 25 
 
Portfolio theory is generally perceived as a body of models that described how 
investors might balance risk and reward in constructing investment portfolios.  
Interestingly, in his famous model for investment portfolios in 1952, Markowitz 
offered no definition of risk; he simply proposed the following rule: “… that the 
investor does (or should) consider expected return a desirable thing and variance 
of return an undesirable thing…” That is, in short, the highlight of Markowitz’s 
views regarding risk.  He simply stated that it is an “undesirable thing”.  Only 
toward the end of the paper did he note: “the concepts “yield” and “risk” appear 
frequently in financial writings”. 
 
Any general definition of risk may firstly consider outcomes and personal interest, 
and secondly, that people do not know what will happen - therefore in both 
situations the outcome is uncertain.  It seems, according to most definitions 
therefore, that risk entails two essentials components: 
 
 exposure; 
 uncertainty. 
 
Risk, then, is exposure to a proportion of which one is uncertain.  In a generic 
definition (Holton, 2004) mentions, “risk is a condition of individuals - humans and 
animals - that are self-aware”.  Organizations, companies, and governments are 
not self-aware, so they are incapable of being at risk.  Rather, they are conduits 
through which individuals - members, investors, employees, voters, and such - 
take risk.  This fact of the input of human and non-human variables is rarely 
acknowledged in today’s literature on financial risk management, which tends to 
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treat abstract things, such as companies as risk takers.  Looking through a 
company to see who ultimately bears specific risks can be enlightening.  The 
author comments that the subjective probability, utility, and state preferences are 
tools for characterizing the uncertainty and exposure components of risk.  Such 
tools are limited by the fact that they apply only to those aspects of risk that are 
perceived. 
 
Another important body of research in the field of risk and risk perception is that of 
behavioural finance.  Paul Slovic’s (2000) definition states that “Risk is inherently 
subjective...human beings have invested the concept risk to help them understand 
and cope with the dangers and uncertainties of life...  Even the simplest, most 
straightforward risk assessments are based on theoretical models, whose structure 
is subjective and assumption-laden and whose inputs are dependent upon 
judgement”.  This links to Holton’s (2004) point that risk is a condition of human 
beings that are self-aware.  Therefore, it is important to consider human behaviour 
when studying, monitoring and managing risk.  The Decision Research 
organisation demonstrates that a wide range of risk indicators may be reduced to 
two main risk constructs; these are “dread risk” and “unknown risk”.  Behavioural 
finance scholars find that people have a substantial anxiety or dread of risks whose 
severity, they judge, cannot be controlled - (consider people’s attitudes towards the 
risks of terrorism, versus the risk of smoking).  Unknown risk separates out 
between hazardous activities that are familiar, have been around longer and have 
immediate consequences, versus those risky actions that are unfamiliar, new and 
have belated causes.  When humans make investment decisions, they perceive 
familiar scenarios to be less risky.  Finucane (2002) commented, “perceived risk 
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was judged as greater to the extent that the advisor would worry about the 
investments, that the investments had greater variance in market value over time 
and how knowledgeable the advisor was about the investment option”.  
Girgerenzer & Todd (1999) define familiarity as “to denote a degree of knowledge 
or experience a person has respect to a task or object”.  Therefore, familiarity bias 
is an inclination or prejudice that alters an individual’s perception of risk.  Gilovich 
(1981) finds that familiarity bias is found in the world of equity investing.  For 
example, investors demonstrate a preference for investing in domestic stocks 
(familiar assets) rather than international stocks (unfamiliar assets).  Gilovich 
(1981) also finds that portfolio managers have also demonstrated a tendency to 
invest money in local companies or stocks with recognizable brand names or 
reputations.  Gilovich (1981) refers to this tendency as “home bias”, and the recent 
IMA survey (2009) says that UK equity portfolios have 47% of assets is invested in 
the UK and a further 17% in Europe (so at home or close to home). 
 
Ricciardi (2008) finds that various demographic characteristics can affect an 
individual’s decision making towards risk.  Well-established research finds that: 
 Gender: men tend to be more risk seeking than women; 
 Marital status: Single individuals tend to make riskier decisions than married 
persons; 
 Age: Younger persons are inclined to be more risk seeking than older 
individuals; 
 Level of education: A person with higher levels of education display a greater 
risk propensity or tendency to take risks; 
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 Financial Knowledge (Experience/Expertise): Individuals who believe they 
have more knowledge of risk and risky situations, tend to undertake greater 
financial risks. 
 
For a review of the impact of manager characteristics on performance see, for 
instance, Chevalier and Ellison (1999).  Importantly, behavioural finance literature 
on risk reminds us that risk would not exist without a human element.  The failures 
of risk management in the recent financial crisis were down to humans, but 
humans must also fix them and therefore this needs to be taken into account for 
any meaningful risk measurement. 
 
2.1.1 Common Measures of Risk 
One cannot thoroughly discuss risk without discussing how it is measured and 
again, just as there is no absolute and agreed definition of risk, there is much 
debate on aspects of risk measurement.  However, the two key measures of risk 
are VaR (“Value-at-Risk”) and Volatility.  Both measures will be discussed in much 
more detail in the following chapters, however, it is necessary to include a brief 
introduction before we can continue to discuss risk management. 
 
Volatility can be defined as the standard deviation of the returns of a portfolio over 
a given timeframe, and in practice, the words volatility and risk are often 
interchangeable (Litterman 2003).  When, for example, we interchange volatility for 
the beta in the CAPM model, one can make assumptions about return based on 
the volatility of that stock/investment.  However, Boguth and Kuehn (2009) find that 
“under the CAPM, individual stocks returns can exhibit non-trivial unconditional 
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skewness.  Higher-than-expected volatility in times of high returns leads to a fatter 
right tail, or positive ex-ante skewness, while a negative covariance between 
shocks to asset volatility and returns leads to negative skewness”.  Munenzon 
(2010) in his analysis of the VIX (volatility index) finds that different VIX states 
result in very different risk-adjusted performance for all investment strategies.  
Herein lies the problem, or difficulty with volatility as a measure of risk; its value 
changes when the value of the investment changes, and it is only a retrospective 
measure. 
 
DeMiguel et al (2010) investigate how information implied in prices of stock options 
can be used to forecast volatilities of stock returns.  For example, they find that 
stocks with high volatility risk premia tend to outperform those with low volatility risk 
premia when using option implied information to estimate historical volatilities.  
Their empirical evidence shows that the portfolios where volatilities have been 
scaled using the volatility risk premium outperform the traditional portfolios in terms 
of Sharpe ratio and certainty-equivalent return, but with an increase in turnover. 
 
Hsu & Li (2010) find that stock market volatility is not consistent over time, and that 
equity market volatility is time varying, as is the equity risk premium.  Hsu & Li 
(2010) and Schwert (1989) note that volatilities for various risky asset classes tend 
to be lower in bull markets and higher in bear markets.  This illustrates another 
problem with volatility as a measurement of risk Bear market returns generally 
exhibit up and down days, as investors tend to be eternally optimistic, which is 
often proved wrong.  Indeed, swings are often larger in percentage terms too 
(given the reduced value of assets) leading to a higher volatility measure.  
Conversely, during bull markets, because the up and down price movements on a 
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daily basis become an ever smaller percentage of the asset value, volatility is 
lower.  David and Veronesi (2009) state that “the relation between the volatility of 
stocks and bonds and their price valuations is strongly time varying”.  David and 
Veronesi (2009) argue that the relationship between volatility and the macro 
economy is much more complex than the simple boom-bust business cycle 
variation.  They find that volatility changes when the state of the economy 
changes, whether for the better or for the worse.  Investors learn about the current 
state of the economy in terms of earnings and inflation, and act accordingly.  When 
earnings or inflation change in a way they did not expect, their attitude to 
investments would change, which in turn causes an increase in volatility.  Zhou 
and Zhu (2010) examine both the long-run and short-run volatilities in their model; 
their two-factor volatility model better captures macroeconomic volatility. 
 
Engle and Rangel (2008) illustrate that despite our assumptions about volatilities 
and returns, there is still little examination of the relationship between the state of 
the economy and financial market volatility: 
 “After more than 25 years of research on volatility the central unsolved 
problem is the relation between the state of the economy and aggregate financial 
volatility.  The number of models that have been developed to predict volatility 
based on time series information is astronomical, but the models that incorporate 
economic variables are hard to find.  Using various methodologies, links are found 
but they are generally much weaker than seems reasonable.   
For example, it is widely recognised that volatility is higher during recessions and 
following announcements but these effects turn out to be a small part of measured 
volatility” [Engle and Rangel (2008)]. 
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According to Rossi and Timmerman (2010), despite over 20 years of empirical 
research, there is little consensus on the basic properties of the relationship 
between the equity premium and conditional stock market volatility.  Breedon 
(1979) and Merton (1971) in the consumption and intertemporal CAPMs 
respectively, propose different measures of risk.  Rossi and Timmerman (2010) 
build on these models to create a new measure of covariance risk that is based on 
the high-frequency business activity index developed by Aruoba, Diebold and 
Scotti (2009).  Rossi and Timmerman (2010) find in their analysis using US stock 
return data that there is a positive trade-off between conditional volatility and 
expected returns at low or medium levels of conditional volatility, but that the 
relation becomes flat or even inverted during periods with high volatility.  Put 
simply, the risk return trade-off does not hold true in periods of high market 
volatility. 
 
Another measure of risk commonly used is Value-at-Risk; VaR. 
 
VaR has proven very popular because the concept is so simple (Li , 2004), and 
indeed it is one of the most common ways to measure risk (Resti, Sironi, 2007).  
However, there has recently been an increasing call for the development of 
techniques to evaluate the quality of these models.  The academic world and the 
financial community have thus started to wonder as to the quality of the risk 
measures generated by VaR models and their ability to correctly predict trading 
portfolio losses.  Such questions are beginning to be of great interest to regulatory 
authorities.  For example, the Basel Committee requires that VaR model should be 
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regularly back-tested to determine its relevant predictive ability as a pre-condition 
for using that same model to determine the market risk capital requirement. 
 
VaR is an estimate of how much a certain portfolio can lose within a given time 
period and at a given confidence level.  More precisely VaR is defined so that the 
probability that a portfolio will lose more than its VaR over a particular time horizon 
is equal to , a pre-specified number.  Put mathematically: X denotes a random 
variable with density function f(x) and cumulative distribution function (cdf) F(X). 
 
Define the quantile X(P) of X as the maximum value of X for which there is a 
probability of P to be below this value under the cdf of F(X).  Formally, the 
definition of X(P) is: Pr(X X(P))=P. 
 
Value-at-Risk at 1-  confidence interval, VaR( ), can be defined as the loss 
below some reference target, (F(X)), over a given period of time, where there 
exists a confidence interval of 1-  of incurring this loss or a smaller one. 
 
If (F(X)) =E(X) X, where X is the expected mean of X, then the VaR is the 
loss below the expected mean, X, and is denoted as VaRe.  If a constant 
reference point, such as the risk free return or zero is selected, then it is denoted 
as VaRt. 
For example, a weekly VaRt = 0 of $5 million at the 99 percent confidence interval 
means that there is a 1 percent probability of having a loss greater than $5 million 
within the next week. 

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In terms of the quantile function, VaR ( ) can be written simply as: 
VaR( ) =  (F(X )) - X ( )       (1) 
 
VaR calculation involves two primary steps: First, derive the forward distribution of 
returns1.  Second, calculate the first  percent of this distribution.  Figure 1 
illustrates this process. 
 
Figure 1 – VaR process 
 
Source: (Li , 2004) 
 
In simple terms, VaR is an estimate of how much a certain portfolio can lose within 
a given time period and at a given confidence level.  Because VaR is defined so 
that the probability that a portfolio will lose more than its VaR over a particular time 
                                                 
1
 In order to prove it is sufficient to provide an example. Suppose that X takes a value of either 10 or 
20, each with a probability of 0.5. Similarly, Y takes a value of either 0 or 5, each with a probability of 
0.5.  It can easily be seen that any rational investor would prefer alternative X over Y (Min(X) > Max 
(Y)) Y DY.  However, at a 50 percent or higher confidence interval (  < 0.5 ), the VaReS of X 
and Y are given by: VaRe(X)=5 and VaRe(Y)=2.5, respectively.  Hence, both the mean and the VaRe 
of X are higher than the mean and the VaRe of Y and according to the mean-VaRe rule there is no 
dominance between the two alternatives. 
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horizon is equal to , a pre-specified number, VaR plays in the tails of the 
distribution of returns.  Danielsson et al (2006) reminds us that financial returns 
tend to exhibit fat tails, which makes preparation for those tail events even more 
pressing.  Therefore, the best VaR models are those that model a realistic 
distribution of portfolio returns, exhibiting fat tails. 
 
VaR estimates can be used for many purposes.  The natural first field of 
application is risk management within portfolios.  Setting position limits in terms of 
VaR can help management estimate the cost of its positions in terms of risk.  This 
allows managers allocate risk in a more efficient way.  Second, VaR can be 
applied to evaluate the performance of the risk takers on a risk/return basis.  
Rewarding risk takers only on a return basis can bias their behaviour toward taking 
excessive risk.  Hence, if the performance (in terms of returns) of the risk takers is 
not properly adjusted for the amount of risk effectively taken, the overall risk of the 
firm may exceed its optimal level.   
 
Most VaR models follow a similar structure: 1) the portfolio is marking-to-market 
daily; 2) the distribution of the portfolio’s returns is estimated; 3) the VaR of the 
portfolio is computed. 
 
The ensuing portfolio models construct historical returns that mimic past 
performance of the current portfolio.  From these historical returns, the current VaR 
is constructed based on a statistical model.  Thus changes in the risk of a 
particular portfolio are associated with historical experience of this portfolio.  
Despite methodologies being similar they come up with varying results:  Beder 

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(1995) applies eight common VaR methodologies to three hypothetical portfolios.  
The results show the differences among these methods can be very large, with 
VaR estimates varying by more than 14 times for the same portfolio.  Clearly, there 
is a need for a statistical approach to estimation and model selection. 
 
Extending from the simple measure of VaR are a number of variations that try to 
answer VaR’s shortcomings.  An extension of VaR is found when we consider 
VaRe (VaR with expected mean as a reference point) and VaRt (VaR with a 
constant reference point).  Li (2004) discusses these VaR measures, which are 
summarised briefly below: 
 
VaRe, is the VaR with expected mean as a reference point.  This measure is 
appealing to investors as it simply quantifies the maximum loss below an expected 
mean value.  Baumol’s (1963) claim that “Investment with a relatively high 
standard deviation will be relatively safe if its expected value is sufficiently high" 
illustrates this point.  Thus, he identifies the mean less k times the standard 
deviation as the subjective "confidence level" for the risk taken by the individual.  
Nevertheless, the main drawback of VaRe (as well as any other risk measure 
which is based on results below the mean) is that it is unaffected by a constant 
shift of the whole distribution (Atkinson, 1970).  Because of this shortcoming, the 
Basel (1996) Amendment recommends calculating the VaR as the potential loss 
below the current value, i.e. VaRt. 
 
AVaR (The Accumulate VaR), which is also known as Conditional-VaR or Mean-
Shortfall, was introduced by Embrechts, Klueppelberg & Mikosch (1997), Artzner et 
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al. (1997, 1999), Basak & Shapiro (2001) and Longin (2001) and was further 
investigated by Uryasev (2000) and others.   
 
According to Li (2004) “VaR measures assume that investors assess risk in a 
completely different process, in that the attitude toward risk is determined not only 
by the size of the loss but also by the probability of this loss to occur”.  It is worth 
summarising other measures of risk in order to understand the complexity of the 
subject.  The fact that there are so many different measures of risk also shows that 
there is a long way to go in finding the optimal risk management strategy for equity 
portfolios.  Not only is there debate over how best to manage risk, but there are 
also many debates in academic literature on how best to measure risk.  The 
following table by Kaplanski and Kroll, 2001 presents the mathematical expression 
for each measure, discusses their main properties and summarizes the main 
differences between them. 
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Figure 2 – Types of measures of risk 
 
Source: Kaplanski and Krol (2000) 
 
The majority of risk measures discussed so far assume a normal, symmetrical 
distribution of returns.  However, in the general case positive deviations cannot be 
considered a source of risk.  In the second group, risk is measured only by results 
below some reference point.  Below we review the most common measures in 
each group. 
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The Standard Deviation Risk Measure is the most common risk measure in the 
dispersion group and is given by: 
       (17) 
 
Many criticisms of the standard deviation as a risk measure have been published, 
mostly relating to its inadequacy with regard to the expected utility theorem (see for 
example Markowitz (1959), Mao (1970) and many others).  Other dispersion 
measures include the coefficient of variation, which is simply the standard 
deviation divided by the mean and The Expected Absolute Deviations Risk 
Measure, which is given by: 
        (18) 
 
Atkinson (1970) discussed this dispersion measure as a measure of inequality.  
More recently, Konno & Yamazaki (1991) developed a mean-Absolute Deviation 
optimization model, which utilized this risk measure. 
 
The Gini Mean Difference measures the expected value of the absolute difference 
between every pair of realizations of the random variable and is given by: 
      (19) 
 
The mathematical complexity of this measure obscured the intuition behind it and 
discouraged its use. 
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An alternative to the dispersion measures of risk are the “below a reference point” 
risk measures.  These only consider results in the lower part of the distribution, and 
are thus more appealing as risk measures to investors.  This is because investors 
consider risk as what they could lose, rather than return that they hope to gain.  In 
Fishburn's (1977) paper, he states that their attractiveness in the framework of the 
mean-Risk analysis is their ability to "recognize the desire to come out well in the 
long run while avoiding potentially disastrous setbacks or embarrassing failures to 
perform up to standard in the short run". 
 
Most of the traditional important measures in this group are specific cases of 
Fishburn's α-t model, which is defined as: 
       (20) 
 
where α describes different attitudes toward risk.  Other risk measures in this group 
include Roy’s (1952) Safety first Risk measure, Domar & Musgrave (1944) 
Markowitz’s (1959) Semi-Variance (SV) Risk Measure, Boudoukh, et al’s (1995) 
Worst-Case-Scenario measure, which can be written approximately as: WCS=t-
X(0), and: Baumol’s (1963) measure, which is given by the expected return minus 
k times the standard deviation.  This is when the parameter, k, is an arbitrary 
number which is supposed to reflect the subjective level of risk aversion.  The 
larger k is, the higher this level is and the larger the Baumol efficient set is. 
 
Despite the acceptance that there are several measures of risk, each with their 
own advantages and disadvantages, one must be aware that VaR risk measures 
are currently used for risk management purposes, and VaR measures of risk are at 
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least as good as other risk measures for decision-making purposes.  However, 
VaR did not save portfolio managers from significant losses in the recent financial 
crisis.  Using instruments that allowed them to trade volatility, another measure of 
risk, may have been the solution, as we discuss in the following chapters. 
 
2.1.2 Types of Risk in the Portfolios 
There are various types of risks within equity portfolios and factor models seek to 
explain risk by building on the variance/co-variance approach and adding 
explanatory structure in the form of different factors (Ross, 1986). There is great 
choice of explanatory variables, but they fall into two broad categories. The factors 
are typically either macro-economic or fundamental.    
Macro-economic factors essentially try to model the sensitivity of equities and other 
assets as a function of economic factors. The most common factors are usually:    
- interest rates (short-term, long-term, shape of the yield curve);  
- currencies;  
- inflation (consumer prices, producer prices, unit labor costs);    
- commodity prices (oil, gold, indices); and    
- output (gross domestic product, industrial production, retail sales,  
survey data, etc.). 
 
Fundamental factors are generally based upon data derived from corporate 
accounts, and are felt by the investment community to be important factors that 
drive equity prices from time to time.   Fundamental factor models express the 
riskiness of assets as a function of various styles and indices. The most common 
factors are usually:  
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- value vs. growth (price/earnings ratio, price-to-book, yield);    
- the size (log market capitalization, `blue-chip' effect);    
- momentum/success (index out-performance, moving averages);    
- forecasts/surprises (I/B/E/S expectations, earnings revisions);   and    
- the country or economic/industry sector effects.  
 
Despite its undoubted popularity, this type of model is fraught with a number of 
serious problems. The models intrinsically lack flexibility; they do not respond well 
to changes in market conditions or to new variables that may drive prices. In most 
cases the factors simply do not match up to those that are used by the portfolio 
managers. There are a limited numbers of factors; different factors would require a 
completely new re-estimation of the model that often renders the exercise 
impractical. The factors are correlated, and therefore interpretation of the results, 
whilst it appears to be quite simple, is, in fact, extremely difficult. In the case of 
economic series, most economic series are highly correlated, and one runs into 
severe problems when including many factors. Frequently, meaningful data are not 
available on a consistent basis either across or within markets. Lately use of “big 
data” has been included in the analysis of risk within the portfolios. 
 
2.2. What is risk management? 
After studying the available literature regarding the concept and definition of risk, I 
will introduce the reader to what risk management is, taking into consideration the 
research and information available about the subject. Afterwards, in Chapter 3, I 
will analyse the risk management within the active European Equity Asset 
Managers.  
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According to Rebonato (2007) risk management is the discipline concerned with 
assessing the probability of and, most importantly, reacting and planning for 
uncertain events.  By being aware of what could happen, one can be prepared for 
what action to take in that event.  Having experienced the past couple of years in 
the financial markets, it is fair to say that many market participants were not 
particularly prepared and therefore their risk management was not as robust as 
many thought.  In this thesis, we will focus on risk management with the objective 
of risk reduction and eventually with the possibility of trading risk to enhance 
portfolio returns.  Risk reduction is only part of risk management; risk management 
has to be defined far more broadly to include actions that are taken by firms to 
exploit uncertainty (Damodaran, 2003). It is a complex and challenging concept as 
it implies much more than risk reduction. It is to identify and measure the risks 
taken, aggregate these risks in a measure of total risk, enable to eliminate, mitigate 
and avoid bad risks as well as to ensure that the risk level is consistent with its risk 
appetite (In any financial services’ company, guaranteeing the risk management 
function plays an efficient and correct role is challenging because there are still 
many limitations in measuring risk). Limitations of risk measurement imply that 
setting appropriate incentives for risk takers and promoting an appropriate risk 
culture are essential. (Economic Policy Review, 2016) 
 
In traditional portfolio theory, risk management is very straightforward, as the 
portfolio manager only has to choose the relative weights to be allocated to the 
tangency portfolio and to the riskless asset, respectively. However, reality is more 
complex and there are several frictions that do not allow the traditional portfolio 
theory to model risk. Therefore, risk management in Asset Management is a much 
 43 
 
more central and complex part of Asset Management companies and is frequently 
independent from the management divisions of an Asset Management (Dangl, T., 
Randl, O. and Zechner, J., 2014).  
 
Active and passive portfolio managers have different models to manage risk. 
Passive portfolio managers can follow the traditional portfolio theory where each 
asset’s risk will be measured by a constant beta for each of the risk systematic 
factors while for an active portfolio manager the position’s marginal risk 
contribution depends on the portfolio weights in addition to the covariance matrix. 
(Dangl, T., Randl, O. and Zechner, J., 2014). 
 
The Asset Management has a strong influence over the financial markets and the 
populations’ wealth due to the increasingly amount of savings for retirement as 
pension funds or mutual funds. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that 
Portfolio Managers monitor and control their risks in order to guarantee the welfare 
of the societies. (Dangl, T., Randl, O. and Zechner, J., 2014).  
 
The recent financial crisis and the following sovereign debt crisis have 
demonstrated the limitations of the risk management in the Asset Management 
Industry. These market events lead to an enhancement of risk monitoring and 
controlling within all industry. Downside protection’s strategies that were used 
until the recent years ended up being too expensive during volatile periods and 
there was a clear need to develop risk management concepts. However, 
according to Dangl, T., Randl, O. and Zechner, J., 2014, risk management for 
long-term investor is still in an early stage, supporting this research’s findings.  
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This agrees with my findings from Chapter 3, making them relevant in current 
risk climate. The researcher found that only 20% of the Portfolio Managers in 
the sample use their risk management system on a daily basis and there are still 
22% that only use their risk systems quarterly. Furthermore, the survey proved 
the lack of commitment that most Portfolio Managers had with the risk 
department. Generally, the conducted survey shows that the hedge fund 
industry is better prepared and more diligent in terms of risk management.  
 
While most risk models agree that risk comes from the distribution of actual returns 
around the expected return and that risk should be measured from the perspective 
of a marginal investor, who by definition should be well diversified, they part ways 
when it comes to measuring non-diversifiable or market risk.  The risk and return 
model that has been in use the longest, and is still the standard in the practitioners’ 
world, is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; 
Mossin 1966).  It assumes that there are no transaction costs, that all assets are 
traded, investments are infinitely divisible (i.e. you can buy any fraction of a unit of 
the asset) and that everyone has access to the same information.  Making these 
assumptions allows investors to keep diversifying without additional cost.  At the 
limit, their portfolios will not include every traded asset in the market but will have 
identical weights on risk assets - which then would be called the market portfolio.  
The risk of a stock becomes the risk that it adds on to the portfolio.  This, in turn, is 
measured with a beta, measured against this portfolio: 
 
where, 
 Expected Return on asset i 
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Risk-free rate 
 Expected Return on market portfolio 
 
Beta of investment i 
In the CAPM, all market risk is captured in the beta, measured relative to a market 
portfolio, which, at least in theory, should include all traded assets in the market 
place held in the proportion to their market value. 
The restrictive assumptions on transactions costs, private information in the capital 
asset pricing model and the model’s dependence on the market portfolio have long 
been viewed with scepticism by both academics and practitioners.   
 
Like the CAPM, the arbitrage-pricing model begins by breaking risk down into firm 
specific and market risk components.  As in the CAPM, firm specific risk covers 
information that affects primarily the firm.  Market risk affects many or all firms and 
would include unanticipated changes in a number of economic variables.  Unlike 
CAPM, the arbitrage-pricing model allows for multiple sources of market-wide risk 
and measures the sensitivity of investments to changes in each source.  Therefore, 
with n market risk factors, the expected return on an asset can be written as: 
 
where: 
 Expected return on a zero-beta portfolio 
 Sensitivity of the asset to market risk j (j=1,2,…n) 
 Expected return on a portfolio with a factor beta of 1 for a factor j and zero 
for all other factors. 
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A major downfall of the CAPM model is that it assumes stock returns exhibit a 
smooth variation typical of a Gaussian distribution.   
The terms in the brackets can be considered the risk premium for each of the 
factors in the model.  However, several authors (Chernov et al (2003), Eraker et al 
(2003) and Huang and Tauchen (2005)) observe that stock returns exhibit jumps.  
These jumps arise for a number of different reasons.  If jumps are broadly 
systematic, unpredictable, and highly correlated, as in the recent crisis, 
diversification provides little solace for even the most-diversified portfolio 
(Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009)).  It is in this area that the researcher wishes to 
examine ways for ameliorating losses in equity portfolios. 
 
Multi-factor models are estimated using historical data, rather than economic 
modelling (Damodaran, 2003).  Once the numbers of factors has been identified in 
the arbitrage-pricing model, their behaviour over time can be extracted from the 
data.  The behaviour of unnamed factors over time can be compared to the 
behaviour of macroeconomic variables over the same period to see whether any of 
the variables is correlated with the identified factors (Chen, Roll and Ross 1986).  
 
Basak, Shapiro and Tepla (2005) mentioned that portfolio theory must address the 
fact that in reality portfolio managers are evaluated relative to a benchmark and, 
therefore, adopt risk management practices to account for the benchmark 
performance.  The authors capture this risk management consideration by allowing 
a pre-specified shortfall from a target benchmark-linked return, consistent with 
growing interest in such practice.  In a dynamic setting, the authors demonstrate 
how a risk averse portfolio manager optimally under or over performs a target 
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benchmark.  Risk management with benchmarking, when shortfall is allowed, 
leads to a rich variety of investment behaviours.  In the absence of benchmarking, 
a normal manager’s optimal policy is driven by his risk tolerance, which reflects the 
sensitivity of the normal policy to changing economic conditions. 
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2.2.1 Factor Models in Practice 
There are different kinds of BARRA models, and it should be noted that most 
pension/mutual fund managers will have an equity benchmark against which their 
risk and performance is measured.   
 
The expected deviation in returns from such a benchmark is expressed as a 
volatility number, and termed tracking error or active risk.  Benchmarked long-only 
funds will typically hold somewhere around 30-70 stocks from an investment 
universe based on the benchmark.  Their active risk will be estimated as a percent, 
for example, 4%, suggesting that the expected deviation (within 95% probability 
band) is +/-8%.  This will be different to the portfolio’s total risk, which may be 
around 20% (similar to that of the benchmark).  
 
In the case of benchmarked portfolios, almost all attributes are measured relative 
to the benchmark, with a term ‘active’ preceding the name.  For example, and 
‘active beta’ of 0.1, will denote a portfolio with a beta of 1.1.  An ‘active exposure of 
+5% to Germany’ will denote a portfolio that holds 5% more in German stocks than 
the benchmark.  
 
The pattern of stock price movements is affected by many fundamental factors, 
which are common across a broad set of securities.  Barra multi-factor risk models 
measure asset’s sensitivities to these factors, e.g. market conditions and 
fundamental data, in order to forecast risk and segregate its common factors from 
the sources of asset-specific risk.  Barra Models enable fund managers to rank 
securities and find trends in the marketplace, according to the quantified ex-ante 
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risk.  They can also represent a valid instrument when running pre-trade “what if” 
scenarios and simulations to evaluate the trade-off between risk and return.  In 
addition to this, “tilt” active strategies may be developed using the common factors 
identified by the Barra models. 
 
The first multi factor risk models have been launched in 1970s, followed in 1990s 
by the launch of Barra Aegis and GICS®, a standardized classification system for 
equities.  In the 2000s Barra and Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI)2 
merged their operations.  Actually, MSCI is a leading provider of support tools for 
investment decisions worldwide and the first provider of multi-factor risk models.  
Multiple-factor models have become primary tools for forecasting and analysing 
portfolios’ risk.  Today, Barra models are one of the most powerful tools of risk 
management in the world.  
The standard form of a multi-factor model is the following:  
 
rj=x1f1+ x2f2+ x3f3…+ xkfk+ uj 
 
where xi with i=1, 2…k measures the asset’s exposure to the relative factor i 
whose return is denoted as fi.  The error term of the regression measures the 
asset’s specific return.  As mentioned, the fundamental risk model will assume 
some ex-ante structure to forecast volatility.  It will do so by setting the exposures 
of securities (xi) to the systematic risk factors (fi).  It will also determine the number 
of factors (xi) ex-ante.  So for example, X may be a matrix of exposures to 
                                                 
2
 “MSCI is a leading provider of world-class, mission-critical investment decision support tools to 
financial institutions worldwide, with over 40 years of experience, 2000 employees, in 19 countries and 
around 5800 clients worldwide”. Manghani R., Ruban O., (2013), “Best Practices in Risk 
Management”, MSCI. 
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Industry, Country, and the security’s liquidity, size or status as a value stock for 
example.  
 
Given the factor structure X, and the exposures, the cross-sectional regression is 
estimated on a regular basis (daily usually) to estimate fi. Clearly, the fi, or factor 
returns, are highly dependent on the regression structure, estimation, and potential 
bias.  Once the factor returns are estimated daily, they are cumulated into a time-
series to create the factor returns of the model.  The stock-specific returns (uj) are 
also saved, and used later to calculate the stock-specific volatility of an individual 
security.  
 
These returns are subsequently used to estimate the factor covariance matrix as 
denoted by: 
Fk,m=Cov [fk, fm] 
where k,m are the common factors.  This variance-covariance matrix is at the heart 
of the fundamental factor model.  It is calculated with some care, as usually the 
half-life for the volatility estimates (the diagonal of the matrix) will differ from the 
correlation (off-diagonal) elements, to reflect the faster changing volatility structure 
versus the ‘long-term’ correlation that the model is hoping to capture.  The 
correlations (and covariance) between factors are the only mechanism that 
individual securities can achieve correlated returns.  It is also the key vulnerability 
in the model for when market are in distress, and correlations change rapidly. 
An important component of the Barra risk models is the amount of data cleaning 
and servicing that must take place.  Firstly, a model must identify a relevant 
investment universe.  This is particularly important, as a very broad investment 
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universe will have different kinds of firms (usually smaller cap) that may affect the 
regression based factor returns.  Secondly, the model must identify the X, or the 
ex-ante exposures that it thinks drive the risk of securities.3  The objective of this 
step is to identify the variables, “descriptors”, which most effectively can partition 
risk.  A test for their statistical significance is made in order to best capture the 
assets’ risk profile.  Descriptors are then standardized and collected into relevant 
combinations.  The standardisation itself is fraught with danger, including missing 
data, outliers, and the need to normalise across what is usually an extremely broad 
investment universe. Finally, risk-models by design choose those descriptions for 
which they have many data across the entire investment universe.  While some 
factors may be particularly good at describing risk, if the data is sparse across all 
stocks, they will often not be used, instead replaced by those where data is readily 
available.  In the past, models have used composites (across 3-4 different metrics) 
to get around this problem.  
 
Once the statistical estimation is done, the model is back-tested against alternative 
models and continuously updated to reflect changing trends and new information 
with the most recent fundamental and market data.  The final model released will 
often be ‘fitted’ to historical data, and be the best forecaster of risk for a historical 
time-range.  This itself is a kind of ‘model-selection’ bias. 
 
There is clear evidence that Barra Equity Models play a relevant role in supporting 
managers' investment decisions.  The wide range of products offered allows 
investors to create optimal portfolios and select assets, choosing the desired 
                                                 
3
 MSCI, “Barra Risk Model. Handbook”, Sect. 2, Ch. 3 “Barra Equity Risk Modeling”. 
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investment risk profile.  Managers and investors’ requests, together with their 
remarks and feedback, allow the MSCI to better tailor the most recent versions of 
their Barra Equity Models to any particular investment mandate. 
 
The MSCI, notwithstanding the accuracy and the explanatory power of the models, 
provides constant improvements in order to enhance their efficiency and flexibility.  
One of the last notable examples has been the enlargement of the MSCI products 
to Stochastic Multifactor Models, which adopt non-fundamental analysis as a base 
for their estimates. 
 
2.2.2 Risk Management Process  
In Chapter 3, I will be reviewing the adequacy of risk management process in the 
active European Equity Funds. In this section, I will introduce the reader to what is 
considered a good risk management process to help my further analysis in 
Chapter 3.  
 
According to Martellini (2010) investors require risk management.  The raison 
d’etre of the investment industry is not to generate alpha or design complex 
structured products, but is to serve investors’ needs by helping them find solutions 
to their problems.  This involves meeting long-term objectives in the presence of 
short-term constraints.   
 
Risk management can provide: 
 Diversification: design improved performance-seeking portfolios; 
 Hedging: neutralizing impact of risk factors in liability streams; 
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 Insurance: maximizing upside subject to short-term constraints. 
 
According to Bender and Nielsen (2009) a successful investment process requires 
a risk management structure that addresses multiple aspects of risk.  The authors 
mentioned that the latest recession (2008/2009) brought risk management to the 
forefront and highlighted the need for guidance on best practice for investors.  
Asset managers were surprised by the violent market moves during this period.  
Some have argued that risk management practices failed when they were needed 
most, and with multi-sigma events extending across formerly uncorrelated asset 
classes, investors have questioned the very meaning of the term “well diversified 
portfolio” (Bender, Nielsen, 2009).  Bender and Nielsen (2009) mention that there 
are 3 main guiding principles when considering best practices in risk management: 
 
1) “Risk management is not limited to the risk manager”.  Anyone involved in the 
investment process, from CIO to the portfolio managers, should be thinking about 
risk.  It should become part of the firm’s culture, especially when managing 
investment decisions; 
2) “If you can’t assess the risk of an asset, maybe you shouldn’t invest in it”.  For 
institutions invested in alternative asset classes, such as private equity and hedge 
funds, or those who have exposure to complex instruments, such as derivatives 
and structured products, the risk management requirements have greatly 
increased.  These investors need a framework for managing risk that far exceed 
what was required for the plain vanilla stock and bond investing that prevailed only 
ten years ago.  Bender and Nielsen (2009) argue that one should assess one’s risk 
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management capabilities before making the decision to invest in certain asset 
types; 
3) “Proactive risk management is better than reactive risk management”.  Being 
prepared for unlikely events is perhaps the most important lesson learned from the 
recent crisis.  This applies to both market risk and non-market risks such as 
counterparty, operational, leverage, and liquidity.  This relates again to point 1); A 
risk management culture should run through the veins of each member of the firm 
so they can identify non-market risks as well. 
The authors mention 3 main pillars of Risk Management: 
 
Figure 3 – 3 main pillars of risk management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “Best Practices for Investment Risk Management” - Jennifer Bender and Frank Nielsen, June 2009 
 
Bender and Nielsen (2009) lay out a best practice framework, as illustrated in the 
above exhibit, that rests on 3 pillars: risk measurement (using the right tools 
accurately to quantify risk from various perspectives), risk monitoring (tracking the 
output from the tools and flagging anomalies on a regular and timely basis) and 
risk-adjusted investment management (uses the information from measurement 
Risk-Adjusted
Investment Management
(RAIM)
Risk
Measurement
Risk
Monitoring
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and monitoring to align the portfolio with expectations and risk tolerance).  All three 
are critical. 
In the figure below, we see examples of stress tests that can uncover potential 
weaknesses within a portfolio.  If we incorporate these stress tests into our risk 
scenario analyses, we may be able to prevent losses should these shocks occur. 
 
Figure 4 – Stress Tests Uncover Possible Weaknesses in the Portfolio: 
I. Systemic Shock: 
- liquidity shock 
- leverage shock 
II. Macro shock: 
- interest rate shock 
- oil price shock 
III. Market wide shock: 
- market wide decline in equity 
prices 
IV. Target shock 
- U.S. value stocks hit 
- Japan Growth stocks hit 
Source: “Best Practices for Investment Risk Management” - Jennifer Bender and Frank Nielsen, June 2009 
Bender and Nielsen (2009) state that a thorough analysis of the sources of risk, 
which may include market risk, sector risk, credit risk and interest rate risk amongst 
others, requires portfolio decomposition along various characteristics or exposures 
via a factor model.  This model can stress test the portfolio to assess the impact of 
large and rare events. 
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In their explanation of Risk-Adjusted Investment Management (RAIM), Bender and 
Nielsen (2009) point out that risk monitoring requires the necessary IT and 
infrastructure resources for support and that “Delays in a risk manager’s ability to 
view changes in holdings, prices, or characteristics are often caused by 
infrastructure limitations”.  In sum, institutions should consider the costs of 
implementing the necessary risk management systems when they decide in which 
assets to invest. 
RAIM, when implemented firm wide, may have prevented losses seen across the 
board in equity portfolios.  It would have allowed hedges to be implemented well 
ahead of the crisis.  Admittedly, this would have dampened returns pre-crisis, but 
one only has to glance at the figure below to see the losses it could have 
eliminated. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates a successful market hedge that includes just a simple stop-loss 
strategy plan at a point when assets drop below a specified level. 
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Figure 5 – Risk-adjusted investment management to protect against 
                  downside risk 
 
Source: Bender, Jennifer; Nielsen Frank; “Best practices for investment risk management”, 2009 – MSCI Barra Research 
Insights 
All three pillars - Risk Measurement, Risk Monitoring, and RAIM - are 
indispensable to a complete risk management structure.  Figure 6 summarizes the 
three pillars, illustrated with specific examples.  The chart uses the same idea 
presented before, namely, that risk measures can be categorized by normal and 
extreme times and relative versus absolute investment objectives.  The objective of 
our first empirical chapter is to test if asset management firms during crisis period 
really stick to those three principals outlined by Bender and Nielsen (2009). 
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Figure 6 – Three pillars of the risk management 
 
Source: Bender, Jennifer; Nielsen Frank; “Best practices for investment risk management”, 2009 – MSCI Barra Research 
Insights 
 
2.3. Why is risk management important? 
Besides understanding the definitions and concepts, it is quintessential that the 
reader understands the use and importance of risk management within the 
companies. Therefore, in this sub-chapter I will introduce the reader to the 
significance of the subject for the functioning of an Asset Manager.  
 
In practice, the needs of institutional investors and hedge funds can be wide 
ranging, and their ideal measurement, monitoring, and managing capabilities will 
differ.  (Bender, Nielsen 2009) illustrate the case of a hypothetical but typical US 
plan sponsor.  Although there may be additional criteria, the three critical drivers of 
risk management requirements are shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 – Critical drivers of risk management: 
 
Source: Bender, Jennifer; Nielsen Frank; “Best practices for investment risk management”, 2009 – MSCI Barra Research 
Insights 
(1) Return Requirements: The plan’s liabilities or expected payouts will influence 
not only the assets in which it invests but also which benchmarks are used and 
how much it can lose over certain periods.  The latter, in turn, may drive how much 
risk it is willing to take and with how much exposure to certain sources of 
return/risk it is comfortable taking.  
(2) Investment Horizon: The plan’s investment horizon, or willingness to sustain 
shorter-term shocks, will influence which risk measures are appropriate and how 
frequently they need to be monitored.  
(3) Complexity of Investments: Plans that invest in difficult-to-value assets with 
potentially non-normal return distributions or unusually high exposure to tail events 
require additional risk measures, higher monitoring frequencies and advanced 
RAIM capabilities.  
 
The importance of risk management can be wide spread across different aspects 
of the overall business.  However, within asset management the importance of 
managing the risk becomes evident when equity portfolios returns are maximized 
by using different hedging strategies.   
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As an example, Judge (2006) mentions that within the corporate world hedging 
literature over the last decade has grown rapidly, motivated firstly by the 
development of a theoretical framework and secondly by the availability of public 
data.  Much of the early research in this area sourced data on hedging practices by 
surveying corporate risk management practitioners, such as corporate treasurers, 
finance directors and financial managers.  Recent developments in accounting 
standards regulation resulted in an increase in the quantity of risk management 
data and an improvement in the quality of data disclosed in financial statements.  
These developments have acted as a catalyst and facilitated the recent growth in 
empirical studies (e.g. Goto and Xu 2010).  However, within corporate finance the 
existing evidence provides mixed support for the theories of hedging.  The author 
argues that the lack of a general consensus might be due to biases in the samples 
of some studies or that country specific institutional factors play an important role.  
Whichever it is, one thing is certain, existing research has only touched the surface 
and many unresolved issues remain. To support the case for why risk 
management is important one has to support the case of why hedging is important.  
As such, we need to define and measure hedging: hedging can be defined as 
putting in place measures that actively modify your potential losses, should the risk 
event we fear happening take place.  Put simply, hedging is insurance against 
potential loss.  The ability to identify which firms hedge and which do not, and for 
those that hedge, the extent to which they hedge, is vital if reliable tests of hedging 
theories are to be undertaken.  The empirical examination of hedging theories has 
been hindered by the general unavailability of data on hedging activities.  Until 
recently, information on a firm’s exact position in hedging and its methods of 
hedging (for example, use of derivatives) was closely guarded because it was 
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deemed to be of strategic importance to that firm.  It is only in the last few years 
that firms have been encouraged to disclose information on their hedging policies 
and their methods of hedging in their annual reports.  In the absence of this 
information, most of the earlier empirical studies used survey data to examine the 
determinants of corporate hedging (Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) and Dolde 
(1995)).  In these studies, authors surveyed firms, asking respondents whether 
their firm used derivative instruments.  As disclosure of hedging practices in 
financial reports improved, several studies began to search reports for qualitative 
disclosures.  They then defined hedgers as firms whose reports included 
references to terms such as “hedging” or “risk management” or “derivatives” or to 
particular derivative instruments such as “interest rate swaps” or foreign currency 
derivatives” (Francis and Stephan (1993), Wysocki (1996), Mian (1996)).  
 
Parallels can be analyzed when comparing why firms hedge and why portfolio 
managers hedge.  One of the main reasons why risk management is important is a 
consequence of an incorrect assumption by the majority of investors that the 
purpose of risk management is to minimize risk (Litterman, 2003).  In fact, many 
investors even go so far as to worry that too much focus on risk management will 
constrain their portfolio managers and inhibit their ability to generate positive 
returns.  According to Litterman (2003), in an equity portfolio risk is necessary to 
drive return.  The purpose of the risk management function is not to minimize risk, 
but rather to monitor the level and sources of risk in order to make sure that they 
match expectations.  In fact, an investor with strong risk management controls 
ought to feel comfortable targeting and maintaining a higher overall level of risk, 
thus leading to higher, rather than lower, returns over time.  According to Litterman 
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(2003), portfolio managers need to address three main considerations within their 
risk components: 1) country/sector/large, mid, small capitalization/high, low beta 2) 
risk objectives and 3) the long-run rate of return of the portfolio.  These 
components are critical in defining its risk profile.  Nonetheless, risk created the 
capacity for losses, and along the path to long-run returns, there will be painful 
bumps and losses of capital that will cause any investor to question the plan.  One 
critical role that risk management can play in generating long-run returns is to 
provide comfort in such situations that a portfolio remains in adherence to the long-
run plan.  This could mean that an investor does not lose confidence and overreact 
to short-term market fluctuations.  The importance of risk management is 
paramount for the performance of equity portfolios; a useful way of thinking of risk 
in a portfolio (Litterman, 2003) is to view it as a scarce resource.  Just as a family 
must budget its expenditures against income, a portfolio manager must budget the 
risk within the portfolio relative to his/her ability to accommodate losses.  As 
consequence of the characteristics/objectives of the equity portfolio, some 
investors in these portfolios must budget their ability to take losses and volatility 
within the returns and then not overreact to short-term market fluctuations.  If we 
compare portfolios within different asset management companies, but within the 
same family of funds, we see substantial differences in the average risk taken, 
expressed by different levels of tracking errors.  If we now compare the risk within 
equity portfolios to risk within a typical retail investor we can observe that over the 
course of their lives, many investors show a typical pattern of increasing ability to 
take risk as they increase their level of savings, followed by decreasing risk as they 
retire and draw down those savings (Chai et al 2010; Marekwica et al 2010).  
However, after accounting for differences in circumstances, age, country, taxes, 
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and other measurable characteristics, there is a strong component of tolerance for 
risk taking that simply depends on the preference of each individual. 
 
Additionally, according to “Top issues facing asset managers” by Price 
Waterhouse Coopers in April 2012, risk management has been gaining 
significance in the last decade. As corporate culture is an important factor in 
financial failure/error/misunderstandings, when risk management becomes a 
relevant part of a company’s culture, it can help unmask the company’s weak 
spots, no matter the types. Since no corporation has the sufficient resources to 
manage risk perfectly, risk priorities work as a mirror of corporate values 
(Economic Policy Review, 2016). 
 
The volatile markets of this century had a strong impact on asset management 
governance, with risk management programs subject to increased scrutiny by all 
the stakeholders. The most recent financial crises caused deep reflection on the 
effectiveness of risk management in the asset management industry: the economic 
uncertainty, the correlation between the different markets and the convergence of 
many risk factors resulted in the need for a more proactive, transparent and 
adaptive approach to risk management. Besides the new regulatory requirements, 
investors became more risk averse, expecting quality governance, processes and 
controls, as well as a greater transparency about the institutional risk management 
practices. There is a growing pressure for transparency and disclosure of 
information, which led the asset managers’ directors to have a greater insight of 
the compliance programs as well as guarantee the independence of the risk 
management and compliance teams within their firms. Risk management is 
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becoming an increasing concern and requires a continuing effort to identify, assess 
and monitor risk. In accordance with PwC’s study, we will show in Chapters 3 and 
4 that both traditional and alternative asset managers are adapting and refining 
controls and risk management strategies in response to investors and regulatory 
needs. Asset managers are increasingly looking to improve their risk management 
programs in order to extend their analysis to emerging or improbable risks. They 
are also monitoring internal and external risk factors to plan appropriately risk 
mitigation strategies.  PwC adds that asset managers will maintain the focus on 
strengthening the links between risk, regulation and business strategies (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, 20124). 
 
2.4 Utility Theory 
Chapter 4 of this thesis investigates the degree of risk aversion of different 
investors (Pension Funds, Family Offices and Intermediate Financial 
Advisors). Hence, in this section I will introduce the reader to the concept of 
utility theory from which the concept of risk aversion is derived.  
 
2.4.1 The Importance of Utility Theory 
Modern utility theory is considered the “workhorse of modern economics” (Levin, 
2006) because it measures the satisfaction (or utility) that one gains from 
consuming one more unit of a good or service.  The utility concept is important 
because it allows economists to determine how much of an item one will consume 
and this is directly linked to the behaviour of the investors.   
                                                 
4
 http://www.pwc.com/us/assetmanagement 
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Among the Asset Managers, many Portfolio Managers deal with the utility concept 
on a daily basis when evaluating potential investments, either by computing 
expected values with scenario analysis or by weighting the risk budget. For 
professional investors, risk aversion is more than a theoretical concept, it is a 
practical reality that contains much information and insight. This concept was 
visible during the results of the surveys in Chapter 3 and 4 in which we found the 
perception towards risk similar by the investors similar to the Utility concept. The 
original Expected Utility of Von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) has obvious 
limitations and it has been often criticized.  In the last part of this section, we will 
underline some of the critics and alternative approaches in response to the VNM 
model.  However, it is important to underline here that the work of Von Neumann-
Morgenstern still remains the base of modern utility theory. 
 
2.5 Utility Theory vs. Expected Value: The Saint Petersburg Paradox 
Historically, the first concept of utility function goes back to 1783 with Daniel 
Bernoulli.  Bernoulli proposed a utility model to overcome the classic Saint 
Petersburg paradox and the simplicity of the expected value approach 
(Schoemaker, 1982).  The paradox is as follows: In a casino with unlimited 
resources, the decision maker pays a fixed amount of money to enter a game 
where a fair coin is tossed repeatedly until the first tail appears, ending the game. 
The pot starts at 1$ and is doubled every time a head appears.  When the first tail 
appears, the game ends and the decision maker wins whatever is in the pot.  If we 
apply the expected value (EV) calculation:  
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The expected value is infinite and has no upper limits.  According to pure EV 
maximization, the decision maker should be ready to pay any fixed fee to play the 
game, but reality is different and very few people will pay any amount of money to 
participate in the game.  To solve the problem, Bernoulli introduced an expected 
utility formula that takes into account risk preferences of the decision makers to 
correct the limitless expected value.  Bernoulli’s initial utility function is a strictly 
concave ln(x) where x is the expected payoff.  The function gives a finite number 
and assumes decreasing marginal returns.  As such, a rational person will refuse 
to play the lottery after a certain limited fee as the marginal utility of winning the 
game decreases even as the money payoff increases (Schoemaker, 1982). 
 
2.6 Expected Utility Theory 
Expected Utility Theory forms the basis of modern financial theory.  It is critical 
therefore to have a broad view of the topic in its original form and relate this theory 
to the results gathered in both empirical chapters.  The way utility functions 
measure individual preferences in uncertain decisions under wealth constraints is 
cardinal to portfolio optimization problems.  Indeed, Expected Utility had a major 
impact on Markowitz modern portfolio theory (Levy and Markowitz, 1979) and his 
work starts from the approximation of a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 
by a function of mean and variance.  
 
John Von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern formally developed modern utility 
theory in 1944.  In their classic book Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, 
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they develop the expected utility model as a side note to games theory.  The 
approach of the Von Neumann and Morgenstern model is axiomatic.  If an 
individual satisfies 4 axioms of rationality then the outcomes of a game of choices 
can be ranked accordingly to a utility function u(x) based on the individual’s 
preferences under uncertainty. 
The model starts out with a set of possible prizes (monetary or otherwise).  The 
prizes are associated with uncertainty and a set of lotteries/probability distributions.  
To rank the possible outcomes of a lottery P we need a utility function (Levin, 
2006): 
A utility function U: P → R has an expected utility form (a Von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function) if there are numbers (u1, …, un) for each of the N 
outcomes (x1,  ..., xn) that for every .  The VNM utility 
function U is based on mathematical expectations (Norsworthy et al, 2003). 
 
2.6.1 The Von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms 
The VNM model specifies 4 axioms that set limits to an individual's preferences 
over pairs of uncertain lottery outcomes. 
 
1st Axiom: Completeness 
For any choice of probability distributions p1 and p2, either p1 is preferred to p2 
(p1≥p2), p2 is preferred to p1 (p2≥p1), or the individual is indifferent between p1 and 
p2 (p1= p2).  This is considered the basis of rationality assumption. 
 
pÎ P :U(p)= pi *ui
i=1
n
å
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2nd Axiom: Transitivity 
For any choice of probability distributions p1, p2 and p3, if p1 ≥ p2 and p2 ≥ p3, then p1 
≥ p3. 
 
3rd Axiom: Continuity 
A preference relation ≥ in the set of lotteries P is continuous if for any p1, p2 and p3 
 P with p1 ≥ p2 ≥ p3 there exists some α  [0, 1] such that: α *p1, + (1 − α)*p3 ~ 
p2. If the first three axioms are valid and preferences are complete, transitive and 
continuous, then the set of choices for each individual can be represented by a 
utility function U: P → R where p1 ≥ p2 if and only if U(p1) ≥ U(p2). 
 
4th Axiom: Independence 
While the first 3 axioms can be accepted as reasonable, the axiom that really 
defines the VNM original theory and has been the centre of many critics is the 4th 
axiom of independence.  It states that preferences hold independently of the 
probability of a different outcome: 
A preference relation ≥ in the set of lotteries P is independent if for any p1, p2 and 
p3  P and some α  [0, 1], the following relationship is true: p1 ≥ p2  and  
α*p1 + (1 − α)*p3 ≥ α*p2 + (1 − α)*p3.  Therefore, if I prefer p1 to p2 then I will also 
prefer the possibility of p1 to p2 given that the other possibility in both cases is some 
p3.  This axiom is also called the “substitution axiom: The idea that if p3 is 
substituted for part of p1 and p2, this shouldn’t change my ranking” (Levin, 2006). 
 
Î Î
Î Î
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Interestingly, in standard consumer theory, there is no independence axiom. If I 
prefer {2 oranges, 0 apples} to {0 oranges, 2 apples}, this doesn’t mean that I 
prefer {2 oranges, 1 apple} to {1 orange, 2 apples}, even though the last two are 
averages of the first two choices with {2 oranges, 2 apples} (Levin, 2006). 
 
Many authors have documented systematic violations of this axiom, which are 
listed at the conclusion of this chapter.  Von Neumann and Morgenstern responded 
to these critiques with: "Many economists will feel that we are assuming far too 
much ... Have we not shown too much? ... As far as we can see, our postulates 
[are] plausible ... We have practically defined numerical utility as being that thing 
for which the calculus of mathematical expectations is legitimate." (Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern, 1953). 
As a result of the axioms, the VNM theory implies “the existence of numerical 
utilities for outcomes whose expectations for lotteries preserve the preference 
order over lotteries” which means greater expected utility equals to higher 
preference (Schoemaker, 1982). 
The utility function of the outcomes are unique and up to positive linear 
transformations: For any rational decision maker in the model (satisfying the 
axioms) exists a function U of utility assigning to each outcome of a lottery a real 
number U(p) such that for any two lotteries, we can always rank the outcomes 
according to the decision maker’s preferences. Specifically, the linearity of the 
utility function means that:
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The linearity is the most critical and defining property of the VNM model.  In 
investment decisions, for instance, the VNM model values compound lotteries as 
the aggregation of their components.  
 
2.6.2. Implication of the Utility Theory for Investment Decision Making 
Let’s consider lotteries where the outcomes for the decision makers are dollars.  
According to Von Neumann-Morgenstern, a rational decision maker will always try 
to choose the lottery that maximizes its expected utility and the 4 axioms 
guarantee there is a utility function that ranks lotteries by their expected utility 
(Schoemaker, 1982).  As utility functions can be linearly transformed, the scale and 
the measures of utility can be set accordingly to the cases. 
Within finance, an investment can be easily seen as a lottery where the cost of the 
investment is the value of the bet and the possible gains or losses of the 
investment are the outcomes of a lottery with a certain probability distribution.  The 
VNM formula, therefore, becomes very powerful as every investment decision can 
be represented by a utility function up to a linear transformation. 
U(x), the form of the utility function in the VNM model, is twice differentiable and 
normally assumes the following two properties (Gerber and Pafumi, 1998): 
Non-satiation:  u’(x) > 0 
Risk aversion:  u’’(x) < 0 
The non-satiation rule means that “more is better” and that U(x) is an increasing 
function of x: Utility increases with wealth and decision makers are never satiation - 
always preferring more dollars to fewer, even if the value of one dollar more is just 
slightly more desirable (Norstad, 1999).  
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Norstad (1999) explores other properties of utility theory.  Firstly, the non-satiation 
property states that utility increases with wealth, however, the risk aversion 
property states that the utility function is concave.  In other words, the marginal 
utility of wealth decreases as wealth increases.  If you start with one dollar and this 
is increased by one dollar, your increase in utility is greater than if you started with 
one hundred dollars, and this was increased by one dollar.  Because of the risk 
aversion property within utility theory, we find that investors attach greater weight 
to losses than they do to gains of equal magnitude similar to the behaviour 
gathered in the answers to the surveys in Chapter 4. 
The second rule of risk aversion requires more attention and is covered latter on in 
this literature review. If a decision maker is always risk averse, then U(x) will 
always be a concave curve as its second derivative is negative.  If this is the case, 
the marginal utility of wealth decreases as the wealth of an individual rises 
(Norstad, 1999). 
In summary, the literature reviewed outlined that utility of wealth curves or mean 
and standard deviation data can be used to measure investors’ risk aversion, an 
aversion that tends to decrease as wealth increases, consistent with the data 
gathered in the surveys in Chapter 4.  While modern portfolio theory overall 
supports the risk aversion hypothesis, researchers have highlighted that the 
sensitivity of the investors to risk will affect the determination of the optimal 
portfolio.   
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3. Risk Aversion 
Having reviewed the development of utility theory and how it can be used to 
examine and frame investors’ behaviour in the market place, as well as the 
concept that investors have an interest in separating the risks of their portfolio from 
the risks of the general market through different concepts of neutrality, we now turn 
to behaviour of investors with regards to risk aversion.  One of the main objectives 
of the surveys in Chapter 3 and 4 was gathering their perception/attitude towards 
risk aversion.  
Risk aversion is defined as a preference for receiving the actuarial value of a 
gamble with certainty, rather than the gamble itself (Copeland and Weston, 1983).  
The level of risk aversion can be measured in a number of ways.  Arrow and Pratt 
(1965) proposes that an individual’s level of risk aversion is reflected in the 
curvature of an investor’s utility for wealth curve (Miller, 1975), while others claim 
that risk aversion can be determined by the mean and standard deviation provided 
by combinations of assets (Copeland, Weston., 1983).  Whether risk aversion is an 
increasing or decreasing function of wealth is also debated.  Arrow and Pratt’s 
(1965) conclusion that as wealth increases risk aversion also increases (Graves, 
1979) is inconsistent with the decreasing relative risk aversion behaviour 
demonstrated by a typical investor (Graves, 1979). Regardless of the multiple 
available literatures on the subject, in the next chapter of this paper it becomes 
clear that in the European Asset Managers’ risk aversion decreases with wealth. 
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Arrow-Pratt Risk Aversion 
In 1965, Kenneth Arrow and John Pratt proposed another way to measure risk 
aversion (Schoemaker, 1982).  For any utility function u(x) that follows the VNM 
model, the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion function  is based on 
the curvature of the utility function.  It provides a quick measure of the decision 
maker’s absolute risk aversion as a function of his wealth.  In addition, this 
measure is invariant for linear transformations as the VNM model.  If we maintain 
the initial assumption on risk aversion and decreasing returns, then A will always 
be a positive number. 
The risk aversion hypothesis is supported by modern portfolio theory, which shows 
that portfolios with higher returns demonstrate greater volatility (Sharp, 1964).  
Investors are increasingly searching for long only portfolios that are able to provide 
higher returns than a reference benchmark with lower volatility in those returns 
(Baker, Bradley and Wurgler, 2011).  When considering asset allocation, a static 
asset mix is optimal for a constant relative risk averse investor (Merton, 1971), 
while the greater the risk aversion, the greater the sensitivity to changes in asset 
allocation (Jones and Stone, 1969).  Some risk averse investors advocate the risk 
parity (RP) approach when constructing portfolios, which proposes that investors 
should take similar amounts of risk in different asset classes.  However, this 
approach fails to deliver optimal portfolios unless leverage is employed, as 
investors also balance off return and risk (Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen, 2012).  
Finally, an examination of risk aversion at a market level shows that the market 
price of risk approaches zero as the number of investors continues to increase 
(Lintner, 1972), and higher risk premiums are required in a market consisting of 
A(x) = -
¢¢u (x)
¢u (x)
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risk adverse investors, than in one consisting of risk seeking investors (Ang and 
Schwarz, 1985).  
 
Risk aversion measurement based on the utility for wealth curve  
Arrow and Pratt (1965) define measures of risk aversion based on the curvature of 
an investor’s utility for wealth curve (Miller, 1975).  In a gamble, an investor is risk 
adverse if his expected utility of wealth is less than his utility of expected wealth 
(Copland and Weston, 1983).  Alternatively, an investor would be considered risk 
loving if his expected utility of wealth is more than his utility of expected wealth 
(Copland and Weston, 1983).  Specifically, Arrow and Pratt (1965) defined risk 
aversion, risk neutral and risk loving as follows: 
U(e(w))>E(U(W)) risk aversion 
U(E(W))=E(U(W)) risk neutral 
U(E(W))<E(U(W)) risk loving  
where E(W) is the expected wealth, U(W) is the utility of expected wealth, U(E(W) 
is the utility of the expected wealth and E(U(W) is the expected utility of wealth 
(Copland T. and Weston F., 1983). 
 
Arrow and Pratt (1965) developed their definition of risk aversion further by 
deriving an absolute and relative measure of risk aversion for a given level of 
wealth, and these measures are used to provide insight to an investor’s change in 
attitude to changing risk (Copland and Weston, 1983).  These measures are as 
follows: 
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Absolute ARA = -U”(W)/U’(W)    
Relative  RRA = -WU’’(W)/U’(W)  
where U’(W) is the first derivative of marginal utility and U’’(W) is the second 
derivative (change in marginal utility with respect to changes in wealth) (Copland 
and Weston, 1983).  Relative risk aversion (RRA) is defined by Arrow and Pratt as 
the absolute level of risk aversion (ARA) multiplied by the level of wealth (Miller, 
1975). 
 
An investor shows increasing, constant, and decreasing relative risk aversion when 
RRA is greater than 0, RRA is equal to 0, and RRA is less than 0 respectively 
(Miller, 1975).  These measures of risk aversion assume that risk is small, more 
wealth is always positive (i.e. U’(W)>0 ) and U’’(W) is negative for risk averse 
investors.  The greater the RRA, the more the investor is risk averse (Graves, 
1979). 
 
Risk aversion measurement using mean and standard deviation 
combinations 
Other prominent measures of risk aversion assume that investors’ measure of 
expected utility of risky assets can be examined by looking at the mean and 
standard deviation provided by combinations of these assets (Copland and 
Weston, 1983).  Such a measure, advocated by Tobin (1958), proposes that 
indifference utility curves can represent an investor’s preferences between return 
and risk.  Indifference curves show for each level of expected utility of wealth, all 
combinations of risk and return.  The assumption is made that an investor would 
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prefer a greatest return available for a given level of risk (Tobin, 1958).  Tobin’s 
measure of absolute and relative risk aversion are defined as: 
Absolute (-U ∂/ U w) 
Relative :( -U ∂ / W U w) 
where W is mean wealth and ∂ is standard deviation (Miller S, 1975). 
The slope of the indifference curve relating W and ∂ corresponds to the measure 
of absolute risk aversion (Miller, 1975).  In other words, an investor shows 
decreasing absolute risk aversion about expected wealth as wealth increases for 
each level of risk, if the slope of the indifference loci decreases (Miller, 1975). 
 
Risk averse investors have positive indifference slopes, as in they will only accept 
more risk if they earn more return, while risk lovers have negative slopes as they 
will accept lower expected return in order to have a chance to earn higher capital 
gains at each level of risk (Tobin, 1958).  
 
Risk aversion is an increasing or decreasing function of wealth 
According to Arrow and Pratt (1965), as wealth increases risk aversion also 
increases, and an incremental proportion of wealth is put into safe assets (Graves, 
1979).  In addition, if the size of the bet and the wealth of an investor were to 
increase by the same amount, an investor would be less willing to engage in the 
bet. In order for an investor’s preference towards the bet to remain the same, it 
would be necessary for the probability of wining the bet to increase (Graves, 1979).  
Furthermore, Pyle and Turnovsky (1971) claim that if a risk averse investor tries to 
minimise the probability of falling below a particular level of wealth, in other words 
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employing the safety-first principle, he will also show increasing relative risk 
aversion behaviour (Graves, 1979). 
 
However, not all researchers agree that increasing wealth leads to risk aversion 
behaviour.  The strict safety-first principle claims that as wealth increases, an 
investor will show decreasing relative risk aversion (Graves, 1979).  This principle 
proposes that an investor is expected to try to maximise his expected wealth, 
subject to a constraint on the probability of not falling below a particular level of 
wealth (Graves, 1979).  This type of investor demonstrates decreasing relative risk 
aversion, challenging both Arrow and Pratt’s and Pyle and Turnovsky’s research 
(Graves, 1979).  
 
Further questions over the assumptions made in Arrow and Pratt’s model were 
raised by researchers such as Agnew (1969) and Graves, (1979).  Agnew 
demonstrated that a portfolio selected on the basis of the strict safety-first principle 
reflects the fact that greater variance is not always undesirable, if the expected 
return is allowed to vary (Graves, 1979).  Baumol’s (1963) research supported 
Agnew’s study by outlining that an investor is not just focused on the standard 
deviation of the investment options, but also on the expected return.  For example, 
an investor would prefer to lose $10 on a bet that has an expected return of $100, 
than lose $8 on a bet that could deliver a $50 expected return (Baumol, 1963).  
According to Graves (1979), the most plausible behaviour by an investor is that if 
the bet and wealth level doubled it is likely he will engage in the bet, as the 
probability of going below the disaster level will be lower.  In other words, the strict 
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safety-first principle where an investor shows decreasing relative risk aversion is 
the more likely behaviour (Graves, 1979).  
Pyle and Turnovsky (1971) also examined the impact of changes in the amount of 
available investable wealth on an investor’s behaviour under three different 
specifications of the safety-first criterion.  They established that if the investor 
defines a minimum required rate of return, the relative riskiness of her portfolio will 
not change due to changes in investable wealth (Pyle and Turnovsky, 1971).  
However, if the investor specifies a minimum required level of revenue, and 
behaves according to the maximising total revenue version of the safety-first 
principle, the relative riskiness of her portfolio will decrease with increases in 
investable wealth (Pyle and Turnovsky, 1971). 
 
In re-examining Arrow and Pratt’s model, Graves (1979) claimed that an investor’s 
reaction to an increase in wealth is not independent of the amount of wealth owned 
by others.  On this basis, Graves suggested that it is appropriate to use cross-
sectional data in which higher levels of wealth imply a high level of relative wealth 
(Graves, 1979).  The hypothesis of decreasing relative risk aversion is strongly 
supported when this data is used (Graves, 1979).  
 
In Chapter 4 it is visible that for Active European Equity Asset Managers as the 
assets under management/wealth increase, the portfolio managers will be less risk 
averse: family offices are in general more risk aware than pension funds. For 
instance, 71% of the pension funds surveyed were comfortable with potential 
drawdowns between 5% and 20% while only 35% of the family offices were willing 
to accept drawdowns greater than 15%. 
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Rubinstein’s measure of risk aversion is similar to Arrow and Pratt’s 
The most straightforward implications of increasing or decreasing absolute or 
relative risk aversion occur in the context of a portfolio with one risky and one risk-
free asset, which is the portfolio model on which Arrow and Pratt’s (1965) 
measures of absolute and relative risk aversion are based (Li and Ziemba, 1987).  
However, in light of some of the ambiguous results derived from Arrow and Pratt’s 
model concerning attitudes toward risk, Li and Ziemba (1987) derived Rubinstein’s 
measure of absolute and relative risk aversion.  These researchers used 
approximations of risk premiums with correlated risks and showed that their 
measure was similar to the Arrow and Pratt measure of risk aversion.  
 
The Rubinstein’s measures are: 
Absolute R(X)=  -E(U’’(X))/E(U’’(X)) 
Relative R*(W, X)=   -W E(U’’(X))/E(U’(X)) 
 
Assuming that the returns from the two investments have a bivariate normal 
distribution, and the allocation between the two risk investments is proportional, an 
investor’s risk preference can be determined.  According to Li and Ziemba (1987), 
the investor with the highest measure of Rubinstein’s risk aversion will chose the 
portfolio with the least risk, similar to how an investor would invest a portfolio 
consisting of a risk-free and a risky investment.  In addition, the weight of the 
higher return investment in the portfolio is an increasing, constant, or decreasing 
function of initial wealth, in line with the investor’s decreasing, constant, or 
increasing Rubinstein’s measure of risk aversion.  These results are similar to the 
conclusion about risk aversion derived from the Arrow and Pratt model. 
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Furthermore, according to Kallberg and Ziemba (1983) when the time period is 
small (e.g. daily, monthly, or quarterly returns), Arrow’s and Pratt’s measure of 
relative risk aversion can be used to approximate Rubinstein’s relative risk 
aversion measure (Li and Ziemba, 1987).  Therefore optimal portfolios weights and 
utility curves with the same increasing, constant, or decreasing properties of risk 
aversion can be derived (Li and Ziemba, 1987).  Li and Ziemba’s (1987) research 
went further to show that Rubinstein’s measure of risk aversion can be presented 
as multivariate.  For example, a number of factors can influence the real value of 
an investor’s wealth.  
 
Risk aversion hypothesis supported by volatility of high return portfolios 
Sharpe (1964) tested the validity of the statement that the prices of capital assets 
will adjust so that:   
E1 = P +b∂  
for all efficient portfolios where E1 is the expected value of the distribution, P is the 
riskless interest rate, and b is the risk premium, which is greater than zero.  Sharpe 
used the ex-post values of the means and standard deviations of return as proxies 
for investors’ expectations (Sharpe, 1964).  His model incorporated the annual 
returns of 34 mutual funds over the period from 1954 to 1963, assigning the 
average rate of return for each fund over a ten year period as an expected rate of 
return (E1) while using the standard deviations of the actual returns over the same 
period as estimates for the risk.  The results were in line with the risk aversion 
hypothesis, showing that high return portfolios exhibited greater volatility.  Although 
the relationship between the average return and standard deviation was not 
perfectly linear, it did show generally linearity (Sharpe, 1964).  Overall, the 
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portfolios’ returns showed a high level of correlation with the overall market in line 
with the risk aversion hypothesis.  
 
 
A static asset mix is optimal for a constant relative risk aversion investor  
Merton (1971) studies established that there were certain conditions which 
ensured that a constant asset mix in a portfolio across multi-time periods was 
optimal (Jones and Stone, 1969).  A central proposition is that rebalancing is 
required continuously, otherwise drift will lower the investor’s utility (Merton, 1971).  
Merton measures drift by the difference between the level of risk that would 
rebalance a portfolio back to its optimal asset mix, and to the investors’ actual level 
of risk (Jones and Stone, 1969).  With continual rebalancing, an investor with 
constant relative risk aversion will have an optimal portfolio if the constant weights 
between the risk-free and risky assets are maintained (Jones and Stone, 1969). 
 
Risk aversion causes sensitivity to portfolio’s asset allocation changes 
Jones and Stone (1969) claimed that the greater the amount invested in risk-free 
assets, (i.e. the more risk adverse the investor is), the greater the sensitivity of the 
investor to a change in asset allocation within a portfolio.  The same conclusion 
was reached by Hawawini (1986) who proposed that an investor’s sensitivity to 
asset mix can be determined by the curvature of his utility curve.  Hawawini 
defines an investor’s absolute level of risk aversion by the rate of change of the 
curvature of his utility curve in response to a change in the riskiness of his portfolio.  
As a result, it follows that the frequently rebalancing of a portfolio is necessary if 
the investor is risk averse (Jones and Stone, 1969). 
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Leverage changes the relationship between risk/return in CAPM 
According to research undertaken by Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen (2012), the 
introduction of leverage changes the predictions of modern portfolio theory.  The 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) proposes that investors should hold the market 
portfolio levered in line with the investor‘s risk preference.  However, Risk Parity 
(RP) investing has become a well-known alternative approach to asset allocation 
(Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen, 2012).  RP advocators propose that one should 
take a similar amount of risk in different asset classes (Asness, Frazzini and 
Pedersen, 2012).  The RP approach uses an asset allocation heuristic where the 
justification is not theoretical but intuitive.  Given the different risk profiles of 
different asset classes, an investor is required to invest more investable wealth in 
low risk assets than high-risk assets in order to diversify risk.  The attractiveness of 
the RP theory centres on the appeal of risk diversification as the objective of the 
asset allocation decisions, thus RP does not depend on expected returns which 
investors have less confidence in predicting (Schachter and Thiagarajan, 2011). 
 
Despite this intuitive appeal, diversifying risk as an investment approach is not 
sufficient due to the fact that if the expected return from investing in a risky asset 
class is high enough, an investor would (intuitively) be content to place all his 
assets in that market (Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen, 2012).  In other words, 
equalising risk across asset classes is not necessarily the optimal approach to 
portfolio construction, unless the expected return from these asset classes are also 
equal. 
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Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen (2012), demonstrate that leverage aversion might 
be the link which could result in RP portfolios being optimal.  Their proposition is 
that some investors, such as pension funds, are not in a position to use leverage 
(Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen, 2012).  In order to meet their return targets, 
therefore, they hold riskier asserts instead of using leverage to increase the return 
of the lower risk assets and that is in line with the results gathered in Chapter 3 
survey results.  As demand for riskier assets pushes up valuations the expected 
return is reduced.  The lower risk underweighted assets trade at lower valuation 
and hence their expected return is higher (Asness, Frazzini & Pedersen, 2012).  
Those investors who are able to use leverage should do so in low risk return 
assets to achieve a higher return (Black, 1972).  The research undertaken by Black 
and colleagues demonstrated that a RP portfolio over 1926-2010 achieved a 
Sharpe ratio which was 0.27 higher than that of the market portfolio, implying that 
an investor in the RP portfolio earned 2.7 per cent more per annum than a market 
portfolio investor (Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen, 2012).  The research done by 
Asness and colleagues (2010) and Black (1972) is robust across many asset 
classes.  Hence, leaving aside investors with high leverage costs or aversion to 
leverage, investors can benefit from using leverage (Asness and colleagues, 
2010). 
 
Relationship between the market price of risk and the market risk aversion 
Given the assumptions of stable expectations and variances of rates of return, 
John Lintner (1972) established that the market price of risk varies inversely with 
the market size as measured by the number of investors and their total investable 
wealth.  Lintner (1972) established this proposition in a number of ways.  Firstly, by 
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showing that market risk aversion is equal to the market price of risk.  He defined 
the market’s risk aversion as being equal to the mean of the individual risk 
aversion parameters, divided by the number of investors in the market.  Secondly, 
Lintner (1972) claimed that the market price of risk and risk aversion is the sum of 
the risks of all the shares in the market.  The individual’s risk aversion, on the other 
hand, is the sum of the risks of the shares that the individual holds (Lintner, 1972).  
Thirdly, Lintner (1972) showed that the sum of all the risks of all investors is less 
than the sum of all risks being ‘’priced out’’ by the market price of risk.  The latter 
risk is equal to the total of all the variances and covariances between all shares of 
different stocks and all the different shares of the same stock.  However, no 
investors are holding the risks involved when different shares of the same security 
are held by different investors (Lintner, 1972).  As the market size increases this 
has an eliminating effect, which explains why the market price of risk falls, even 
when the average risk aversion of the investors is constant (Lintner, 1972).  Lintner 
concludes that the market price of risk approaches zero as the number of investors 
continues to increase. 
 
Investor’s risk aversion behaviour causes price variability in markets 
Ang and Schwarz (1985) examined whether the risk aversion behaviour of 
investors causes price variability in markets.  In a study based in two experimental 
markets with two sets of traders, it was established that risk averse investors 
required higher risk premiums and were slow to make changes to their portfolio 
(Ang and Schwarz, 1985).  In contrast, in a market place consisting of risk 
preferred investors, there was greater price variability and prices tended to 
converge to the prior equilibrium price quickly (Ang and Schwarz, 1985). 
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3.1 Certainty Equivalent and Risk Aversion 
An important implication of expected utility is the Certainty Equivalent (CE), or the 
guaranteed amount that someone would accept, rather than taking a chance on a 
higher but uncertain alternative amount (Norstad, 1999).  An equivalent term for 
CE is selling price.  There is a specific certainty equivalent for any specific 
expected utility.  In formula, the CE c(X,u) is the amount of money for which:
 
 
The difference between the EV and CE of the investment is called the Risk 
Premium (RP), and in the case of a risk-averse individual, the CE will always then 
be less than the EV of a lottery (Norstad, 1999).  According to Bodily (1981), many 
risky opportunities are evaluated solely by the average of the possible financial 
outcomes or Expected Monetary Value (EMV).  For example, a risk-averse 
individual will prefer to sell a $500 lottery ticket with a 50% chance of winning 
$1000 for less than its $500 sale price.  Besides EMV and probability, Bodily 
identifies a third factor in evaluating risk as our willingness to face risk, or the Risk 
Premium (RP).  The risk premium is the amount of money an individual is willing to 
give up to avoid the risk of loss.  Individuals who have positive risk premiums are 
risk-averse individuals.  Risk-averse utility functions display a concave shape. 
CE is particularly important in that it gives a broad measure of how risk-averse 
investors and decision makers behave.  Given two decision makers with different 
utility functions u(x) and v(x), if c(X,u) ≤ c(X,v) for every X, then the decision maker 
with utility u will be more risk averse than the decision maker with utility v (Levin, 
2006). 
 
 
U c   E U X  
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In the case where an investor has an exponential utility function:  
with a>0 and  (note: u’(x)>0 and u’’(x)<0), then
 . 
 
3.2 Application of Expected Utility Theory in a Portfolio Problem 
Up to now, we have considered only two options: invest (participate in the lottery) 
or do not invest.  Applying the Expected Utility Theory to a portfolio problem, the 
decision maker can invest a certain amount of dollars in a risk-free investment with 
a return r or in a risky investment with a random return z with a probability 
distribution F.  We maintain the assumptions that the utility function of the decision 
maker is double differentiable, concave and with decreasing marginal returns.  The 
decision maker invests a certain amount of wealth a in the risky assets and the 
remaining amount of wealth (w-a) in the risk-free assets.  For the non-satiation 
assumption, the risk-free investment return r is always preferable to nothing. 
Ultimately, the investor’s wealth will equal . 
According to the utility theory, the decision maker will allocate his resources 
according to the optimisation equation:   
The first order condition of the maximisation problem is: 
 
If the investor is risk neutral, it is easy to calculate the asset allocation because 
u(x) = α*x where α is a constant.  Therefore, the marginal return of the allocation 
problem is which means that the risk-averse individual put 
all his wealth in the asset class with the highest expected returns.  
 
U(x)=1-e-ax
-¥< x< +¥
 
C Ea*l n1 u x  
a*z+ (w-a)*r
max u(a*z+ (w-a)* r)dF(z)ò
¢u (a*(z- r)+wr)*(z- r)dF(z)= 0ò
a *w*r +a *a*(E(z)- r)
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If the investor, however, is risk averse ( ), the implications are different.  As 
the optimisation curve is concave, then the first-order condition is the solution of 
the investment, and if the risky asset has a rate of return greater than that of the 
risk-free asset z > r, the investor will still invest a part of his wealth in the risky 
asset (Levin, 2006).  To demonstrate this, if a=0, then , 
which doesn’t maximise the solution of the portfolio.  As a result, the optimal 
investment in the risky asset is some amount where a>0.  The investor will not 
invest all his wealth in risk-free assets because his utility will remain the same no 
matter the outcome of the lottery.  In insurance, for instance, if insurance prices are 
close to their actuarial fair value, then the risk-averse decision maker will never 
insure 100% since being fully insured is like completely investing in risk-free 
assets.  Similarly, in any portfolio problem, even the most conservative (risk-
averse) investor will invest some of his wealth in risky assets as a portfolio of only 
risk-free assets does not optimise utility.  
 
3.3 Limitations of the Expected Utility Theory 
The strong assumptions of the VNM model have been tested in the last half-
century with empirical studies and theoretical critiques.  While the model is still 
regarded as a valuable normative description of how people behave under 
uncertainty in terms of descriptive power, it has several limitations (Machina, 
1982).  
 
Most criticisms of the VNM model focus on its independence axiom.  One of the 
best-known critiques is by Tversky and Kahneman (1979) in the formalisation of 
¢¢u < 0
¢u (wr) (z- r)dF(z)> 0ò
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their prospect theory.  Starting from an experiment of Maurice Allias in 1953, they 
use a series of counter examples against the VNM utility theory. 
 
3.3.1. The Certainty Effect 
The certainty effect is the psychological effect resulting from the reduction of 
probability from certainty to probable.   
 
The assumption of independence means that if Lottery B is preferred to Lottery A, 
then any probability mixture of B (B, p) must be preferred to A (A,p).  The reduction 
of probability from certain to uncertain has a greater effect than from more 
probable to less probable.  People overweight certain outcomes to probable ones. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) call this violation the certainty effect.  Similar 
results have been found with non-monetary outcomes such as weeklong trips to 
England. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) experiential results mean that people 
tend to overvalue a sure thing in the context of investments – certain profit.  This 
experiment and similar others do not respect the linearity in the probability 
constraint of the VNM (Machina, 1982).  Similar outcomes were visible on the 
surveys we elaborated in which investors would prefer a certain outcome on the 
underperformance of the portfolio understanding that would have a cost on the 
potential outperformance of the portfolio. 
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3.3.2. The Reflection Effect 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) studied a second violation of the independence 
axiom called the reflection effect. Decision makers are risk averse in the face of 
gains and risk seeking in the face of loss.  Together with the reflection effect, the 
certainty effect still holds valid for gains, but in the opposite way for losses: 
Individuals prefer a larger potential loss that is uncertain to a smaller loss that is 
certain. 
 
3.3.3. The Framing Effect 
Outside the validity of the independence axiom, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
found another problematic aspect in the way lotteries are framed.  Framing can 
change people’s behaviours from risk averse (if lotteries are presented as gains) to 
risk taking (when lotteries are presented as losses).  Schoemaker called this the 
context effect and explains several other similar psychological biases of the VNM 
model (1982). 
 
3.4 Variations on the Classical Utility Model 
Although it has limitations, “expected utility analysis remains quite robust to failure 
of the independence axiom” (Machina, 1982).  The basic concepts and tools of the 
utility model remain mainly valid if we make some variations to the VNM axioms 
according to Machina (1982).  Many authors have been trying to explain their own 
version of the utility model in order to increase its descriptive efficacy (Machina, 
1982). 
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3.4.1 Friedman and Savage Critique 
One of the first variations to VNM came 
from Friedman and Savage (1948).  Starting 
from the empirical fact that people buy both 
insurance and lotteries, Friedman and 
Savage proposed a utility function shaped 
without the assumptions of VNM, which 
holds constant the utility function among 
levels of wealth.  Friedman and Savage’s function changes according to different 
levels of wealth and is concave where w < A, convex from A to B, and concave 
again where B > w.  This means that in the interval between A and B, a bet is 
preferred to its CE. Even in the case of slightly unfair lotteries, individuals will play 
the lottery rather than do nothing (Friedman and Savage, 1948).  The authors go 
as far as to interpret the different concavity and convexity of the function among 
different socioeconomic levels and classes (Friedman and Savage, 1948).  
According to Markowitz (1952), another implication of their utility curve is 
that”individuals with such a curve will prefer “positively skewed distribution (with 
large right tails) more than negatively skewed ones (with large left tails)” (Machina, 
1982).  In the results of the Surveys in Chapter 2 and 3 we were confronted with 
similar behaviour from the investors, i.e. the need to limit the downside (the 
portfolio drawdown) but interested capturing the potential upside, understanding 
that potential upside could be limited by the cost of the constant hedging of part of 
the portfolio. 
 
Figure 8 - Friedman and Savage’s 
                 Utility Function 
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3.4.2. Markowitz’s Critique 
One problem with Savage and Friedman’s (1948) 
hypothesis is that their utility function remains 
defined over ultimate wealth levels. Stability of 
preferences remains as in the VNM model.  
“Fixed utility functions are fixed to ultimate levels 
of wealth” (Machina, 1982).  However, this 
characteristic empirically contradicts the fact that 
people of every possible wealth actually buy both a lottery ticket and an insurance 
policy, sometimes at the same time.  In his article “The Utility of Wealth” (1952), 
Markowitz sustains that changes in wealth cause the utility function to shift 
horizontally. Starting from similar examples to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
Markowitz expresses a utility function that does not respect the independence 
axiom of the VNM theory.  Markowitz’s hypothesis is that utility theory has 3 
inflections points with alternating convexity and concavity.  The second inflection 
point corresponds to “customary wealth” (Markowitz 1952).  The utility function 
does not change according to the level of wealth, but according to deviations from 
present wealth.  The curve is monotonically increasing, but bounded. Individuals 
will buy both an insurance policy and a lottery ticket, and the behaviour of the 
investor will be the same whether he is rich or poor.  What changes is the meaning 
of small or large gains or losses for each decision maker and, accordingly, the 
position of the inflection points. 
 
Markowitz explains that decision makers will tend to act more conservatively when 
they are moderately losing and more aggressively when they are moderately 
Figure 9 - Markowitz’s 
                 Utility Function 
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winning (during our surveys we were able to confirm this behaviour from both the 
portfolio managers as well as the investors).  If one game concludes and the 
individual decides to play again, both his customary wealth and utility function shift.  
If the individual has recently lost a lot, he will continue to play as a risk seeker 
(from the lower part of the utility curve).  If the individual has won a lot, however, he 
will continue to play conservatively (from the upper part of the utility curve).  
According to Markowitz, the decision maker’s preferences cannot be defined 
independently from his current consumption point.  
 
 
3.4.3 Prospect Theory  
In their seminal paper "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk", 
Kahneman and Tversky (1981) studied the inconsistencies of expected utility 
theory and developed the most important critique of the VNM model.  Prospect 
theory is particularly useful in the case of investor behaviour and asset allocation 
and was visible in the results obtained in the surveys of Chapter 2 and 3. 
 
According to prospect theory, “people perceive outcomes as gains and losses 
rather than final stage of wealth fare.”  Similar to Markowitz’s studies, prospect 
theory is centred on the evaluation of gains and losses rather than the absolute 
level of wealth.  The decision process, however, involves two stages: editing and 
evaluation.  In the editing phase, the individual takes into account the framing 
effect, and in the evaluation phase, the individual formulates a decision (value) 
based on the potential outcomes and their respective probabilities, and then 
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chooses the alternative, which has a higher utility.  Kahneman and Tversky 
formulation of the value function comes from the modification of the VNM utility 
function as: 
 
where x1, x2, xn are the potential gains and losses from a certain reference point of 
the decision maker and p1, p2, pn their respective probabilities. 
 
Gains and losses are the variables of the value function and they are related to a 
certain reference point, which can be to the status quo, but can also deviate in 
response to framing factors in the editing phase.  
 
Another aspect of the theory is w, the decision weight.  The weights are not 
probabilities but they moderate probabilities according to the decision makers’ 
expectations.  However, they do not follow any utility maximization rule and the 
weighting establishes a nonlinear effect independent from the underlying 
probability.  Weights highlight how the individuals interpret personally the possible 
outcomes of the prospect and they can be affected by factors such as ambiguity, in 
a sort of “psychological weighting”. 
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As a result of the subjective 
expectations of the decision makers, 
the weighting function tends to 
overweight small probability while 
underweight medium and high 
probability. This is in line empirically 
with the certainty effect that was 
previously discussed. 
The value function of Kahneman and 
Tversky’s prospect theory is therefore s-shaped, asymmetrical, and centered 
according to a reference point.  The curve is concave for gains and convex for 
losses and the function is steepest near the reference point.  
 
Their theory is obviously very different from the VNM theory as losses are valued 
differently from gains and the decision makers do not make decisions according to 
absolute wealth but to gains and losses.  In addition, the theory leaves the 
possibility to account for psychological effects including for instance ambiguity in 
the formulation of weights or the editing phase. 
 
Prospect theory and portfolio problems 
The three main implications of prospect theory are loss aversion (the function is 
asymmetric in the valuation of losses or gains), diminishing sensitivity (the 
marginal value of gains and losses decreases with increasing size) and reference 
Figure 10 - Kahneman and Tversky’s  
                   Value Function 
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dependence (gains and losses are depended according to a reference point).  All 
behaviours that were gathered in the surveys collected in Chapter 2 and 3. 
 
Each of these effects has particularly important implications in behavioural finance. 
Whether investors value gains and losses symmetrically (VNM model) or 
asymmetrically (Kahneman and Tversky, 1981) changes the way assets should be 
priced.  Similarly, while VNM predicts that the valuation of large gains or losses of 
an investment should be proportional to the mathematical expectations, in the case 
of Kahneman and Tversky, investors’ valuation of large gains and losses can 
decline as the prospective gain or losses increases (Norsworthy et Al., 2003). 
 
Norsworthy et Al. (2003) test these effects across the stock returns of 100 
companies with significant results.  Firstly, through a partitioning of CAPM model, 
he demonstrates that investors’ expectations are heavily influenced by frames of 
reference (Norsworthy et Al., 2003).  For Norsworthy et Al. (2003) the CAPM 
model with single values of beta and alpha is unstable and less descriptive than a 
model which includes reference points of investors which influence the perception 
of current market conditions.  Furthermore, across their experiment, symmetrical 
valuation of gains and losses was rejected and non-proportional marginal 
sensitivity accepted (although they do not demonstrate decreasing sensitivity).  
Norsworthy et Al. (2003) test the characteristics of Prospect Theory across three 
different time periods: although some periods show stronger results than others do, 
in all of them the investor behaviours hold the same effects.  These experiments 
concisely demonstrated that market behaviours of investors are strongly influenced 
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by reference frames according to the behavioural assumptions of the prospect 
theory.  Of course, the concept of subjective reference is an obvious contradiction 
of the efficient market hypothesis where current investor behaviour should solely 
relate to the currently available information on the state of the markets.  
 
More recently, Norsworthy et al (2003) point to Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
Prospect Theory as an even better description of reality.  Put simply, it states that a 
person’s decision in a risky situation is dependent on their current frame of 
reference.  This would partially explain Ricciardi’s (2008) findings mentioned in 
chapter 2 of this research, that: 
 Gender: men tend to be more risk seeking than women; 
 Marital status: Single individuals tend to make riskier decisions than married 
persons; 
 Age: Younger persons are inclined to be more risk seeking than older 
individuals; 
 Level of education: A person with higher levels of education display a greater 
risk propensity or tendency to take risks; 
 Financial Knowledge (Experience/Expertise): Individuals who believe they 
have more knowledge of risk and risky situations tend to undertake greater 
financial risks.  
 
The marital status and age differences are of particular relevance, as a person is 
more likely to take the riskier decision if they have more time to fix it if it goes 
wrong, or they have less to lose if it goes wrong.  However, there is a slight conflict 
as Bodily (1981) states that we tend to become more tolerant to risk as we become 
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wealthier.  Increasing wealth is usually partially a factor of age, so we must read 
Ricciardi’s (2008) findings as younger people are likely to take more risk if they 
have the same wealth as the older people.  Norsworthy et al (2003) state the most 
important element of Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory is the 
dependence of expected returns on the current frame of reference.  Similarly, we 
found similar results in our initial surveys in Chapter 2 and 3 that support the above 
conclusions. 
 
Probability vs. Uncertainty 
One of the important implications for Utility Theory is in options pricing which is 
vastly used by the hedge funds that were interviewed in Chapter 2 and the family 
office clients that invest in hedge funds.  Miao and Wang (2004) state that “Many 
economic decisions can be described as an option exercise or optimal stopping 
problem under uncertainty...many economic decisions can be described as binary 
choices”.  Miao and Wang (2004) use a Knightian (1921) definition and distinguish 
risk from uncertainty.  In this case, ambiguity may accelerate or delay option 
exercise. 
 
When positing that most economic decisions are binary choices, Miao and Wang 
(2004) extend their explanation: 
 
 “First, the decision is irreversible to some extent.  Second, there is uncertainty 
about future rewards.  Third, agents have some flexibility in choosing the timing of 
the decisions.  These three characteristics imply that waiting has positive value.  
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Importantly, all the preceding problems can be viewed as a problem where agents 
decide when to exercise an “option” analogous to a financial call option”. 
 
Miao and Wang (2004) make a clear distinction between risk as a probability 
problem, and risk as an uncertainty problem.  This distinction is more important in 
the researcher’s opinion.  The Ellsberg Paradox suggests that people prefer to act 
on known rather than unknown, or ambiguous probabilities. 
 
 
4. Portfolio Insurance Strategies 
In Chapter 4, I will investigate the degree of risk aversion for different investors. 
Therefore, in this section I will introduce the reader to different portfolio insurance 
strategies that help investors protect their portfolios. Investors have different levels 
of utility, exhibit different levels of risk tolerance, and have an interest in isolating 
the different types of risks that their portfolios encounter.  Therefore, investment 
strategies that could provide protection against losses, while preserving some 
upward potential, would likely be attractive for a wide range of investors.  We now 
take a look at a specific set of strategies through which investors seek to manage 
the trade-offs between risks and maximising their level of utility.  That is through 
the explicit use of portfolio insurance techniques to mitigate the risks on their 
overall portfolios.   
 
4.1 Tail Risk Management 
Advancements in portfolio management have made it possible for investors to be 
more flexible in the approach they take towards maximizing their utility by 
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balancing their risk/reward calculations and their risk aversion across a wide array 
of asset classes (Weng and Sullivan 2012).  As previously discussed, investors 
have different levels of risk aversion and utility, and that the risk premiums on 
assets cycle over time within a given market as investors’ appetites change (Xiong 
and Idzorek, 2010).  Traditional portfolio theory has looked at managing risk 
aversion by considering standard (normal) distributions of potential portfolio risk, 
generating much interest in what the exact nature of the curve looks like (fat tail, 
standard, shifted etc.).  However, in light of recent events such as the 2008 
financial crisis, and the 2011 European debt crisis, there has been an increase of 
interest in the potential for high-risk events at the tail of the distribution (Vrecko and 
Branger, 2009).  The detrimental effects of these high-risk events, has created 
interest from investors for ways of hedging their portfolios against them.  This type 
of hedging is called tail-risk management.  
 
Tail risk, is by its own nature an elusive quantity, and therefore presents 
economists with the difficult task of explaining market behaviour with relatively few 
(and rarely observed) actual situations.  However, the mere potential for infrequent 
events of extreme magnitude can have important effects on asset prices.  Previous 
reviews of these phenomena such as peso problems (Krasker (1980)) or the rare 
disaster hypothesis (Rietz (1987), Barro (2006)) have developed to try and make 
sense of impact of this risk on asset prices. 
 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2011) challenged popular understandings of tail risks, 
pointing out that the frequency of high impact events in the financial markets has 
far exceeded mathematical expectations build on standard models.  Interest in tail-
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risk management has increased following the financial crises of 2007-2008 and the 
subsequent European debt crisis, and financial institutions have responded to the 
demand, offering new tail-risk management solutions for investors (Vrecko and 
Branger 2009).  Examining the returns of over 6000 hedge funds following the 
financial crises of 1998 and 2007-2008, Jiang and Kelly (2012) found that tail-risks 
play a significant role in driving hedge fund returns.  Given the apparent propensity 
of tail-risk events, it has become clear that investors need to think more carefully 
about managing the full distribution of potential risks to their portfolio.  The 
following section takes a look at some of the basic ways in which investors attempt 
to limit the downside of their portfolios while preserving the upside, which is in line 
with the concerns expressed by the investors that answered our surveys.  
 
Why Investors Buy Portfolio Insurance 
Leyland (1980) concluded that investors who purchase portfolios should fall into 
two categories: either they are investors with average risk tolerance but have 
expectations that are above average or they are investors with average 
expectations but whose risk tolerance increases with wealth faster than the 
average.  As we have discussed with regards to Tvsersky’s (1979, 1991) Prospect 
Theory, risk (tolerance) aversion is a key driver of investor behaviour.  Following 
on from Tvserky’s work, Benninga and Blume (1985) demonstrated that the 
optimality of a portfolio insurance strategy depends on an investor’s utility function.  
Therefore, we can build on the previous examination of the behavioural finance 
concepts of Utility Theory, Risk Aversion and Neutrality in this paper to determine 
how portfolio insurance strategies can satisfy investor preferences for returns.  
Furthermore, the perceived increase in extreme, but unlikely events, has given rise 
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to renewed interest the tail-risk management strategies offered through portfolio 
insurance techniques. 
 
 
Portfolio Insurance 
The term portfolio insurance is a generic way of describing a set of investment 
strategies that attempt to limit downside risk to the value of an investor’s portfolio 
while retaining the portfolio’s exposure to higher returns (Pain, 2008).  
Alternatively, Grossman and Villa (1989) and Basak (2002) define a portfolio 
insurance trading strategy as a strategy which guarantees a minimum level of 
wealth at a specified time horizon, but also participates in the potential gains of a 
reference portfolio.  Ideally, these strategies allow investors to tailor their 
investment portfolios more closely to their risk preferences by allowing the 
separation of different types of underlying risk within the portfolio.  The concept of 
portfolio insurance (and the academic literature examining it) is not new, and in fact 
UK based firms offered actual insurance contracts on investment portfolios as early 
as the 1950’s.  The modern conceptualizations of portfolio insurance however, are 
generally viewed as having developed shortly after the emergence of the Black-
Scholes-Merton option pricing theory in the early 1970s.   
 
Despite this extended timeframe, portfolio insurance strategies have experienced 
resurgence over the past few years in terms of both investor and academic interest 
(Vrecko and Branger 2009).  The enhanced interest in portfolio insurance has 
generally been attributed to lower structuring and trading costs, a broadening in, 
and growth of, asset classes on which investors find the idea of principal protection 
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attractive, and as a reaction to dramatic swings in the market such as following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers and the ensuing financial crisis (Pain 2008). 
 
 
4.2 Types of Portfolio Insurance Strategies  
Though portfolio insurance strategies vary widely, they generally fit into two broad 
categories, option based portfolio insurance (OBPI) and the constant proportion 
portfolio insurance (CPPI) (Bertrand and Pringent 2005).  It should be mentioned 
that these are not the only types of portfolio insurance, there are also simplistic 
strategies such as stop-loss or even “buy and hold” approaches, but we will not 
focus on those for the purposes of this paper, given their relative simplicity and 
lack of relevance for the professional money management industry.  Building on 
the earlier work of Black and Scholes (1973), OBPI was popularized by Leland and 
Rubinstein (1976), who introduced the concept of securing a floor for a portfolio by 
combining a put option and a risky asset.  While Black and Scholes proposed a 
method to create risk-free returns by hedging in a dynamic way an option with a 
stock, Leland and Rubinstein reversed the process by providing a dynamic 
strategy through which an option could be created based on an investment. 
 
4.2.1. Option Based Portfolio Insurance (OBPI) 
OBPI consists of the simultaneous purchase of a risky asset S, and a put option 
with a strike price of K on the same risky asset.  This strategy protects the value of 
the risky asset at the terminal time T, ensuring that independent of the price 
movements for S, the value of the portfolio at T will be greater than the strike price 
of the put K.  The strike K is usually set as a proportion of the initial investment.  
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Basically, the investor is able to put a floor under the value of the portfolio should 
the value of the risky asset S fall past the strike price.  
 
Figure 11 
 
Source: Pain, 2008. 
 
This construction of OBPI can also be inverted, with the investor securing a floor 
through purchasing a risk free asset, and then purchasing a call option on the risky 
asset (Pain 2008, Pezier and Scheller 2013).  Explaining OBPI in this fashion is 
preferable for our purposes, as it eases the comparison with CPPI and points to 
why CPPI strategies have come into favour. 
 
Looking at a simple example of OBPI using a call option, we can write the payoff 
for this strategy at the terminal moment T as: 
 
 104 
 
Here SC is the price of the risky asset, F denotes the investment in the risk free 
asset; by rf we represent the continuous risk-free rate of return and by N the 
number of call options bought at a strike K. As mentioned by Joossens and 
Schoutens (2008), the value of the strike K is related to the value of the initial floor 
in the CPPI strategy, see below for an explanation of the CPPI approach.  Thus, 
the OBPI strategy insures that at the terminal moment T, the investor will at least 
have a portfolio of value K. 
 
In these simple constructions, the OBPI approach offers a robust and simple 
method of providing portfolio insurance, however the theory rests upon many 
assumptions that make it difficult to perfectly replicate the appropriate option pay-
offs.  Underpinning the theory are key assumptions such as the availability of 
continuous trading, the complete lack of transaction costs, and the absence of 
credit constraints on the investor.  As these are obviously non-trivial assumptions 
that do not hold true in the real world, the OBPI strategy is not always a practical 
methodology for investors.  As a result, constant proportion portfolio insurance 
(CPPI) - has become the more prevalent approach in the market (Pain 2008).   
 
4.2.2. Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI) 
Black and Jones (1987) pioneered the CPPI approach for equity portfolios, which 
was extended to fixed income portfolios by Perold (1986), and more recently to 
more exotic instruments such as credit default swaps (CDS) by Joossens & 
Schoutens (2008) and Jessen (2008).  This strategy also consists in setting a floor 
that gives the lowest acceptable value of the portfolio, but instead of using options 
to attempt to guarantee that value the investor seeks to approximate the payoffs of 
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a call option on the risky asset by switching the allocation of assets between a risk 
free asset and a risky one using a discrete, mechanical rule.  At each time period, 
the investor calculates the investment needed in the risk free asset to preserve the 
lowest value of the portfolio (the floor), as well as the amount left over in excess of 
that floor.  This excess is known as the cushion, and in subsequently invested in 
the risky asset based on a constant multiple that reflects a mix of risk tolerance 
and available leverage.  Using the notation in Pezier and Scheller (2011), we can 
formally write: 
 
Here  is the initial wealth; as for the previous equation; F is the investment in 
the risk free asset and rf the risk-free rate of return; S(0) is the initial price of the 
portfolio, σ is the constant diffusion coefficient,  is the price of the risky asset 
at the terminal moment T, finally m stands for the multiplier.  Both the floor and the 
multiplier depend on the choice of an investor.  Thus the terminal value of this 
strategy is a combination of the initial investment in the risk free asset given by F, 
and the remaining value of the initial wealth ( ), called the cushion, invested 
in the risky asset, whose terminal value depend on the price of the asset at the 
terminal time, , and on the multiplier value m. 
 
To make things more clear we provide a simple example.  Let us consider an 
investor that has an initial portfolio with a value S(0) of £500.  For this portfolio, he 
seeks to recoup the entire £500 value of the portfolio at the end of the period, so 
sets the floor as the present value (PV) of the £500 or 372 (assuming a risk free 
rate of 2.5%), and chooses a multiplier m of 3. Thus, he will allocate first 3*(£500 - 
£372) = £383.9 to a risky asset and the remaining £116.1 to a risk free asset.  
  
CCPPISC,T = F exprfT+ (w0 -F)SC(T)s(0)mexp1-mrf +12ms2T
 0
 TS c
  F0
 TS c
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Following the mechanical rule, the investor then reallocates the sums at the end of 
the each period as the value of the portfolio change.  The example demonstrates 
the basic principles of the approach, which is that as the value of the risky asset 
increases, the allocation to it increases, while when it falls, the allocation shifts 
back to the risk free asset.  Interestingly, the model also shows that in year three 
the risk free asset exposure moves into negative territory as a result of strong 
performance of the risky asset.  This implies that the investor has nothing invested 
in the risk free asset, and instead is borrowing money to invest in the risky asset. 
 
Table 2 - Example of CPPI Strategy Rebalancing Over 10 years (Pain 2008) 
 
 
 
As previously mentioned the OBPI strategy is generally viewed as static once the 
initial insurance has been set, while the CPPI approach is regarded as a dynamic 
one, consisting in a continuous reallocation of the portfolio.  At the same time, we 
note that the CPPI emerged as a response to the difficulty of the OBPI strategy to 
provide options that are sufficiently long-dated or sufficiently match the underlying 
assets of the portfolio. 
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Characteristics of CPPI Strategies 
The construction of a CPPI strategy has some natural characteristics that are 
worth exploring.  For example, there are some biases inherent to CPPI such as 
when the underlying asset performs strongly, a CPPI strategy will tend to 
underperform a pure investment in the risky asset since it does not generally 
allocate 100% of funds to the risky asset from the start.  Obviously, when the 
underlying assets experience weak performance, CPPI will limit the downside, 
which is of course the point of using the strategy in the first place. 
 
Another core feature of CPPI strategies is that they are said to be “Path 
Dependent” because the calculation of the final return to a CPPI strategy depends 
on the entire history of prices of the underlying asset throughout the term and not 
just the terminal value (Pain 2008).  In other words, at any given time in the 
investment horizon, the complete history of the investment strategy affects the set 
of possible choices that the investor can make (Bookstaber and Langsam 2000).  
The path dependence of CPPI strategies also highlights how these strategies are 
affected by developments in the risk-free rate, which may change over the 
investment horizon, and therefore how the investor must take into account the risk-
free rate at each rebalancing point not just its initial level (Pain 2008). 
 
The other two core drivers of CPPI strategies are leverage, as defined by the 
multiple (m), and volatility.  Pain 2008, shows that both leverage and volatility have 
a significant impact on the ultimate returns of the CPPI strategy, with higher levels 
of leverage increasing the potential upside to a CPPI strategy but also resulting in 
more frequent underperformance and hence more variable returns.  Alternatively 
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we can express this with the simple notion that the greater the multiple, the higher 
the convexity of the pay-off profile.  Pain (2008) also points out that for higher 
levels of volatility in the price for the underlying assets result in weaker 
performances for CPPI strategies.  On a practical level, this is easy to understand 
since CPPI strategies are adjusted to reflect movements in prices and therefore 
they are always chasing the market.  Greater movements in the underling prices 
mean that there is a greater potential for the investor to be “knocked out” of the 
risky asset (shifting completely into the risk-free asset) before having to readjust 
back into the risky asset once it recovers.  On a theoretical level this should be 
intuitive as well, since CPPI strategies have option like characteristics, and it is well 
known that options become more expensive when volatility is high, Black and 
Scholes (1973). 
 
Limitations of CPPI Strategies 
Much of the original CPPI theory relies on several assumptions about the market 
that are fundamentally unworkable in real market conditions.  For example, it is 
well known in the literature that (Balder et. al., 2006) if the dynamic process of the 
risky asset is a geometric Brownian one, in the continuous CPPI strategy, the 
value of the portfolio will never fall below the floor.  In reality, however, there are 
constraints that contradict the assumptions of the model.  For example, despite 
globalization, increased and after-hours trading, and the integration of international 
exchanges there is no such thing as truly continuous trading.  Even the simple 
interruption of trading for the weekend or a public holiday is enough to render this 
assumption untrue, for events can happen while the markets are closed meaning 
that asset prices can gap higher or lower without a trader having a chance to react.  
 109 
 
Plainly said, fund managers run the risk of not being able to adjust their portfolios 
quickly enough to market conditions when changes happen outside of normal 
trading hours.  Therefore, CPPI strategies have an inherent “gap risk,” i.e. the risk 
that the portfolio will have a value lower than the floor, Cont and Tankov (2009) or 
De Franco and Tankov (2011).  The impact of gap risk became particularly 
apparent around the financial crisis of 2008, and as previously mentioned has 
increased interest in tail risk management.  
 
Cont and Tankov (2009) provided a framework to study the gap risk by using a 
model with jumps.  They showed that the jump risk is significant for the CPPI 
strategies.  They were also able to derive expressions for the probability of hitting 
the floor, as well as for the expected loss and the distribution of losses.  The 
problem of limiting risk exposure has been addressed by De Franco and Tankov 
(2011), who built on the previous work by Gundel and Weber (2007), provided a 
solution to the problem of maximizing the utility of a portfolio given the risk of an 
expected shortfall.  They considered the problem of utility maximization of a 
portfolio only for both positive gains and negative shortfalls. 
 
Comparing OBPI and CPPI Strategies 
A primary focus of the academic literature reviewing portfolio insurance looks at 
the comparison of the two strategies, and/or how closely the theory matches the 
practical outcomes in the market.  Given that the two strategies offer alternative 
ways to seek protected payoffs, it is natural to examine under what circumstances 
an investor should prefer one type of protection to the other.  
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In order to better understand the differences between these strategies, we present 
the results of a simple simulation following Betrand and Pringent (2001).  While 
OBPI is a strategy based on the choice of a single parameter, K the strike of the 
put, the CPPI strategy implies the setting of both the cushion and multiplier.  The 
simulation assumes the same initial amounts and that the two strategies provide 
the same guarantees.  Moreover, the cushion value equals the price of the call.  It 
is further assumed that the terminal date T equal one year, that the initial value of 
the portfolio is 100, that the risk free rate rf is 3% in annual terms, and the volatility 
σ is 0.40%.  The results of the simulation can be seen in Figure 1.  Different paths 
of the CPPI strategy are provided for different values of the multiplier m.  The 
intersection of the strategies provides the approximate value of the risk-free return.  
The graph shows that the higher the multiplier, the higher the payoffs of the CPPI 
strategy. The OBPI approach outperforms the CPPI one only for moderate values 
of the multiplier m.  At the same time, Betrand and Pringent (2002) underlined that 
one should not choose too high values for this multiplier, since the higher the value 
of the multiplier, the higher the risk for an investor to reach the floor. 
 Figure 12 - OBPI vs. CPPI for different multipliers 
 
Source: Betrand and Pringent (2011) 
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Bertrand and Pringent (2005) extended the previous work by considering the 
probability distributions of the portfolio values under different strategies.  They 
pointed that when the probability distribution is ignored, one cannot discriminate 
between OBPI and CPPI.  When the probability distribution is taken into account, 
as the insured amount at maturity rises, the CPPI strategy becomes better than the 
OBPI one.  The reason for this, as they note, is that the OBPI call has a lower 
probability to be used. 
 
Annaert et al. (2009) extended the work by Betrand and Pringent (2005), by 
considering the use of stochastic dominance criteria in comparing the different 
portfolio insurance strategies (while most of the previous research focused on 
mean-variance criteria).  They argued that the literature up to considered only the 
standard mean-variance measures of investment performance, but failed to 
account for the entire distribution, as stochastic dominance does.  At the same 
time, due to the portfolio insurance specifics, which imply possible upward and 
downward movements, an appropriate approach must take into account the whole 
distribution.  They also considered a comprehensive comparison of the different 
portfolio insurance among each other and with the buy and hold strategy.  Their 
main results are that the portfolio insurance strategies lead to both better downside 
protection and lower excess return as compared to the passive buy and hold 
strategy.  However, the portfolio insurance strategies do not stochastically 
dominate the buy and hold strategy.  They also found that when the floor is the 
highest, the protection against downside movements is the best. 
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Zagst and Kraus (2011) noticed that the two strategies act in different market 
environments.  Namely, the CPPI strategy is a dynamic one within a certain market 
characterized by an empirical volatility, while the OBPI strategy uses put options 
that require implied volatility.  However, the implied volatility and the empirical 
volatility are not necessarily equal.  They extended the previous research by 
considering stochastic dominance criteria up to the third order, as well as by taking 
into account the spread between the implied and empirical volatility.  Their main 
conclusion was that the higher the implied volatility, the higher the chances that the 
CPPI strategy stochastically dominates the OBPI strategy in the third order. 
 
Another study that addressed the issue of the hypothesized law of motions of the 
asset returns is due to Bertrand and Pringent (2011).  They introduced the Omega 
measure in comparing the two portfolio insurance strategies.  They considered not 
only the standard case of Brownian motion with drift but also the sum of Brownian 
motion and a compound Poisson process with jump.  In both cases, for the Omega 
measure (and Kappa measures in general), the CPPI strategy outperformed the 
OBPI one (Bertrand and Pringent 2011).  
 
5. Conclusions 
Having studied the literature available on the topic of risk management there are a 
few key themes we can draw out at this stage.  Firstly, there are several definitions 
of “risk” and indeed several types of risks that authors try to define when writing on 
the topic of risk and this is not always the same thing.  Secondly, in general, most 
authors are in agreement about what risk management is, and most also have 
suggestions on how it could be better applied on the basis of its failure during the 
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most recent crisis.  Thirdly, there were several papers and articles that have 
focussed on the asset classes in which it was found their risk profile was 
incorrectly estimated pre-crisis (Credit Default Swaps, Asset Backed Securities, 
Mortgage Backed Securities, etc). 
 
In order to expand the first point on the definitions of risk, we looked at some of the 
multiple definitions/debates.  It was stated earlier in this chapter that we would use 
the definition of market risk as stated by Resti and Sironi (2007) since it assumes 
portfolios are well diversified and, therefore, is most applicable to active equity 
portfolios: “the risk of changes in the market value of an investment or portfolio of 
financial instruments connected with unexpected changes in market conditions”.  
This is closely related to Markowitz’s (1952) notion of risk as an “undesirable thing” 
in his description of the perfect portfolio.  In his CAPM model, all the market risk is 
captured in the beta, measured relative to a market portfolio, which should, in 
theory, include all traded assets in the market place held in proportion to their 
market value.  Damodoran (2003) points out that when trying to address risk in 
equity portfolios we are often drawn to statistical measures of risk. 
 
As stated above, most authors agree risk management could and should be 
improved upon.  It is important to note the reasons why it has not been improved 
upon in the past, particularly in equity portfolios.  Brandolini et al (2000) identify the 
key reason when they speak of the third-party portfolio manager who has control 
over the investments, yet the liability is removed from him.  The most he could lose 
from a risky investment that did not pay off is his job.  However, in normal market 
conditions, if he made a bad stock pick, his performance in other investments 
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would hopefully far outweigh that one bad bet.  Many authors try to blame risk 
models, and more importantly, our ability to use the risk models.  The truth is, 
models can only produce scenarios from the data that is put into them.  Darnell 
(2009) points to the short volatility bias that caused significant losses across the 
board.  Traditional equity portfolios had little in the way of options hedging in place. 
 
One paper the researcher believes presents a good model to use going forward is 
that of Bender and Nielsen (2009) which talks about the 3 pillars approach of Risk 
Measurement, Risk Monitoring and Risk Adjusted Investment Returns. 
 
The focus of the rest of this research is on equity portfolios within Europe.  There 
has been so much focus in the academic literature on alternative and derivative 
investments, but we cannot ignore the significance of the plain vanilla equity funds.  
These funds suffered large losses during this crisis, and stock picking was not 
enough to manage their risk.   
 
With such a significant amount of assets under management in equity portfolios, it 
is important to investigate the risk management culture that allowed some portfolio 
managers to take risk without sufficient hedges. 
 
In Chapter 2 upon the review of the literature within risk management in portfolio 
management we gathered substantial information that helped us answer broad 
questions regarding risk management such as what are the various definitions of 
risk and the role of the risk management within the portfolio management – our 
main conclusion is that it is clear that there is a lack of specific risk management 
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literature dedicated to this specific topic and to the best of our knowledge the 
above risk management review literature is the most complete and detailed 
available. 
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Chapter 3: First Empirical Chapter 
 
1. Introduction and objectives 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no comprehensive study on the current state 
of risk management within European equity portfolios.  
 
The objective of the first empirical chapter is to research how risk management is 
currently used. Using a questionnaire survey, we determine to what extent risk 
management is currently used, how it has changed in recent times and 
expectations of how it will change in the immediate future. 
 
The questions in the survey try to analyse the state of the art of the Risk 
Management in the Asset Management Industry.  It tries to answer several key 
questions: 
- What are the consequences of past financial crises? 
- Is risk management taken seriously inside financial organizations? 
- Are funds with fewer assets under management expected to spend 
(proportionally) less on risk management? 
 
2. Literature review 
The last two crises in financial markets, the dotcom bubble which burst (2000-
2003) and the credit crisis (2008-2009), have made the industry and investors 
rethink many of the paradigms and beliefs fundamental to it. In many respects 
these issues are not wholly new and as far back as 1996 the then US Federal 
Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, described the behaviour of financial 
participants as displaying “Irrational Exuberance”, as they simply did not value 
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companies in a judicious manner (Shiller, 2000) and simply continued to inflate the 
dotcom bubble that finally blew up in 2000.  Furthermore, in the recent credit crisis 
(2008-2009) there was a lack of transparency and feasibility in the quantitative 
tools used to compute the value and risk management for the exotic credit 
derivatives products.   
 
To the best of our knowledge, there are no academic papers which have surveyed 
risk management practices in financial institutions.  Nevertheless, Price 
Waterhouse Coopers completed a survey on valuation and risk management with 
regard to 68 US, European, Asian and Canadian hedge funds5.  They found that 
for a majority of funds some areas of risk management were not sufficiently 
considered, in particular, counterparty risk and the risks associated with the 
approval of new instruments.  They also found that hedge funds have a diverse 
view of who should bear prime responsibility for risk management in the company.  
This role is variably delegated to the General Partner, the Board of Directors, the 
Senior Portfolio Manager, and the CFO or to an independent risk manager.  
Further, almost 70% of the respondents to their survey were found not to have a 
risk management committee, while only 31% had an independent risk manager.  
Additionally, a third of respondents believed that tools used for risk management in 
hedge funds were not that sufficient, while 11% considered that the risk 
management process was relatively weak.  Finally, it was found that the 
performance of only 50% of portfolio managers is measured on a risk-adjusted 
basis, taking into account adequate risk measures.  
                                                 
5
http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/financialservices/pdf/globalhedgefundsurvey.pdf  
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Ernst and Young’s Risk Management for Asset Management Survey (2011)6 is 
based on interviews of a limited sample of around 30 UK and European large, 
medium, small (by assets under management) and alternative asset management 
firms.  They found that, in general, risk management practices in 2011 were 
improving relative to previous years.  They also found: that managing liquidity risk 
was a priority for most of the firms; that investment risk (deviation from an 
expected return, i.e. volatility) was “well managed”; that 65% of respondents used 
Value at Risk (VaR) to model market risk; and that 45% of respondents had 
increased the size of their risk management team.  Further, the survey also 
assessed respondents’ views on counterparty risk, operational risk, tax risk and 
various aspects of regulation.  They found that although mitigating counterparty 
risk was viewed as very important, improvements were needed in terms of (intra-
daily) monitoring of such risk per counterparty and asset class; that risk managers 
spend less time relative to previous years on operational risk and that more 
emphasis should be put on how regulation will affect outsourcing and delegation; 
and that 42% of respondents believe that tax issues are adequately overseen by 
the risk team, while an even higher 66% believe that tax inefficiencies are 
evaluated on a consistent basis. However, the survey confirms that the 
governance structures of hedge funds have not changed significantly despite the 
forces of change that have affected public companies and registered investment 
companies. 
 
Two years later, Ernst and Young repeated the survey by interviewing 54 UK and 
European large, medium and small traditional and alternative asset managers. The 
                                                 
6
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Risk_management_for_AM_2011Survey/$FILE/Risk_m
anagement_for_AM_2011Survey.pdf 
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survey reflected that the pace of regulatory change, the need to mitigate 
reputational risks and the desire for capital optimization has been motivating the 
companies to improve the risk management functions. The Risk Management for 
Asset Management Industry’s (2013) results showed a greater appetite among the 
Asset Managers to hold more risk factors under consideration. In contrast of the 
2011 survey’s results, in 2013 several asset managers posted improvements in 
how they were able to determine counterparty risk exposure. Regarding the 
operational risk, respondents claimed to outsource this service. Above the 
traditional operational and counterparty credit risks, the risk categories of major 
concern were regulatory, mandate, conduct and liquidity risks, followed by market 
and investment risks. 76% of the respondents consider regulatory risk as the top 
risk category to be monitored. Nonetheless, there was a wide variance in the 
involvement of the risk management in the investment process among the firms, 
namely in organization, the key decisions and how tolerances and limits were 
defined. Only 51% of the respondents confirmed the independence of the 
investment risk function but 66% claimed intra-day reporting from sophisticated risk 
metrics. 62% evidenced liquidity metrics for regulated and segregated portfolios on 
an ongoing basis and 40% claimed an advanced process for risk budgeting. 
Moreover, 61% of firms could demonstrate the measurement and monitoring of risk 
at both an aggregate and a factor level while 47% could demonstrate dynamic 
modelling. Respondents also commented on the need to extract information from 
interlinked systems, with only 57% of the respondents showing their ability to carry 
this out.  
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On the Rethinking Risk Management survey in 2015, Ernst and Young concluded 
that despite the previous years’ enhancement of risk management systems and 
processes to meet regulatory and market demands, in 2015 companies started a 
process to re-engineer some aspects of risk management. More than 50% of the 
respondents reported they aimed to identify non-financial risks by developing more 
forward-focused and prevention measures as well as risk scenario analysis and 
tools. 77% of the respondents reported an increase in senior management 
attention to risk culture in the past 12 months and 75% claimed they were still 
making changes in the firm’s culture. Companies were still facing several 
challenges to convert the risk culture into the day-to-day business and most of the 
respondents continue to work to develop stress-testing approaches and improve 
data systems. Only 43% of the total sample confirmed the risk appetite was 
successfully linked with the business planning but 57% reported strong progress in 
the ability to enforce risk management. Another good indicator of the 
improvements within these companies is that 64% of the respondents guaranteed 
an increase in the size of the risk function while 60% were expecting such 
increases to continue in the 2016. 
 
In Chapter 3 our findings are consistent with EY’s surveys even though EY uses a 
smaller sample. We found out that hedge funds are more sensible towards risk 
management when they look at it and that risk monitoring frequency and factors 
analysed need to be developed and improved. Furthermore, we observed in the 
survey from Chapter 3 that both long only and hedge fund managers consider 
liquidity and volatility risks more frequently compared with other risk factors and 
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that the Asset Management’s risk teams are not sufficiently independent from the 
investment teams.  
 
To conclude, although practitioners’ surveys have addressed some of the issues 
that the asset management industry is facing in terms of risk management, such as 
those relating to adjustment to new regulations, issues around the allocation of 
additional resources to risk management or issues with regard to better 
communication, we believe that the existing surveys are not comprehensive 
enough to give a definitive picture of the risk management landscape in turbulent 
times.  They do not investigate whether the amount spent on risk management 
improves a fund’s performance or not.  In addition, the surveys are generally 
conducted with a relatively small sample of respondents, making it more difficult to 
draw industry-wide conclusions. To overcome this lack of information, in Chapter 3 
several questions are asked to a sample of 200 asset managers, regarding the 
size of the risk teams, the budget they have, who the CRO reports to, the impact of 
the latest financial events, etc. Afterwards, the researcher will try different 
approaches to explain the performance of the funds in terms of the survey’s 
questions. 
 
Litterman (2003) mentions that by recognizing that risk is a scarce resource and 
that different investors have different appetites for risk, each investor needs to 
develop an individually tailored investment plan with a target level of risk for the 
portfolio based on their preferences and circumstances.  For most investment 
portfolios, the dominant risk will be a relatively stable exposure to the traditional 
asset markets, especially equity and bonds.  This could be referred to as strategic 
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asset allocation.  The construction and management of an active equity portfolio is 
somehow similar to the above example, i.e. divided in two steps:  
1) first the development of equity allocation (based on the weights of the relative 
benchmark), and 2) the implementation and monitoring of portfolio allocations 
relative to that benchmark.  This allocation is designed to be a stable mix of 
equities that maximizes long run expected return given a targeted level of risk.  
Today most of the equity mix within an equity portfolio is conditioned to the 
benchmark of the portfolio.  Since this research focuses on risk management 
within active equity portfolios is necessary to emphasize the distinction between 
total risk and active risk because it is a key element in the design and overall 
management of portfolios.  Total risk is defined as the overall risk within a portfolio 
while active risk is the equity weight above the benchmark (Litterman 2003). 
 
 
2.1. How is Risk Management currently used? 
Brandolini et al (2000) identify some key reasons why asset managers have 
insufficient risk management practices: 
1. Institutional investors manage third party funds so eventual liabilities are 
those of other people - if there is a loss on the fund, it is their clients, not 
their own liability;  
2. Losses, therefore, have no immediate impact on the balance sheet of an 
institutional investor; 
3. Many fund managers are concerned with returns relative to a benchmark 
instead of absolute returns.  Therefore, their analysis of risk in their 
portfolios ignores broad market downturns like that witnessed in 2008. 
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“Investment firms have often managed risk in an intuitive manner and risk 
management systems have been viewed as an avoidable costly investment, which 
has to demonstrate every time it’s utility” Brandolini et al (2000). 
 
Eppler and Aeschimann (2009) identify that Goldman Sachs Investment Bank, 
which was relatively better off than other banks, had a strong risk management 
culture.  Buehler et al (2008) identify daily risk reports and weekly meetings of the 
firm wide risk committee; this regular communication within the firm on risk, 
allowed them to weather the crisis relatively better than their competitors.  An 
Article in Pensions and Investments (2006) adds that in risk management we face 
two issues:  one is an issue of risk model structure; another is an issue of 
economic cycle.  There are times when the economic cycle will dwarf the risk 
model structure.  This article would suggest that even if the human relationships 
aspect of insufficient risk management culture were overcome, we would still have 
issues of picking the right model for whatever stage in the economic cycle.  
 
Martellini (2010) mentions that “for more than 50 years the investment 
management industry has focussed on security selection as its greatest single 
source of added value.  Risk management and asset allocation have therefore 
been largely out of view”. 
 
According to Darnell (2009) most investors look for strategies that have recently 
provided positive, consistent, risk-adjusted returns.  In this approach, however, 
many risks are ignored, including exposure to beta, interest rates and credit.  
Darnell (2009) argues that during low probability high-tail risk events such as the 
 124 
 
financial crisis of 2008, long volatility positions would have been highly successful.  
By having limited protection against loss in many portfolios, they were net short 
volatility.  These short volatility biases looked very attractive to investors, as they 
had experienced positive performance over the prior 20 years.  However, it was 
this growing short volatility bias that created so much pain in the recent downturn. 
 
Rebonato (2007) suggests that risk management should be of major interest in 
behavioural finance and cognitive psychology.  Commentators point to flaws in risk 
management models prior to the crisis because they only looked at historical data 
of the last 20 years, an exceptionally good time in the market.  Over 10 years prior 
to this, Greenspan (1999) was quoted in the New York Times as saying “…boards 
of directors, senior managers, and supervisory authorities need to balance 
emphasis on risk models that essentially have only dimly perceived sampling 
characteristics with emphasis on the skills, experience and judgement of the 
people who have to apply those models.  Being able to judge which structural 
model best describes the forces driving asset pricing in any particular period is 
itself priceless.  To paraphrase my former colleague Jerry Corrigan, the advent of 
sophisticated risk models has not made people with grey hair, or none, wholly 
obsolete”.7 
 
Risk models by their nature make some simplifying assumptions (Cowell 2009).  
According to Cowell (2009), the real danger with risk models is treating them as 
black boxes: accepting, rather than interrogating and dissecting the risk estimates 
they generate.  Cowell (2009) reminds us that a portfolio manager’s main objective 
                                                 
7
 [Federal Reserve Board Speech 1999 http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1999/19991014.htm] 
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is not only to avoid losing clients’ money, but also to add to it progressively.  That 
requires not only picking the best stocks, but also managing risk within the portfolio 
and being aware of the risk profile of each investment decision.  Risk management 
should be at the forefront of the investment management industry, not just an after 
thought.  Cowell (2009) goes on to state that the following three factors must 
combine to create the “machine for good investment management”: 
 
1. High quality security level return forecasts; 
2. Sound risk management; 
3. Relevant and credible risk measurement. 
 
According to results from a survey (European Investment Practices Survey, 2008) 
by Edhec Risk and Asset Management Research Centre, “… investment 
professionals are often familiar with research findings and new techniques, but that 
these are rarely used”. 
 
Why is this the case?  Sandeep Vishnu of Capco in the Cass-Capco Institute 
Paper Series on Risk (2010) suggests that there is a ”silent accusation” within the 
asset management industry that risk management dampens revenue and puts 
brakes on innovation.  This is a challenge faced by risk managers as they try to put 
in structures to guard against losses.  Vishnu assesses that in the recent crisis, 
“managing risks was not an embedded element in critical business processes; it 
was a bolt on activity.  When times are good, fund managers do not want to pay 
attention to risk management because they are too busy making money but when 
times are bad, fund managers do not want to pay too much attention to risk 
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management because they are already incurring losses, and do not want to spend 
more money”. However, after the financial crisis and with the development of 
online markets and financial services, professional investors became aware of 
different types of risk. Operational risk, for instance, has turned to be as important 
as credit risk and market risk. The main consequence is the need to develop new 
types of model risk in order to improve risk measurement and monitoring (Xu and 
Pinedo, 2016). My results in Chapter 3 are in line with Xu and Pinedo’s research, 
as 74.6% of the investors have increased the amount they spend on risk 
management compared to the pre-crisis period.  
 
Vishnu (2010) states that “organizations that integrate resilience (and risk 
management in general) into their culture in a granular manner stand a better 
chance of not only mitigating risks more effectively, but also more cost-effectively”. 
 
Global Investor (September 2001) highlights that the key to success for building a 
risk management culture within a firm is: 
1. The risk management function should provide recognizable and material 
contributions to the portfolio management teams that lead to improved risk-
reward ratios in the performance of portfolios, funds and separate accounts 
under their care;  
2. The risk management function should make a valuable contribution to the 
asset management company in terms of reducing the probability of 
significant losses in portfolios, funds and separate accounts managed by 
the company; 
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3. The risk management function should be performing its duties in such a 
manner that it materially helps the asset management company achieve the 
“brand” recognition for quality risk management, and thus, enhance the 
efforts of its marketing and client service teams. 
 
Global Investor (2001) states that risk measurement can be about producing 
reports that few people take seriously and which do little more than allow the asset 
management company to say that they have a risk management team that 
provides basic risk management services.  Risk management on the other hand, is 
about actually helping the company manage portfolios in a more measured way, 
on a risk-adjusted basis.  However, there is a danger of investing in risk 
management departments who build complex models without achieving the 
desired results, because too much emphasis is placed on the findings of the 
model. 
 
Darnell (2009), on the other hand, mentions that risk models are helpful in judging 
risk exposures under typical situations, but no substitute for investment judgement 
exists when it comes to anticipating how portfolios will respond to tail events.  
Danielsson et al (2006) reminds us that financial returns tend to exhibit fat tails, 
which prepares for those tail events even more pressing.  Risk models are 
generally based on a normal distribution but if the distribution is platykurtic, then 
these tail events are more likely to happen.  Darnell’s (2009) paper asks a number 
of questions relating to risk models and whether they failed during the crisis.  He 
concludes however, that it was not the risk models that failed, it was:  
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a) Not knowing where to go for answers when the limitations of the risk models 
had been reached and  
b) Investment judgement based on an incomplete assessment of risk. 
 
Another issue to consider is human reaction to risks.  Perhaps too much focus has 
been put on the quantitative side of risk management in the past, without looking at 
the qualitative issues.  According to Blommestein (2010) too much faith was placed 
in a new generation of complex risk models.  Eppler and Aeschimann (2009) 
identify that one key problem is effective communication of complex financial risk. 
 
Rebonato (2007) identifies 3 key themes relevant to the management of financial 
risk: 
1. Human beings tend to deal with probabilities in qualitatively distinct 
fashions: a deliberative System II mode, which allows for more accurate, but 
slower, assessment of risk; and a System I mode, which provides quick 
responses, heavily influenced by identifiable heuristics. 
2. In the medium-to-high probability range, these rules of thumb are far from 
perfect, but they do not seem to perform too badly.  When the most likely 
outcome of one such medium-to-high probability event must be estimated, 
heuristics have actually been shown to be surprisingly effective.  Some 
instances of apparent System I “irrationality” can be explained and partially 
justified. 
3. Where the System I mode of operation really breaks down is when the 
probabilities at stake are very low.  When this is the case the heuristics soon 
 129 
 
cease to provide useful guidance, and the behavioural responses become 
very difficult to explain in a “rational” framework. 
 
According to Brown (2008), one in five fund managers who invested in complex 
financial instruments admitted to having no in-house specialists with relevant 
experience.  His research found that institutional investors who invested in 
instruments such as derivatives, collateralized debt obligation (CDO) or structured 
products seem to be at a greater risk skill, with one in three saying they have no in-
house experience regarding these investments. 
 
Golub and Crum (2010) observe that risk managers can only be truly effective 
when they are independent from the risk takers, even if those risk takers are highly 
risk aware.  Further, Golub and Crum (2010) recommend that at a minimum the 
risk management function must not be subordinate to the investment function, but 
of equal standing.  The head of the risk management department should report 
directly to the CEO of the company, and not to the CIO.  The risk department’s 
incentives should also reflect positive incentives for long-term success of the firm, 
and not by the short-term performance of investment portfolios. We will show in the 
questionnaire that 25% of the respondents still report directly to their CIO. 
 
Against this backdrop, financial markets have suffered significant distress in recent 
years and many commentators have started to question methods used, particularly 
in the field of risk management.  Clearly, risk management was not well 
understood or used properly by financial companies that operated in this 
environment during these two latest crises.  It is therefore important to assess the 
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level of commitment that banks and portfolio managers have had in respect to this 
crucial area of risk management to see if improvements can be made before 
further financial crises take place. 
 
In the first empirical chapter, we examine the use of risk management practices in 
the European Asset management industry.  Using a questionnaire survey, we 
determine to what extent risk management is currently used, how it has changed in 
recent times and expectations of how it will change in the immediate future. 
 
The questions in the survey try to analyse the state of the art of the Risk 
Management in the Asset Management Industry.  It tries to answer several key 
questions: 
- What are the consequences of past financial crises? 
- Is risk management taken seriously inside financial organizations? 
- Are funds with fewer assets under management expected to spend 
(proportionally) less on risk management? 
 
The main conclusion of the survey is that risk management functions have been 
neglected for some time.  As we will see in the questionnaire discussion, the role of 
the risk officer is not always clear.  Sometimes the person in charge of the risk 
function is the Portfolio Manager himself.  The survey also highlights the tendency 
that smaller funds spend less (proportionally) in risk management functions.   
 
One of the most interesting conclusions from the survey is that it seems that 
change is now being considered: companies are currently more aware of these 
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problems and they are taking risk more seriously.  They are willing to spend more 
on resources and give risk departments more power inside their organizations.  
This conclusion is based on specific questions in the survey that refer to the recent 
past and the near future in terms of risk management spending. 
 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
Data 
This dataset is focused on European equity type funds: traditional open-ended 
equity mutual funds and hedge funds.  The source used to get the number and 
assets under management of companies that manage traditional equity funds is 
the database FundFile from Lipper Fund Management Information (Lipper FMI). 
FundFile is a research tool specially designed for the European and Asian fund 
industry that tracks over 45,000 funds sold throughout Europe and Asia.  The data 
is released on a monthly basis with an approximate lag of six weeks, which allows 
FundFile to have all groups reporting their assets at the same date.  The latest 
data available for our purposes was to the end of April 2010. 
 
The FundFile database does not have sufficient coverage of traditional hedge 
funds - its main strength is the collection of data on traditional open-ended mutual 
funds.  Hence, in order to add a list of hedge fund companies to the sample size an 
alternative source was used - Morningstar Direct.  
 
Designed for institutional use, Morningstar Direct is an Internet-based research 
platform that enables users to perform in-depth investment analysis.  It powers 
sophisticated holdings - and returns-based style analysis, insightful 
peer/competitive analysis, thorough manager performance evaluation, and efficient 
investment monitoring and reporting.  Morningstar Direct fully integrates all 
investment universes to enable cross-universe analysis.  Over the last few years, 
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Morningstar have continued to expand their hedge fund coverage by acquiring 
businesses and databases.  InvestorForce was acquired, which included the 
Altvest™ hedge fund database, which allows screening of one of the largest 
proprietary global hedge fund databases available.  Hence, these credentials and 
coverage of the hedge fund universe makes this source suitable for this study. 
 
Assets under management for traditional mutual funds in the industry were 
extracted from FundFile and consequently aggregated using the field “Master 
Group” level.  The existence of the “Master Group” level makes this database the 
most suitable source for constructing this dataset.  The Master Group level 
aggregates company subsidiaries to the head company level e.g. some companies 
have various asset management subsidiaries and these are placed under the 
overall banner of the head company.  This prevents counting separate asset 
management entities of the same head company multiple times in the final sample.  
Other data sources show the separate entities within firms which makes it more 
difficult to summarise the data. 
 
For hedge funds, although company names have been added to the overall 
number of companies in the marketplace, assets under management have not 
been included in the total figure.  The main reason is due to the lack of up-to-date 
asset figures for hedge funds within the Morningstar Direct database.  To get to a 
final number of companies in the industry and an overall asset total the following 
filter criteria were used.  In the case of traditional mutual funds, the ten largest 
European domiciles by equity assets under management were taken.  Domicile 
refers to the country where the fund is legally incorporated.  The ten largest 
domiciles by total number of assets under management are Luxembourg, United 
Kingdom, France, Ireland, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, Italy and 
Norway.  Funds that are domiciled in a particular market are primarily sold to that 
market (i.e. UK domiciled funds are sold primarily in the UK, French domiciled 
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funds are sold primarily to French based investors etc.).  However, the exceptions 
are Luxembourg and Irish domiciled funds, which are sold cross-border.  I.e. fund 
companies domicile a fund range in Luxembourg and/or Dublin and register the 
funds for sale throughout Europe (and are hence in competition with funds also 
domiciled in each local domicile).  There are tax advantages for companies 
domiciling their ranges in such centres.  This methodology gives suitable coverage 
of the largest equity funds in Europe incorporating both funds in “offshore centres” 
as well as those funds domiciled in each local market.  The largest ten domiciles 
by assets under management specified above account for 93% of total assets 
domiciled in Europe.  Hence, the total sample size covers the majority of the 
marketplace. 
 
Secondly, only mutual funds that FundFile classify as Investment Type “Equity” 
were put into the sample.  Hence the dataset excludes bond funds, fund of funds 
(both fettered/unfettered), any funds that FundFile label as “hedge funds”, mixed 
asset funds (i.e. those investing across multiple asset classes in the same fund), 
money market, money market enhanced and property funds.  Note that property 
funds that invest in shares of real estate companies are included in the sample.  
However, funds that invest in physical property i.e. offices, hotels, warehouses etc. 
are not included in the sample.  There has been no further filtering based on where 
underlying stocks are listed and hence the sample includes funds investing in 
regions throughout the world (UK, Europe, US, Asia, Japan, Emerging Markets, 
sector specific funds etc.). 
 
It is worth noting that the funds within the sample include pooled funds i.e. open-
ended OEICs/SICAVs that are sold to both institutional and retail investors.  For 
example, institutional OEICs/SICAVs run by both Fidelity and Schroders are 
included in the sample.  These institutional funds often have a higher initial 
investment requirement than their retail counterparts.  However, segregated 
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mandates that companies run for specific institutional clients are not included in the 
sample (i.e. funds that are run to the specific requirements of a company pension 
scheme and hence not available to the wider investing public).  Indeed, assets in 
segregated mandates are not so widely reported on a consistent basis by all fund 
groups.  Closed-ended funds (investment trusts) are also not included in the 
sample. 
 
The sample also excludes any funds in the database classified as ETFs (Exchange 
traded funds) or index trackers.  The majority of the funds listed are pure long-only 
funds but the sample does include some funds that peruse full UCITS III powers 
and hence have the ability to use derivatives to create synthetic shorts or write 
covered call options to enhance income.  I.e. Blackrock UK Absolute Alpha (net 
equity exposure 15.9%), Fidelity Special Situations (which has some specific stock 
shorts), Schroder Income Maximiser (writes covered calls to enhance income). 
 
The sample of traditional open-ended equity mutual funds may also contain some 
funds that are domiciled in Europe but contain assets invested in these funds by 
Asian based investors (i.e. Hong Kong or Japanese based investors). 
 
The following filter criteria have been applied to the hedge fund dataset from the 
Morningstar Direct database.  Firstly, as the majority of hedge funds are domiciled 
in offshore centres such as the Cayman Islands, using domicile as per the 
methodology used to extract the traditional mutual fund dataset from FundFile is 
not a sufficient filter criterion.  Hence, in this instance the city where the managing 
firm is headquartered was used and limited only to show those companies based 
in London (actual filter on the Morningstar Direct system is named “Advisor City”).  
 
The dataset was then further filtered to display equity based hedge fund strategies 
only.  As specified earlier, Morningstar categorise funds into their own sectors and 
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this allows grouping of funds by particular strategy/asset class.  Hence, the 
following Morningstar Categories have been used - Hedge Fund Developed Asia 
Equity, Hedge Fund Emerging Market Equity, Hedge Fund Equity Arbitrage, Hedge 
Fund Equity Europe, Hedge Fund Global Equity and Hedge Fund US Equity. 
 
Once the list of hedge funds in these categories was obtained the data was 
aggregated from the fund level to the company level in order to get a number of 
hedge fund companies in these specified equity categories where the managing 
firm was based in London.  
 
The final step in the sample construction meant combining the list of companies 
obtained from Lipper FundFile to the list of hedge fund companies obtained from 
Morningstar Direct.  Once the list was combined companies that appeared in both 
the traditional mutual fund list and the hedge fund list were only counted once to 
avoid double-counting of a company with a hedge fund business and a traditional 
long only open-ended fund business. 
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The following graph summarises the filter criteria: 
 
Figure 1 - Filter Criteria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This resulted in a list containing 840 companies with 743 coming from the 
traditional mutual fund list sourced from Lipper FundFile and 97 coming from the 
hedge fund list sourced from Morningstar Direct.  
 
The assets under management of this sample total $1.97 trillion with the largest 
five equity managers being Fidelity, Blackrock, JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank Group 
and BNP Paribas.  The assets of BNP Paribas include the acquired assets of 
Fortis.  This re-emphasises the importance of aggregating assets to the “Master 
Group” level as described earlier to avoid counting subsidiaries of groups as 
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separate entities.  The top 10 groups account for 30% of total assets with the top 
20 accounting for 48% of the total assets. 
 
Methodology 
The survey was carried out by one on one interviews where the interviewer had the 
question script in front of him and the interviewees were able to respond.  This 
enabled higher response rates than a mailout would have received, for example 
Levich, Hayt and Ripston (1999) received only a 17.5% response rate from their 
1708 surveys mailed during their study of derivatives and risk management 
practices by U.S. Institutional investors.  Interviews were carried out between 
January and September 2010. 
 
The survey was conducted with 200 subjects whose positions ranged from 
Portfolio Managers, Marketing Heads, Sales, Risk Officers and others within (the) 
their asset management firm.  93% of the surveys were completed by Portfolio 
Managers. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
In terms of geographic breakdown, UK-domiciled assets represented 60% of the 
Surveys completed. 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
Domicile of assets for those surveyed (% of AUM)
61%
9%
9%
6%
6%
2%
2%
3%
2%
United Kingdom France Ireland Sw eden Germany
Sw itzerland Netherlands Italy Norw ay
Assets Under Management for Those Surveyed ($mn)
1,429,266 , 93%
4,9439 , 3%
785 , 0%
4,9585 , 3%
2,2861 , 1%
PM Marketing Sales Risk Officer Other
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Spanning the following: 
Figure 4 
 
 
The survey consisted of 24 questions and was designed specifically for the 
purpose of this research (see appendix 1).  Sauner-Leroy (2004) found that using 
data not designed for the purpose of his specific research hindered the relevance 
of his results and decided that the relevance of his results could be increased by 
using indicators that specifically measured the studied phenomena using a 
specifically designed questionnaire hence the researcher’s decision to develop his 
own questionnaire for this study. 
 
The questionnaire was designed to understand the current importance of risk 
management within the Asset Management industry in Europe and identify 
possible areas of improvement.  Its purpose is to gather information for two main 
topic areas: Risk Measurement and Risk Monitoring.  Individual questions referred 
to what risk management system is currently in place, how often Portfolio 
Managers use the system, the relationship between the PM and risk managers, 
how often various parameters relating to risk are assessed, who has power when it 
comes to making decisions to address breaches of risk limits, and how much 
importance is given to risk management in terms of spend within the institution.  
The findings can then be used to develop risk-adjusted investment-management 
strategies. 
Total 1,551,935
median 1,126
mean 7,838
max 93,671
min 1
AUM (m$) 
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4. Benefits and limitations of the methodology used 
Interviews for data collection can be performed in two essential manners:  self-
administrated questionnaires, using Internet and mail, or interviews that are 
conducted by an interviewer, either by phone or face-to-face. All methods can 
result in high quality data, so the choice for a specific data collection mechanism 
depends on the research objectives (Leeuw 2008). Due to the nature and detail of 
the present study, it was decided that interviews would be conducted through a 
face-to-face method, with the presence of an interviewer.  
 
In order to conduct an in-depth survey, face-to-face interviews are always 
preferred, since a physical encounter often creates a dynamic and generative 
environment (Legard, Keegan and Ward 2003). Face-to-face interviews have 
proved to be the ones with the highest completion rates (Bowling 2005) and to be 
the most effective to convince reluctant interviewees (Leeuw 2008). Also, they 
have proved to be an effective data collection method for long and more complex 
interviews (Leeuw 2008). However, face-to-face interviews also bear some risks 
and disadvantages. Time and cost can be considered as one of the disadvantages 
of face-to-face surveys. The cost of selecting, training and overseeing a successful 
team of surveyors can be extremely high and can take some time to organize. Due 
to the particular survey situation, the time and financial cost were insignificant 
factors as the researcher was himself the interviewer and easily got access to the 
interviewees. 
 
Another important aspect to have in account is anonymity (Sturges and Hanrahan 
2016). Face-to-face interviews do not allow for anonymity, as do for example 
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Internet conducted surveys. This characteristic can potentially have negative 
consequences and influence interviewees answers, as there are situations in 
which respondents could be embarrassed to respond to questions that are 
attached with social or emotional meanings. In the specific situation of the study at 
hand, anonymity was not a challenge since this survey was not used for evaluating 
individual behaviors nor implied any type of conflict of interests. 
 
On a face-to-face survey, the impact of the interviewer on the interview always has 
to be acknowledged. This impact can be positive, motivate interviewees or clarify 
any question, or negative, it can inhibit socially undesirable answers or influence 
respondent’s behavior in many ways, depending on specific situations. Since the 
200 interviews comprising this study were conducted by the researcher who knew 
the interviewees previously and has a deep expertise in the area, the negative 
impacts were again not relevant.  
 
For the previous mentioned reasons, the researcher decided to interview the 
various asset managers in person, as the completion rates are significantly higher 
and its negative effects were negligible for the results of the present study.  
 
5. Preliminary Results 
In this section, we discuss the answers to the survey’s questions.  For each 
question, we analyse the answers for the all universe of 200 companies.  We also 
provide answers for the long only (182) and hedge funds (18) separately.  For each 
question, the first graph corresponds to the universe, the second to long only funds 
and finally, the third graph states the answers provided by hedge funds. 
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Question 1: How is your institution predominatly characterized? 
This question was introduced in the survey to better understand the universe.  
Figure 5.1 
 
From the sample surveyed, 91% of the respondents claimed their institution was 
predominantly long only, with 9% representing themselves as hedge funds.  
 
Question 2: Which Risk Management tool do you currently use? 
The following question has to do with the risk system used by the asset managers.  
It is interesting to know which risk management tool do asset managers use to 
measure risk within the portfolios. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Your Institution characterized 
by being predominantly:
91%
9%
Long only Hedge Fund
 143 
 
Figure 5.2 
 
 
The respondents were queried on the risk management tools used at their 
respective firms.  A large majority of those surveyed (79%) use Barra’s Risk 
Management system.  Goldman Sachs’ (GS) risk management tool was a distant 
second represented by 5% of respondents. 
 
Different risk systems provide diverse tools for effective risk management.  They 
also differ in terms of assumptions they use.  It is therefore important to know what 
systems are used in the industry.  One obvious conclusion from this question is 
that, once again, the industry seems to be highly correlated in terms of the tools 
they use. In fact, the great majority of the fund managers questioned uses the 
Barra’s Risk Management system.  
 
When the market is more volatile, portfolio managers have more pressure to scale 
their positions and measure risks (DeMiguel, 2010).  It is precisely their risk system 
that measures what positions are riskier and which ones should be sold to reduce 
the portfolio risk.  If the great majority of portfolio managers use the same tool to 
Figure 2: Which Risk Management tool do you currently use? 
79%
1%
4%
5%
3%
3%
1%
1%
1%
1% 1%
Barra Algori thmics APT Barrie and Hibbert
Fin Analytics In house Sophis MS Risk Mgt
GS Risk Mgt Riskmetrics  Statpro
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measure risk, it will create a selling cluster.  As mentioned by Boyson, Stahel and 
Stalz (2008) when using monthly hedge fund style indices representing eight 
different styles from January 1990 to August 2007, the authors find strong 
evidence of clustering of worst returns. 
 
Question 3: How often do your Portfolio Managers use the system? 
Having detailed which risk system they use, it is now interesting to know how often 
they used it.  The first question was important to know the sophistication used by 
asset managers to measure risk.  It is also important to see how often the risk 
models are used.   
 
For all asset managers (all sample): 
Figure 5.3 
 
 
20% of the respondents use their risk management system daily, while 39% use it 
monthly.  While the frequency of use might depend to some degree on the 
structure of the firm, the survey demonstrates that 77% assess their risk system at 
least once a month while only 22% use it quarterly. 
Figure 3: How often do your Portfolio Managers 
use the system?
20%
18%
39%
22%
1%
Daily Weekly Monthly Quarterly Other
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These findings come in line with Dangl, T., Randl, O. and Zechner, J., 2014 
studies, as they state risk management for long-term investor is still in an early 
stage.   
 
For long only: 
 
Figure 5.3a 
 
 
74% of Long-only portfolio managers use their risk system at least once a month 
with only 15% checking this daily.  A quarter of those surveyed look at their risk 
systems only once per quarter. 
 
  
Figure 3a: How often do your Portfolio Managers 
use the system?
15%
18%
41%
25%
1%
Daily Weekly Monthly Quarterly Other
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For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.3b 
 
 
66% of hedge fund managers check their risk systems on a dialy basis, while none 
of those surveyed use the risk systems available to them less frequently than every 
month. 
 
We can see by the answers that the systems in place are not used frequently 
enough by many respondents.  Moreover, we clearly see that long only companies 
use the risk system less often, compared with hedge funds.  The majority of hedge 
fund managers look at their portfolio risk every day, while the majority of long only 
managers check this only 4 to 12 times per year.  This indicates that hedge fund 
managers are more concerned about understanding their portfolio risk on a more 
frequent basis.  
 
 
Figure 3b: How often do your Portfolio Managers 
use the system?
66%
17%
17%
Daily Weekly Monthly Quarterly Other
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Question 4: How frequently does a Risk Manager meet with the Portfolio 
Manager to discuss risks within a portfolio? 
The risk manager should monitor the risks in the portfolio.  This has to be done by 
discussions between portfolio manager and risk manager.  This question is to 
measure the frequency of these occurrences.  
 
For all asset managers: 
Figure 5.4 
 
 
52% of those surveyed said risk managers at their firm met with portfolio managers 
on a quarterly basis, while 29% of those surveyed said the meetings were held on 
a monthly basis. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: How frequently does a Risk 
Manager meet with the Portfolio 
Manager to discuss portfolio risk?
6%
12%
52%
1%
29%
Daily Weekly Monthly Quarterly Other
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For long only: 
Figure 5.4a 
 
 
57% of long only managers only meet their risk managers on a quarterly basis.  
While only 2% meet their risk managers on a daily basis. 
For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.4b 
 
 
72% of Hedge fund managers meet their risk manager at least once a week, with 
the majority of these meeting every day.  Only 6% meet their risk manager on a 
less frequent quarterly basis. 
Figure 4a: How frequently does a Risk 
Manager meet with the Portfolio 
Manager to discuss portfolio risk?
2%
10%
57%
1%
30%
Daily Weekly Monthly Quarterly Other
Figure 4b: How frequently does a Risk 
Manager meet with the Portfolio 
Manager to discuss portfolio risk?
44%
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6% 0%
22%
Daily Weekly Monthly Quarterly Other
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These answers point again towards the lack of commitment that portfolio 
managers have with the risk department, particularly within long only institutions.  
This clearly shows that hedge funds place a greater emphasis on risk management 
than long only funds.  Overall, we can see that risk monitoring is not frequent 
enough for all companies and specifically for long only.  Hedge Funds are once 
more shown to be better prepared and are more diligent in terms of risk 
management. 
 
Question 5.1: Portfolio Liquidity 
Liquidity risk - defined by Jorion (2007) as arising when a forced liquidation of 
assets creates unfavourable price movements - is a crucial area of risk 
management and asset management in particular.  It is not possible to accurately 
value portfolios without taking into account the liquidity of its positions.  In this 
question, we tackle liquidity issues. 
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For all asset managers: 
Figure 5.5 
 
Overall, financial institutions place a greater emphasis on number of days to 
liquidate the portfolio than any other liquidity related issues, with 79.5% looking at 
this on at least a frequent basis.  Other liquidity issues are also reviewed, but are 
not look at as frequently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Portfolio Liquidity
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For long only funds: 
Figure 5.5a 
 
In line with the ‘all asset managers’ results, long only institutions place a greater 
emphasis on number of days to liquidate the portfolio than any other liquidity 
related issues. 
 
For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.5b 
 
Figure 5a: Portfolio Liquidity
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Figure 5b: Portfolio Liquidity
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88.9% of hedge fund managers look very frequently at the number of days it will 
take to liquidate their portfolios.  This is the overriding liquidity concern for hedge 
funds. Regarding other liquidity issues, hedge funds tend to either very frequently 
look at this, or not at all. 
 
Comparing long only funds with hedge funds, we again see that the answers for 
the latter reflect the fact that more attention is dedicated to risk management 
functions on a more frequent basis, and that hedge funds are much more 
concerned about portfolio liquidity than their long-only counterparts are. However, 
despite the differences between long only and hedge fund managers, we found 
evidence in the literature review that managing liquidity risk has been a priority for 
most asset managers in the last several years.  
 
Question 5.2: Active positions over quarter 
All the funds in our universe defined themselves as active funds.  In this question, 
we are trying to analyse how frequent the participants within the survey analyse 
the active positions within the quarter in the portfolio. 
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For all asset managers: 
Figure 5.6 
 
 
Of those surveyed, 45.7% “frequently” measure their ex-ante tracking error to 
control and measure portfolio risk rather than “very frequently”.  While 44% 
frequently analyse whether their portfolio is underweight or overweight in 
comparison to their benchmark, with 21.5% saying they analyse it very frequently.  
We obtained similar answers for the measurement of portfolios being overweight 
vs. the benchmark. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Active Positions Over Quarter
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For long only firms: 
Figure 5.6a 
 
 
Only about one-fifth of long only portfolio managers looks at their active positions 
and tracking error on a very frequent basis.  This would indicate that long only 
managers are concerned about these risk factors, but not necessarily over the very 
short-term. 
 
For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.6b 
 
 
Figure 6a: Active Positions Over Quarter
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Figure 6b: Active Positions Over Quarter
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Hedge fund managers are much more split with regards to looking at tracking error 
and active positions: they tend to look at them either very frequently, or not at all, 
with two-thirds of hedge funds saying that they do not consider active benchmark 
positions.  However, this could be because they are not managed against 
traditional benchmarks, like the S&P500, and are generally judged on absolute, not 
relative returns. 
 
Once more, although the universe of portfolio managers defined themselves as 
active managers, they do not analyse their active money as frequently as 
expected. 
 
Question 5.3: Country positioning summary 
With the recent credit crisis and the actual debt problems in Europe, country and 
sector exposure are important risk factors to be considered. 
 
For all the asset managers: 
Figure 5.7 
 
Figure 7: Country Positioning Summary
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Given the interconnectedness of the global economy and the recent increase in the 
volatility of sovereign government debt, it is important to consider country exposure 
with a greater degree of diligence.  In terms of relative geographic exposure, only 
47.7% of respondents claimed it is considered frequently.  Another 18.6% rarely 
considered country exposure. 
 
With respect to year on year sector weighting positions, 49.7% consider it 
frequently.  The figures are similar for quarter on quarter comparisons for country 
weightings, with 19.7% saying they “rarely” consider sector weight position. 
 
For long only: 
Figure 5.7a 
 
 
The majority of long only managers frequently look at their relative weights and 
how they have changed. 
 
 
Figure 7a: Country Positioning Summary
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For hege funds: 
Figure 5.7b 
 
 
Hedge funds tend to be less concerned about relative weights than long only 
funds, but again there is a more binary outcome shown from their attitude towards 
relative weights and how they have changed. 
 
Since the sample is predominantly focused on long only institutions, it is natural 
that most of these investors consider country when comparing to the benchmark.  
Once again, these factors are not considered enough. 
 
Question 5.4: Top 10 bets since portfolio tenure 
It is relevant to analyse the contribution of the top 10 bets within the portfolio since 
they often count for a substantial portion of the performance of the portfolio 
(Brandt, Santa Clara and Valkanov, 2009); the contribution of the Top 10 holdings 
plays a significant role in determining the Portfolio Manager’s total contribution. 
For all asset managers: 
Figure 7b: Country Positioning Summary
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Figure 5.8 
 
 
21.8% of the respondents said they rarely considered contribution the top 10 bets.  
Only 46.2% of those surveyed said they review this performance “frequently” with 
another 20.3% saying they review it “very frequently”.   
 
For long only: 
Figure 5.8a 
 
 
Figure 8: Top 10 Bets since Portfolio Tenure
20.3% 46.2% 21.8% 7.1% 4.6%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Cumulative
Contribution of top 10
very frequently frequently rarely never n/a
Figure 8a: Top 10 Bets since Portfolio Tenure
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Only 47.5% of long only managers review the contribution to performance from 
their top 10 bets on a frequent basis, while a fairly large 24% rarely do this. 
 
For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.8b 
 
Two-thirds of hedge fund managers surveyed said that they look at the contribution 
of their top 10 bets on a very frequent basis, while the rest look at this frequently. 
 
The top 10 bets count for a significant part of the performance and risk of the 
portfolio.  These answers show that hedge fund managers place more emphasis 
on their top 10 active positions, and the ensuing results, than long only managers 
do. This may reflect the fact that long only managers tend to place large bets on 
‘long-term winners’ and are not so concerned with short-term “noise” affecting the 
performance of their top holdings. 
 
 
 
Figure 8b: Top 10 Bets since Portfolio Tenure
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Question 5.5: Quarterly stock contribution 
Similar to Tracking Error, it is important to distinguish what is market risk and what 
is stock specific.  It is also important to consider the main contributors towards 
performance from the Top and Bottom 20 holdings. 
 
For all the asset managers: 
Figure 5.9 
 
Only a small portion (16.1%) of respondents said they “very frequently” look at their 
active money vs. portfolio beta, while 44.2% review it “frequently”.   
 
It is important to analyse which of the underlying positions are contributing to the 
over or underperformance of the portfolio.  For the relative contribution of the top 
20 and bottom 20 positions, only 19.1% consider it “very frequently” while 47.7% 
look at it “frequently”. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Quarterly Stock Contribution
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For long only: 
Figure 5.9a 
 
 
Only 14.9% of long only portfolio managers look at active money versus beta on a 
very frequent basis and a large 23.8% rarely look at this.  A similar pattern is 
shown towards looking a relative contribution from the top 20 and bottom 20 
positions. 
For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.9b 
 
 
Figure 9a: Quarterly Stock Contribution
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Figure 9b: Quarterly Stock Contribution
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Again, hedge funds show more of a binary outcome when reviewing risk factors, 
with 44.4% not considering active money versus beta, while the rest look at this at 
least frequently. 
All the portfolio managers are active managers hence they have the benchmark 
that they need to outperform.  The portfolio managers considered in this survey are 
all active managers.  Therefore, it is important to distinguish between stock picking 
skills and market behaviour (Alpha and Beta).  Strangely, few portfolio managers 
consider this matter.  Once more, when hedge funds review these issues, they pay 
more attention to it than long only managers do. 
 
Question 6: Cumulative contribution from stock selection 
Market Capitalization is a very important parameter in any portfolio.  This question 
serves to analyse to what extent this value is considered. 
For all asset managers: 
Figure 5.10 
 
 
Figure 10: Cumulative Contribution from Stock 
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Market capitalization remains an important parameter on the back of liquidity 
concerns (companies with large market capitalizations tend to exhibit higher 
liquidity).  53.3% consider the market cap distribution “frequently”, with another 
16.8% considering it “very frequently”.  The figure is similar for those considering a 
portfolio’s market-cap breakdown. 
 
For long only: 
Figure 5.10a 
 
 
The pattern shown by all asset managers is continued for long only managers, with 
most frequently looking at their market-cap positioning.  However, 20.7% rarely 
look at this indicator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10a: Cumulative Contribution from Stock 
Selection
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For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.10b 
 
Hedge funds are more concerned with market-cap distribution than long-only 
managers, with 83.3% of hedge fund managers looking at this at least frequently.  
Market capitalization is considered by many academics to be itself a risk factor 
(Fama, Banz, 1981).  For example, the Carhart (Carhart (1997)) model or Fama 
and French (Fama and French (1993 and 1996)) three-factor model consider size 
as a risk factor.  Once again, Portfolio Managers do not consider all risks to be 
wholly important and hedge funds considered this market-cap positioning more 
than long only funds.  This would indicate that hedge funds are more concerned 
about liquidity. 
 
Question 7: How frequently do you analyse the cash position? 
Cash is an important part of a portfolio.  On one hand, it reduces risk and offers 
possibility of new investments.  On the other, return on cash is usually lower than 
on other investments.  It is relevant to know what the cash position is within the 
fund.  With the recent increase in emphasis on volatility, the cash cushion provides 
Figure 10b: Cumulative Contribution from Stock 
Selection
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the benefit of facilitating redemptions and dampening the effect of volatility 
(Simutin, 2010).  However, the returns on the cash portion tend to be lower than 
equity, and many portfolio managers are encouraged by their investors to put cash 
to work.   
 
For all the asset managers: 
Figure 5.11 
 
 
20% respondents consider their cash position monthly, with another 29% analysing 
it on a weekly basis.  49% analyze it on a daily basis.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: How frequently do you analyse 
the cash position?
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For long only: 
Figure 5.11a 
 
Only 44% of long-only managers analyse their cash position daily, but nearly all do 
look at this at least once a month. 
 
For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.11b 
 
 
Figure 11a: How frequently do you analyse 
the cash position?
31%
22%
2%
1%
0%
44%
Dai ly Weekly Monthly Quarterly Semi-annual ly Other
Figure 11b: How frequently do you analyse 
the cash position?
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A massive 83% of hedge fund managers analyse their cash position every day, 
and none of those surveyed look at this less frequently than every week. 
 
These results indicate that hedge funds look at, and therefore place more 
emphasis, on the cash position of their portfolios than long only firms place.  This 
again highlights that hedge funds are more concerned about liquidity, and may 
indicate that they are more concerned about client redemptions. 
 
Question 8: How often do you analyse the Emerging Markets relative bet to 
the index? 
Emerging markets played a central role in Equity Allocation in recent years.  In 
fact, their risk premia is larger than for developed markets.  It is important to know 
if this is considered by Fund managers.  The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(Samuelson,1965 and Fama 1970) says that greater returns imply greater risk.  
Over the last decade Emerging Markets have had a risk premium over developed 
markets, while returns have been broadly better than in developed ones.  It is 
important to realize all the risk factors in a portfolio, so we questioned respondents 
about this area. 
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For all asset managers: 
Figure 5.12 
 
 
With the importance of emerging markets increasing over the past two decades, 
and with emerging markets projected to be a major growth driver for future returns 
in markets, many managers have turned to them to generate returns and provide 
diversification. 49.5% of respondents say they analyse their emerging markets 
position “frequently”.  It is interesting to see that only 13.2% of the managers 
analyze their exposure on a “very frequent” basis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: How often do you analyze the Emerging 
Markets Relative Bet to index? 
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For long only: 
Figure 5.12a 
 
52.6% of long only managers consider their Emerging Market exposure frequently, 
with 22.5% rarely considering this. 
 
For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.12b 
 
 
Figure 12a: How often do you analyze the Emerging 
Markets Relative Bet to index? 
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Figure 12b: How often do you analyze the Emerging 
Markets Relative Bet to index? 
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Once again, hedge fund managers display a binary attitude towards relative 
exposure, with 52.9% not even considering their Emerging Market exposure. 
Overall, long only managers are more concerned with relative exposure to 
Emerging Markets, yet when hedge funds do consider this, they do so on a more 
frequent basis. 
 
Question 9: How often do you analyze the portfolio turnover? 
Portfolio turnover is important to assess performance and trading costs.  An 
increase in the frequency of this analysis by asset managers might help to improve 
portfolio performance, as they would gain a better understanding of their costs.   
For all the asset managers: 
Figure 5.13 
 
Figure 13: How often do you analyse the 
portfolio turnover?
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From those surveyed, 71% analyse their turnover at least once a month.  Of these 
responses, 41% review their turnover monthly with another 28% reviewing it only 
on a quarterly basis. 
For long only: 
Figure 5.13a 
 
43% of long only managers review portfolio turnover every month, while 30% look 
at this every quarter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13a: How often do you analyse the 
portfolio turnover?
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For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.13b 
 
50% of hedge funds analyze portfolio turnover every day, with only 22% and 6% 
considering this every month and quarter respectively. 
There is a stark contrast between these results when comparing long only fund to 
hedge funds.  Most long only funds look at portfolio turnover every month or 
quarter, while most hedge funds do this at least every week.  This may indicate 
that hedge funds are already much more aware of the effects of the cost of trading 
on their performance.   
 
  
Figure 13b: How often do you analyse the 
portfolio turnover?
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Question 10: How often do you analyse portfolio performance vs. peers? 
In this question, we ask how often the fund is compared with its peers.  It is a 
relevant question, particularly for active managers as this is how they are judged, 
both externally by clients and internally for remuneration.   
For all asset managers:  
Figure 5.14 
 
It is interesting to note that even though performance vs. peers is important, only 
20% of the 200 sampled analyze the performance on a monthly basis.  78% 
undertake a quarterly analysis, with 2% analyzing it only twice a year.   
 
  
Figure 14: How often do you analyse 
portfolio performance vs. peers?
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For long only: 
Figure 5.14a 
 
A large 83% of long only managers review their performance versus peers on a 
quarterly basis. 
For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.14b 
 
Figure 14a: How often do you analyse 
portfolio performance vs. peers?
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Hedge funds review their performance versus peers on a much more frequent 
basis than long only funds, with 63% looking at this every month.  This could be 
because hedge funds tend to exhibit a shorter-term investment horizon than long-
only funds.  Once again, for active portfolio managers, this should be crucial.  
Analysing performance vs. peers is important to assess skill and risk.  Overall, 
most asset manager’s look at performance against peers every quarter, which is 
still a relatively short investment horizon.  This number is heavily skewed by long-
only funds. 
 
Question 11: How often do you analyze the following parameters to detect 
the risks within the portfolio? 
The next question analyzes several risk factors that should be taken into account 
when considering portfolio risk. 
For all asset managers: 
Figure 5.15 
 
Figure 15: How often do you analyse the following 
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31.0%
29.1%
31.0%
18.9%
34.0%
34.7%
34.5%
42.3%
14.2%
15.1%
14.7%
14.7%
16.3%
13.7%
13.6%
11.7%
14.2%
15.3%
19.3% 43.7%
7.1%
7.5%
8.1%
8.1%
7.1%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Active Money
Stocks Outside the Benchmark
Tracking Error
% of TE from Top 10 stocks
Performance that comes from Beta
very frequently frequently rarely never n/a
 176 
 
42% of those surveyed measure their performance that comes from beta 
“frequently” with 18.9% measuring it very frequently.  44% measure the tracking 
error from the top 10 stocks “frequently” with 19% measuring it “very frequently”.  
In terms of the tracking error, 31% measure it “frequently”, with 35% measuring it 
“very frequently”.  For stocks outside the benchmark, 35% measure it “frequently” 
compared to 29% measuring it “very frequently”.  34% measure active money 
‘frequently’ with 31% measuring it “very frequently”.  It is interesting to see that only 
31% of the surveyed analyze the active money on a frequent basis. 
For long only: 
Figure 5.15a 
 
Overall, long only funds place greater emphasis on tracking error, off-benchmark 
positions and active money, yet other parameters are still considered.  Nearly a 
third of all long only managers rarely or do not ever consider these parameters. 
Figure 15a: How often do you analyse the following 
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For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.15b 
 
Hedge funds continue to exhibit a binary outcome when considering positions on a 
relative basis.  For example, 50% of hedge fund managers do not think about 
tracking error, yet of those who do, 33% consider this very frequently. 
 
Once again, for portfolio managers that define themselves as active managers, 
these values are probably not what they should be.  While most investment 
managers look at these parameters, there are a number of hedge funds that do not 
consider them.  This could be because the vast majority of the hedge funds may 
be judged on absolute, not relative performance, hence they may have cash 
benchmarks, rather than standard equity market ones.  
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Question 12: How often do you analyze the following risk decomposition 
parameters? 
Once again, the question serves to understand the depth of the risk analysis that is 
done in investment companies. 
For all asset managers: 
Figure 5.16 
 
It is clear that these risk parameters are not overly considered by asset managers. 
Only 13.5% of managers surveyed said that they very frequently look at stock 
specific risk.  This is surprising given that most are active equity market managers. 
  
Figure 16: How often do you analyze the following risk 
decomposition parameters? 
13.5%
14.5%
13.5%
13.1%
12.8%
31.0%
28.0%
28.0%
26.6%
28.6%
12.0%
13.5%
13.5%
14.6%
13.3%
12.0%
12.0%
12.5%
12.6%
12.8%
31.5%
32.0%
32.5%
33.2%
32.7%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stock Specific Risk
Country Risk
Industry Risk
Risk Index
Currency Risk
very frequently frequently rarely never n/a
 179 
 
For long only: 
Figure 5.16a 
 
Long only managers tend to follow the same pattern shown by the results for all 
asset managers.  There is a reasonably equal spread of results for all questions 
asked regarding these risk parameters. 
For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.16b 
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11.5%
12.6%
12.1%
11.6%
10.7%
34.1%
30.8%
30.8%
29.3%
31.5%
13.2%
14.8%
14.8%
16.0%
14.6%
12.6%
12.6%
13.2%
13.3%
13.5%
28.6%
29.1%
29.1%
29.8%
29.8%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stock Specific Risk
Country Risk
Industry Risk
Risk Index
Currency Risk
very frequently frequently rarely never n/a
Figure 16b: How often do you analyze the following 
risk decomposition parameters? 
33.3%
33.3%
27.8%
27.8%
33.3%
5.6%
5.6%
5.6%
5.6%
5.6%
61.1%
61.1%
66.7%
66.7%
61.1%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stock Specific Risk
Country Risk
Industry Risk
Risk Index
Currency Risk
very frequently frequently rarely never n/a
 180 
 
Again, hedge funds display an ‘all or nothing’ approach to assessing risk 
parameters.  All of these risk parameters are either viewed very frequently, or not 
at all. 
This question asks about the analysis frequency of simple risk decomposition 
parameters.  Even with such core and simple risk factors, the frequency is far from 
reasonable.  Once again, for active portfolio managers this analysis should be 
deeper and more frequent.  The typical behaviour appears: hedge funds are more 
sensible towards risk management, when they actually look at it. These results are 
meaningful, namely because to the best of our knowledge there is no 
comprehensive study analysing in such detail, the risk decomposition parameters 
of the asset managers. As we found out in the literature review (Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, 2012, Ernst and Young’s Risk Management for Asset Management 
Survey, 2013 and Rethinking Risk Management Survey, 2015), besides the 
traditional operational and counterparty credit risks, the risk categories of major 
concern in the last few years have been regulatory, mandate, conduct and liquidity 
risks, followed by market and investment risks. However, what we conclude with 
this question’s responses is that the risk monitoring frequency and the factors 
analyzed still need to be developed and improved. This also highlights the previous 
mentioned problem mentioned by E&Y in 2015, that companies are still facing 
several challenges to convert the risk culture into the day-to-day business and 
most of the respondents continue to work to develop stress testing approaches 
and improve data systems. 
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Question 13 and 14: Sector and country: Top 10 /Bottom 10 risk contributors 
as % of tracking error 
This question tries to measure risk for the active part of the portfolio both in terms 
of sector and country exposure. 
For all asset managers: 
Figure 5.17 
 
50.8% of those sampled “frequently” analyze the country origin for the top 10 as a 
risk contributor as a percent of tracking error, with only 10.1% analyzing it “very 
frequently”. 
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For long only: 
Figure 5.17a 
 
Most long only managers review their country and sector contributions to risk on a 
frequent basis, recording 53.6% and 55.6% of the reponses respectively.  
However, 17.7% and 17.2% rarely look at this. 
For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.17b 
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Following from the trends we have seen, hedge funds show binary outcome.  
27.8% of hedge funds review their country and sector contributions to risk.  50% of 
hedge funds do not even consider the contribution of country positions to their total 
tracking error.  After the last financial crisis, country risk assumed a crucial 
importance.  It seems that many Portfolio Managers are still yet to consider this 
new reality.  Once again, when considered, hedge funds review these factors more 
frequently than long only institutions. 
53% of those surveyed said they “frequently” analyze the top 10 and bottom 10 
sector positions to measure their risk contribution as a percentage of tracking error, 
with only 9.6% measuring it “very frequently”.  Considering that these positions 
play an important role in the performance of the fund, risk management in this area 
is, once more, neglected by the Portfolio Manager. 
 
Question 15: How often do you analyze the following contributors as a 
percentage of tracking error? 
The following question tries to analyze the risks considered in the portfolio. 
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For all asset managers: 
Figure 5.18 
 
Overall, you can see that liquidity, then volatility, are the most considered when 
analysing contribution to risk.  You can also see that style biases, such as growth 
or value or momentum, are largely ignored. 
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For long only: 
Figure 5.18a 
 
Similarly, you can see that liquidity, then volatility, are the most considered by long 
only funds when analysing contribution to risk.  You can also see that style biases, 
such as growth or value or momentum, are largely ignored.  
Figure 18a: How often do you analyze the following 
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For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.18b 
 
All factors are given greater consideration by hedge fund managers.  For example, 
a massive 88.9% of hedge fund managers very frequently review the contribution 
of liquidity to their tracking error, while 77.8% very frequently review volatility. 
All the risks considered in the question are very standard risk measures.  Both long 
only and hedge funds consider liquidity and volatility risks more frequently 
compared with other risk factors.  This would support the findings from questions 
5.1 and 6, as well as the Ernst & Young’s study presented on the literature review, 
which states that 62% of the asset managers evidenced liquidity metrics for 
regulated and segregated portfolios on an ongoing basis. Once again, hedge funds 
seem to be more risk aware than long only firms. 
The Carhart (1997) model considered momentum, size, Book to market and beta.  
This model was discussed in the academic literature.  However, portfolio managers 
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do not seem to take into account simple risks that are known.  If risk is not 
considered, it is not possible to measure performance.  
 
Question 16: Do you use the Style Research Ltd. tool? 
Style Research is a comprehensive software analysis tool used to assess market 
risk and style factors in portfolios.  This tool is especially used for equity portfolios. 
For all the asset managers: 
Figure 5.19 
 
41% of those surveyed said they used the tool, while a majority (59%) does not 
use this tool. 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Do you use Style Research Ltd. tool? 
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For long only: 
Figure 5.19a 
 
43% of long only managers surveyed said they used the tool, while 57% do not 
use the tool. 
 
For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.19b 
 
Figure 19a: Do you use Style Research Ltd. tool? 
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22% of hedge funds surveyed said they used the tool, while the vast majority 
(78%) does not use Style Research. 
The Style Research tool is a comprehensive and simple tool to use.  This software 
enables portfolio managers to track different risk behavior, the possible change in 
risk premium and any style bias in their portfolios.  It is a tool that is of particular 
interest for the equity market.  Even so, almost half of the portfolio managers do 
not use it.  In respect to this tool, it is less used by hedge fund industry compared 
with long only companies.  This may indicate that hedge funds prefer other risk 
measuring software, and are less concerned about style bias. 
Question 17: How often do you use the above system? 
The previous question asked about the usage of the style research.  This question 
asks about how often those who have Style Research use it. 
For all the asset managers: 
Figure 5.20 
 
Figure 20: How often do you use the above system? 
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For those respondents who use the Style Research tool, the majority, 70% said 
they only used it quarterly, while 19% said they used it monthly.   
For long only: 
Figure 5.20a 
 
For long only respondents who use the Style Research tool, the majority, 70% said 
they only used it quarterly, while 19% said they used it monthly.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20a: How often do you use the above system? 
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For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.20b 
 
For hedge fund respondents who use the Style Research tool, there is an equal 
split as to the frequency of use. 
Considering both answers, portfolio manager’s do not use this simple and 
comprehensive tool for equity risk management often enough.  Comparing hedge 
funds with long only asset managers, hedge funds use the tools less in absolute 
terms, but, when they do it, is used more often.  This could also indicate that long 
only managers are more aware of style bias present in their portfolios. 
 
 
Figure 20b: How often do you use the above system? 
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Question 18: Who has the final decision regarding changes to the portfolio 
when the portfolio is outside the risk parameters? 
It is important to understand who has the final call when the portfolio deviates 
outside its risk parameters in order to understand the independence of the risk 
department. 
For all asset managers: 
Figure 5.21 
 
The survey queried respondents regarding the individual who exerted final 
responsibility when the portfolio fell outside the stated/mandated risk parameters. 
30% of those surveyed said the head of equities held final decision-making 
responsibility, while only 36% said the risk manager made the final decision.  31% 
of those surveyed responded that the portfolio manager himself had final authority.   
Figure 21: Who has the final decision regarding changes 
to the portfolio when the portfolio is outside the risk 
parameters? 
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CIO Head of Equities Risk Manager Portfolio Manager Other
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For long only: 
Figure 5.21a 
 
For long only managers the final decision regarding portfolio risk is fairly evenly 
split between the Head of Equities (30%), the Risk manager (37%) and the 
Portfolio Manager (30%). 
 
  
Figure 21a: Who has the final decision regarding changes 
to the portfolio when the portfolio is outside the risk 
parameters? 
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For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.21b 
 
For hedge funds, there is more involvement of the CIO and Portfolio Manager in 
the final risk decision (6% and 39% respectively) than for long only managers, but 
the decision-making role of the Risk Manager is reduced. 
 
The answers given raise the question of whether fund management firms provide 
any separation of responsibility for the risk management function, especially when 
the risk characteristics deviate from those stated in the fund’s mandate. 
Furthermore, it raises doubts about the portfolio manager’s ability to independently 
separate his risk management from his portfolio management functions. They 
support the findings from the literature review, that the Asset Management industry 
Figure 21b: Who has the final decision regarding changes 
to the portfolio when the portfolio is outside the risk 
parameters? 
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still needs a strong improvement in what concerns the independence of the risk 
management functions. According to the E&Y reports, in 2013 only 51% of the 
asset managers confirmed the independence of the investment risk function to the 
risk decisions. 
 
In this case, hedge fund risk managers have less independence as far as risk is 
concerned.  This can be just a consequence of the size of hedge funds teams and 
organizations, which are usually smaller than typical asset managers, meaning that 
there may be shared roles of responsibility.  
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Question 19: How many people are in your risk management team? 
The purpose of this question is to understand the scale of risk management 
resources used by the investment companies. 
For all asset managers: 
Figure 5.22 
 
The survey indicated that 42% of firms had 1-5 members on their risk management 
team, and a further 35% had more than 10 members.  23% had between 6-10 
people. 
 
 
 
Figure 22: How many people are in your Risk Management 
Team? 
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 197 
 
For long only: 
Figure 5.22a 
 
The survey for long only managers indicated that 40% of firms had 1-5 members 
on their risk management team, and a further 36% had more than 10 members.  
24% had between 6-10 people. 
  
Figure 22a: How many people are in your Risk 
Management Team? 
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For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.22b 
 
The survey indicated that 66% of hedge funds had 1-5 members on their risk 
management team, and a further 28% had more than 10 members.  Only 6% had 
between 6-10 people. 
 
Again, in line with the findings from the literature review (Rethinking Risk 
Management  Survey, 2015), overall, the number of people financial institutions 
have working in their risk department seems quite low. However, one would need 
to consider some sort of assets under management/number of risk management 
employee’s relationship before making a fully informed statement.  In general, 
hedge funds tend to have fewer members on their risk teams.  A possible and 
similar explanation for this has to do with the size of hedge funds companies, 
Figure 22b: How many people are in your Risk 
Management Team? 
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1 - 5 6 - 10 10+
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typically smaller than long only ones in terms of assets under management and 
personnel. 
In 2015 E&Y wrote a report in which it claimed that 64% of the Asset Managers 
guaranteed an increase in the size of the risk function in that year while 60% were 
expecting such increases to continue in the 2016. Therefore, despite the small 
number of people in the teams had in 2010, in the last few years they have been 
growing and gaining relevance and responsibility. 
 
Question 20: Does your risk manager have other duties? 
This is similar to the previous two questions.  The objective is to understand the 
strength and dedication of the risk department. 
Figure 5.23 
 
Figure 23: Does your Risk Manager accumulate other roles 
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15% of risk managers have other duties apart from their risk management 
responsibilities, which might preclude them from focusing on and devoting 
sufficient time and resources to risk management.  85% of fund management firms 
have dedicated risk managers.   
For long only: 
Figure 5.23a 
 
Most long only firms (88%) have a dedicated Risk Management role. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23a: Does your Risk Manager accumulate other 
roles 
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For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.23b 
 
44% of hedge fund risk managers have another role within their company.  This 
additional role could mean that the risk manager dedicates less time to identify risk 
within portfolios. 
 
As highlighted in questions 18 and 19, hedge funds have less dedicated risk 
managers.  However, a similar argument can be used: the size of hedge fund 
companies and the need for the risk manager to undertake other duties.  It is also 
important to understand what other roles they execute as this may lead to a conflict 
of interest. 
 
 
Figure 23b: Does your Risk Manager accumulate other 
roles 
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Question 21: Who does your Head of Risk Management report to? 
This question also has to do with the independence and strength of the risk 
department. 
For all the asset managers: 
Figure 5.24 
 
71% of Risk Managers report to their Investment Risk Oversight Committee, while 
25% still report direct to their CIO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 24: Who does your Head of Risk Management 
report to? 
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For long only: 
Figure 5.24a 
 
74% of Risk Managers in long only institutions report to their Investment Risk 
Oversight Committee, while 22% still report direct to their CIO. 
  
 Figure 24a: Who does your Head of Risk Management 
report to? 
22%
74%
4%
CIO Investment Risk Oversight Committee Other
 204 
 
For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.24b 
 
Only 44% of Risk Managers in hedge funds report to their Investment Risk 
Oversight Committee, while 56% report direct to their CIO. 
 
Overall, 25% of risk managers report to their company CIO, while 71% report to a 
Risk Oversight Committee.  This highlights a potential lack of authority of the Risk 
Oversight Committee as 25% of PM’s still reported to the CIO when regarding risk 
matters.  More importantly, these responses could indicate that there is a conflict of 
interest when measuring risk, as the CIO may not be as objective when it comes to 
balancing risk management against reaching performance targets.  Clearly, the 
role of the Chief Investment Officer and the Chief Risk Officer should be different in 
aims. 
 Figure 24b: Who does your Head of Risk Management 
report to? 
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Once again, hedge fund risk managers seem to have less independence than long 
only companies do.  A similar justification to the previous questions can be given 
for this fact. 
 
Question 22: How much do you spend on Portfolio Asset Risk Management 
on an annual basis? 
It is interesting to have an absolute value for the expenditure on risk management.  
 
For all the asset managers: 
Figure 5.25 
 
Figure 25: How much do you spend on Portfolio Asset Risk 
Management on an annual basis? 
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 206 
 
While the size of the firm surveyed may vary, 46% of firms spend only less than 
$5million on risk management annually, while 34% spend between $10million and 
$20millon. 20% spend more than $20million.   
 
For long only: 
Figure 5.25a 
 
44% of firms spend only less than $5million on risk management annually, while 
35% spend between $10million and $20million. 21% spend more than $20million.   
 
  
Figure 25a: How much do you spend on Portfolio Asset 
Risk Management on an annual basis? 
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For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.25b 
 
A large number of hedge funds (61%) spend only less than $5million on risk 
management annually, while 28% spend between $10million and $20million.  Only 
11% spend more than $20million. 
 
The total assets within the sample aggregate to approximately $503billion, but the 
money spent on risk management as a percent of assets managed still seems to 
be very limited.  These answers again point towards the lack of commitment of the 
senior management towards risk management, but this time an angle of financial 
commitment. 
 
Figure 25b: How much do you spend on Portfolio Asset 
Risk Management on an annual basis? 
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Hedge funds spend less on risk management than long only firms do in absolute 
terms.  However, hedge funds tend to be smaller.  It would be interesting to see 
what the relative spend is of these two type of Asset Management firms in order to 
determine who takes risk more serious in terms of financial resources. 
 
Question 23: Has this amount increased vs.? 
The recent financial crisis made investors and asset managers rethink their attitude 
towards risk.  This question tries to determine whether the recent financial crisis 
has led to an immediate consequence, in terms of investment in risk management. 
For all asset managers: 
Figure 5.26 
 
74.6% of firms have increased the amount that they spent on risk management 
compared to last year.  Slightly higher figures are recorded for the last 3 and 5 
years. 
Figure 26: Has this amount increased vs. 
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For long only: 
Figure 5.26a 
 
75.6% of firms have increased the amount that they spent on risk management 
compared to last year.  Slightly higher figures are recorded for the last 3 and 5 
years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26a: Has this amount increased vs. 
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For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.26b 
 
64.7% of hedge funds have increased the amount that they spent on risk 
management compared to last year.  The same figures are recorded for the last 3 
and 5 years.  
 
Overall, this trend points to an increasing focus and awareness of the importance 
of risk management, and indicates that firms have begun to address at least some 
of the issues regarding additional resources to enhance their risk management 
capabilities.  However, considering all the events from the last couple of years, 
nearly a quarter has made no increase in investment in risk management. 
 
Hedge funds have not increased the expenditure on risk management as much as 
long only firms.  One possible reason is that they were already more cautious in 
Figure 26b: Has this amount increased vs. 
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terms of risk, finding less need to improve and invest, compared with their long 
only counterparts. 
 
Observe that the relationship between Assets Under Management (AUM) and risk 
management will be addressed later in this section. 
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Question 24: Are the above parameters within the survey checked now on a 
more frequent basis than in the last...? 
This question analyses the impact the recent financial crisis had on the frequency 
of how often the above parameters are observed vs the last 1, 3 and 5 years. 
For all asset managers: 
Figure 5.27 
 
Over three-quarters of those surveyed said that the parameters in the survey were 
checked with increased frequency compared to last year (2009).  A similar number 
reported an increase in the frequency over the last 3 and 5 years.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Are the above parameters within the Survey 
checked now on a more frequent basis than in the last: 
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For long only: 
Figure 5.27a 
 
Similarly, over three-quarters of long only firms surveyed said that the parameters 
in the survey were checked with increased frequency compared to last year 
(2009).  A similar number reported an increase in the frequency over the last 3 and 
5 years.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27a: Are the above parameters within the 
Survey checked now on a more frequent basis than in 
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For hedge funds: 
Figure 5.27b 
 
Hedge funds surveyed show that while 70.6% of the firms have seen an increase 
in risk management activity over the last 1, 3 and 5 years, 29.4% of those 
surveyed have seen no increase.  
 
Overall, even following the financial turmoil, just under a quarter of those surveyed 
still do not analyze their risk parameters more frequently.  In line with the previous 
question, hedge funds did not change their attitude towards risk management as 
much as long only asset managers.  However, these results do show that risk 
management is becoming increasingly more important to investment managers. 
 
 
 
Figure 27b: Are the above parameters within the 
Survey checked now on a more frequent basis than in 
the last: 
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6. Relationship between performance and level of risk management 
 
The objective of this research is to understand what risk management processes 
are currently in place amongst active European equity asset managers, and to 
determine which practises are most effective. After analyzing the results of the 
primary data survey question by question, our goal is to link 6/w level of risk 
management (the level of risk management in an asset management) with the 
funds’ performance by measuring the influence that risk management has on a 
fund’s returns.  
 
A 6/w analysis will show the level of risk management within a company. The 6W’s 
can assist in evaluating the risk management within a company, by answering 
some questions: What is being done? Is it necessary? What useful purposes does 
it serve?; Where should it be done?; When should it be done?; Who is the best 
qualified person to do it?; How can it be done better/Easier/Safer?. 
 
This link can be analyzed by two different approaches: multivariate regressions 
and Principal Component Analysis (PCA). However, as all the questions try to 
measure risk awareness and focus on the same subject (the size of the risk teams, 
the budget they have, who the CRO reports to, etc.), they all have a natural 
correlation between them. Therefore, a multivariate regression per se may not be 
the best option to our study (Dodge, 2003) as it violates one key assumption of the 
multivariate regression: that the observations must be independent (Amemiya, 
Takeshi, 1985).  
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Regarding the Principal Component Analysis, it is a Statistical tool that makes the 
different variables orthogonal, and hence, uncorrelated (Jolliffe, 1982). PCA is a 
procedure used to overcome problems arising when the exploratory variables are 
close to being collinear (Dodge, 2003 and Jolliffe 1982).  
 
We are going to compare two multivariate regressions results in which the 
dependent variable is the performance rank as we are trying to measure the 
impact of the different questions of the survey on the performance of the funds (we 
computed performance from the available monthly NAV of the Fund in Bloomberg). 
In order to do this, we developed the following structure: 
- Perform a univariate robust OLS (Reference) for each question in the 
survey  
- Perform a multivariate robust OLS for the questions that were identified as 
significant in the previous step 
- Perform a Principal Components Analysis on the questions 
- Perform a univariate robust OLS for each Principal Component 
- Perform a multivariate robust OLS for the components that were identified 
as significant in the previous step 
- Compare the results of the different approaches. 
 
1. Univariate Robust OLS 
The goal of regression analysis is to find a linear relationship between one or more 
independent variables and a dependent variable.  The simplest regression method 
is the ordinary least squares regression (OLS). However, this simple method has 
several limiting assumptions regarding the data (Greene, 2011).  If the 
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assumptions are not true, this simple technique can give misleading results and 
OLS is said to be not robust to violations of its assumptions.  Robust regressions 
were designed to overcome these problems and are not overly affected by 
violations of assumptions by the underlying data-generating process (Andersen, 
2008). 
We are going to do several univariate robust regressions of the type 
 
where 40 are the different questions (variables) of the survey (please refer to 
appendix for the list of questions).  In this regression, the dependent variable is the 
performance of the Fund and the independent variables are the various questions 
of the survey. The regressions in questions were performed using Matlab routine 
robustfit of the Statistical Toolpack.  The results are presented in the following 
table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40,,1,  jXY ji
jj
i 
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Table 1– Results from the Robust univariate regressions on all the 
               questions in the survey 
 
As we can see by the results, only questions 5.3.c and 12.e are significant at 10%.  
 
These questions are the following: 
5.3.c) Country Positioning Summary, Country relative weights 
12.e) How often do you analyse the following risk decomposition parameters? 
Country Risk 
 
Question Intercept beta p-value t stat R2
5.1.a 65,79 -0,23 0,96 -0,06 0,00%
5.1.b 66,06 -0,33 0,93 -0,09 0,01%
5.1.c 65,21 0,08 0,98 0,02 0,00%
5.1.d 65,11 0,12 0,97 0,04 0,00%
5.2.a 59,01 2,74 0,38 0,88 0,61%
5.2.b 58,39 2,99 0,34 0,97 0,73%
5.2.c 57,12 3,64 0,25 1,15 1,03%
5.3.a 54,86 4,60 0,18 1,35 1,41%
5.3.b 54,11 4,96 0,17 1,40 1,50%
5.3.c 52,50 5,47 0,08 1,76 2,36%
5.4.a 56,37 4,06 0,24 1,18 1,07%
5.5.a 63,97 0,63 0,85 0,19 0,03%
5.5.b 64,63 0,32 0,92 0,10 0,01%
6.1.a 63,18 1,00 0,80 0,26 0,05%
6.1.b 62,63 1,25 0,74 0,33 0,08%
7 63,34 1,21 0,78 0,28 0,06%
8 58,03 3,16 0,31 1,02 0,81%
9 62,46 1,02 0,79 0,27 0,06%
10 79,95 -7,64 0,18 -1,34 1,38%
11.a 59,95 2,45 0,36 0,92 0,66%
11.b 58,52 3,02 0,27 1,11 0,96%
11.c 61,54 1,78 0,52 0,65 0,33%
11.e 60,87 1,89 0,50 0,68 0,36%
11.f 64,00 0,57 0,83 0,21 0,03%
12.a 72,68 -2,30 0,34 -0,96 0,71%
12.b 74,25 -2,76 0,24 -1,17 1,06%
12.c 73,46 -2,48 0,30 -1,03 0,83%
12.d 70,92 -1,71 0,47 -0,72 0,40%
12.e 77,19 -3,73 0,10 -1,68 2,15%
13 72,32 -2,87 0,39 -0,86 0,58%
14 71,32 -2,38 0,45 -0,75 0,44%
15.a 64,88 0,16 0,93 0,09 0,01%
15.b 74,08 -2,00 0,44 -0,77 0,47%
15.c 61,52 0,87 0,76 0,31 0,08%
15.d 58,83 1,59 0,46 0,75 0,44%
15.e 64,88 0,23 0,91 0,11 0,01%
15.f 62,41 0,74 0,73 0,34 0,09%
15.g 73,15 -1,81 0,47 -0,72 0,40%
15.h 64,17 0,29 0,90 0,13 0,01%
Q22 72,46 -2,40 0,26 -1,13 0,98%
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Analysing the last regression results, the portfolio manager’s main concern seems 
to be country risk exposure.  In fact, the two most significant variables are the 
country risk and how often they analyse it. 
 
It would have been interesting to explore potential significance between country 
risk analysis and performance of the Funds, which is something that will be 
explored in future research. 
 
In order to have more independent variables, we are going to analyse the 
multivariate regression results using statistically significant variables at 10% and 
secondly we are going to allow the introduction of variables with t-statistics greater 
than 1. 
 
2. Multivariate Robust OLS 
a. 90% Confidence Intervals 
We are now going to perform a multivariate robust regression on the two variables 
identified as significant in the previous section.  In this analysis, the independent 
variables (Xi) are questions 5.3.c and 12.e, and the output (Yi) is the performance 
of the Fund. The regression is  
 
 
  
2
2
1
1 iii XXY  
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The results are: 
 
Table 2 – Results from the multivariate Robust regression on questions 
                 5.3.c and 12.e 
 
 
 
An interesting point is that the questions have a stronger significance in the 
multivariate regression than in the corresponding univariate regressions.  This is 
due to the high collinearity between the variables. 
b. T-stat greater than 1 
 
It would have been interesting to explore potential significance between country 
risk analysis and performance of the Funds, which is something that will be 
explored in future research. 
 
We are now going to perform a multivariate robust regression on the seven 
variables identified with a t-statistic greater than 1 (Xi) in the previous section.  The 
regression is  
 
  
Intercept p-value t stat
64,23 0,00 6,82
Question beta Description
Q5.3c) 7,67 0,02 2,41 Country Positioning Summary, Country relative weights
Q12.e) -5,34 0,02 -2,34 How often do you analyze the following risk decomposition parameters?, Currency Risk
R2
6,43%



7
1j
j
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The results are 
 
Table 3 – Results from the multivariate Robust regression on questions with  
                 t-stat greater than one 
 
 
The questions used to perform this regression are questions 5.2.c), 5.3.a), 5.3.b), 
5.3.c), 5.4.a), 8), 10), 11.b), 12.b), 12.c), 12.e) and 22).  There are some 
differences in using more variables. Firstly, the R2 is bigger.  Secondly, instead of 
just considering questions regarding the geographical and diversification of the 
portfolio, more risk variables come in place, highlighting the importance of the 
different questions in the survey.  The country risk continues to appear as 
significant for the funds’ performance but considering t-stats greater than 1, the 
currency risk, Industry risk and the analysis of peers’ performance plays also an 
important role. 
 
 
 
 
Intercept p-value t stat
82,02 0,00 4,53
Questions beta Description
5.2.c) 0,26 0,96 0,04 Active Positions Over quarter, Ex-Ante Tracking Error (%)
 5.3.a) 3,20 0,81 0,24 Country Positioning Summary, Country breakdown vs previous quarter
5.3.b) -9,17 0,46 -0,75 Country Positioning Summary, Sector weight position vs. previous year
 5.3.c) 11,30 0,16 1,42 Country Positioning Summary, Country relative weights
 5.4.a) 6,51 0,13 1,53 Top 10 / Bottom 10 Bets since Portfolio Tenure, Cumulative Contribution of top 10
 8) -3,61 0,41 -0,82 How often do you analyze the Emerging Markets Relative Bet to index
 10) -10,13 0,12 -1,55 How often do you analyze the portfolio performance vs. peers?
 11.b) 1,92 0,62 0,50
How often do you analyse the following parameters to detect the risks within
 the portfolio?, Stocks Outside the Benchmark
 12.b) -9,74 0,22 -1,24 How often do you analyze the following risk decomposition parameters?, Country Risk
 12.c) 14,33 0,13 1,52 How often do you analyze the following risk decomposition parameters?, Industry Risk
 12.e) -10,34 0,07 -1,83 How often do you analyze the following risk decomposition parameters?, Currency Risk
 22) -1,33 0,55 -0,60 How much do you spend on Portfolio Asset Risk Management on an annual basis?
R2
12,25%
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3. PCA – Principle Component Analysis 
PCA is a statistical tool that has been used in several financial studies.  For a 
tutorial on PCA see Smith (2002).  Avellaneda and Lee (2008) developed a 
statistical arbitrage strategy for the US equity market using PCA.  Itzhaki and 
Infantino (2010) developed a high frequency trading system also for the US market 
using PCA techniques.  Sopipan, Kanjanavajee and Sattayatham (2012) used 
Principal Components Regression to predict the SET50 Index. The studies show 
the power and usefulness of PCA when dealing with financial data. 
 
We are going to do a Principle Components Regression and to proceed in the 
same way as we did for the multivariate OLS regression.  First, we compute the 
principal components. The first component, C1, corresponds to the one with the 
largest eigenvalue, C2 with the second higher eigenvalue, and so on.  Second, we 
do a univariate robust regression for each one of them to identify those, which are 
significant.  Finally, we do a robust OLS on these principal components. The 
objective of this analysis is to assess the relationship between the survey’s 
questions and performance. The results for the univariate regressions are: 
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Component Intercept beta p-value t stat R
2
C1 65,40 -0,48 0,63 -0,48 0,18%
C2 65,38 -0,19 0,91 -0,11 0,01%
C3 65,45 3,31 0,07 1,85 2,60%
C4 65,34 -0,62 0,78 -0,28 0,06%
C5 65,38 -0,88 0,72 -0,35 0,10%
C6 65,37 1,09 0,70 0,39 0,12%
C7 65,40 1,78 0,56 0,58 0,26%
C8 65,44 -2,58 0,42 -0,81 0,51%
C9 65,34 4,16 0,21 1,25 1,20%
C10 65,38 -0,68 0,85 -0,18 0,03%
C11 65,38 6,64 0,08 1,75 2,34%
C12 65,38 1,57 0,69 0,39 0,12%
C13 65,37 -0,18 0,97 -0,04 0,00%
C14 65,40 -6,39 0,13 -1,53 1,79%
C15 65,44 2,90 0,52 0,64 0,32%
C16 65,37 -0,76 0,88 -0,15 0,02%
C17 65,37 2,69 0,61 0,51 0,20%
C18 65,45 7,07 0,19 1,33 1,36%
C19 65,37 3,80 0,53 0,63 0,31%
C20 65,39 1,69 0,79 0,27 0,06%
C21 65,44 11,02 0,11 1,60 1,96%
C22 65,35 7,97 0,26 1,12 0,97%
C23 65,36 -5,32 0,49 -0,70 0,38%
C24 65,41 -4,33 0,59 -0,54 0,23%
C25 65,38 1,95 0,83 0,22 0,04%
C26 65,43 7,01 0,47 0,72 0,41%
C27 65,34 22,57 0,04 2,10 3,34%
C28 65,27 22,25 0,05 2,01 3,07%
C29 65,31 -16,79 0,16 -1,40 1,51%
C30 65,36 25,64 0,06 1,89 2,72%
C31 65,37 -15,84 0,35 -0,93 0,68%
C32 65,47 -19,13 0,31 -1,03 0,82%
C33 65,42 -35,59 0,13 -1,54 1,81%
C34 65,45 -30,25 0,21 -1,25 1,21%
C35 65,36 22,28 0,46 0,74 0,42%
C36 65,41 29,12 0,41 0,82 0,53%
C37 65,35 22,14 0,59 0,54 0,23%
C38 65,40 89,80 0,04 2,07 3,25%
C39 65,43 -85,39 0,22 -1,22 1,15%
C40 65,35 -109,67 0,61 -0,51 0,21%
Table 4 – Results from the Robust univariate regressions on all Principal 
                Components 
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Observe that there are six components with a p-value less than 10%: Components 
C3, C11, C27, C28, C30, and C38.  
 
Finally, the results for the multivariate OLS for these components are 
 
Table 5 – Results for the multivariate OLS for a p-value less than 10% 
 
 
Considering Table 4, there are 16 components with a t-stat greater than 1. The 
results for a multivariate OLS on these 16 components are the following 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept p-value t stat
65,55861 3,98E-40 19,83193
beta
92,25957 0,025403 2,262788
23,16576 0,07228 1,812941
20,66697 0,042447 2,050429
21,9169 0,037027 2,108381
-3,356091 0,048647 -1,991452
-6,198491 0,082789 -1,748982
R2
17,15%
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Table 6 – Results for the variables with a t-stat greater than 1\ 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Chapter 3 had the objective of analysing how risk management is currently used in 
European funds. The questions we developed tried to analyse the state of the art 
of the Risk Management in the Asset Management Industry.  The survey tried to 
answer several key questions: 
- What are the consequences of past financial crises? 
- Is risk management taken seriously inside financial organizations? 
- Are funds with fewer assets under management expected to spend 
(proportionally) less on risk management? 
Intercept p-value t stat
66,067 0,000 21,030
beta
3,359 0,039 2,089
3,729 0,212 1,256
6,276 0,066 1,856
-6,588 0,080 -1,765
7,611 0,111 1,606
10,919 0,078 1,781
8,645 0,175 1,365
17,852 0,066 1,857
20,491 0,041 2,066
-16,308 0,129 -1,528
26,167 0,034 2,147
-19,197 0,246 -1,167
-31,946 0,123 -1,556
-31,610 0,142 -1,480
88,071 0,025 2,264
-87,821 0,159 -1,419
R2
31,24%
 226 
 
A survey of 200 asset managers and hedge funds was implemented to identify 
current approaches to risk management, and what might need to be improved. The 
findings highlighted that there are significant issues within the risk management 
systems utilized by the various asset managers that need to improve considerably. 
In this chapter, we tried different approaches to explain the performance of the 
funds in terms of the survey’s questions.  We did robust regressions on the 
questions and on their principal components.  Due to the high collinearity of the 
questions, we were expecting the PCA approach to deliver better results and it 
proved to be correct.  The R2, which measures the capability of the regression to 
explain the problem, is greater for the PCA than the robust OLS (17.15% and 
6.43%, respectively).To further understand the impact of choosing more variables, 
we chose variables with t-stat greater than one.  Not surprisingly, the PCA results 
improved.  As the variables are uncorrelated, each one brings different information.  
For the opposite reasons, the multivariate OLS results were worse. 
 
The main conclusion from Chapter 3 is that there are significant issues within the 
risk management systems utilized by the various asset managers (traditional asset 
managers with a bias towards long only products and hedge fund managers with 
an absolute bias) and that there is a need to improve these systems. 
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Chapter 4: Second Empirical Chapter 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2 we provided a comprehensive analysis of the current risk 
management practices (literature review) of active European equity long only and 
hedge funds.  Using a unique survey (Chapter 3) we revealed many important 
issues for the industry.  In particular, we find: evidence to suggest that there is an 
insufficient financial commitment to risk management; that risk managers may not 
be independent enough; that important risk types may be being ignored; and that 
portfolio holdings are assessed on an infrequent basis.  However, we also find that 
efforts have been made by funds to allocate more resources to risk management 
since the start of the recent financial crisis.  Further, we find that hedge funds tend 
to be more ‘risk aware’ than their long only counterparts and finally that spending 
more on risk management is likely to improve fund performance rankings.  
 
This chapter provides, using a unique survey, a comprehensive analysis of the 
level of risk that pension fund clients (Board Members, Chief Financial Officers, 
and upper management of organisations with pension funds under third-party 
management), family offices that invest in hedge funds and Intermediate Financial 
Advisors (IFAs in UK) are willing to accept. By pension funds we mean a fund that 
was stabilised by an employer to facilitate and organise the investment of 
employees’ retirement funds contributed by the employer and the employees. By 
family offices we consider private wealth management and advisory firms that 
serve ultra-high net worth investors. By IFAs we mean professionals who offer 
independent advice on financial matters to their clients and recommend suitable 
financial products.  In particular, we found evidence suggesting that there are 
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different levels of risk acceptance between pension fund clients, family offices and 
IFAs.  Family offices are more risk aware than pension fund clients since pension 
fund clients use traditional asset managers (long only) following a benchmark, and 
their main concern is not to deviate significantly from the benchmark.  On the other 
hand, family offices are typically invested in hedge funds, and hence, their main 
task is capital preservation trading in more liquid markets, have higher cash levels 
and are more concerned with tail risk.  Finally, Independent Financial Advisor 
clients are more concerned with capital preservation, unwilling to take significant 
drawdowns and volatility on the returns and less sophisticated in terms of 
understanding financial instruments but with a more absolute attitude towards 
returns. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive analysis of the level of 
risk that pension fund clients (Board Members, Chief Financial Officers, and upper 
management of organisations with pension funds under third-party management), 
family offices that invest in hedge funds and Intermediate Financial Advisors (IFAs 
in UK) are willing to accept. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Expected Utility Theory 
John Von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern formally developed modern utility 
theory in their classic book Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour in 1944.  
The approach of the Von Neumann and Morgenstern model is axiomatic. If an 
individual satisfies four axioms of rationality they are completeness, transitivity, 
continuity and independence - then the outcomes of a game of choices can be 
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ranked accordingly to a utility function based on the individual’s preferences under 
uncertainty. 
 
Schoemaker (1982) showed that a rational decision maker will always try to 
choose the lottery that maximizes its expected utility and the four axioms 
guarantee there is a utility function that ranks lotteries by their expected utility.  As 
utility functions can be linearly transformed, the scale and the measures of utility 
can be set accordingly to the cases. 
 
Norstad (1999) noted the non-satiation property states that utility increases with 
wealth, however, the risk aversion property states that the utility function is 
concave.  In other words, the marginal utility of wealth decreases as wealth 
increases. 
 
Kenneth Arrow and John Pratt (1965) absolute risk aversion function is based on 
the curvature of the utility function.  It provides a quick measure of the decision 
maker’s absolute risk aversion as a function of his wealth.  In addition, this 
measure is invariant for linear transformations as the VNM model.  
 
Most criticisms of the VNM model focus on its independence axiom.  Tversky and 
Kahneman (1979) use experiential results to show that people tend to overvalue a 
sure thing.  People overweight certain outcomes to probable ones.  Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) call this violation the certainty effect. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) noted a second violation of the independence axiom called the reflection 
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effect. Decision makers are risk averse in the face of gains and risk seeking in the 
face of loss.  Together with the reflection effect, the certainty effect still holds valid 
for gains, but in the opposite way for losses: Individuals prefer a larger potential 
loss that is uncertain to a smaller loss that is certain. 
 
Friedman and Savage (1948) starting from the empirical fact that people buy both 
insurance and lotteries, proposed a utility function shaped without the assumptions 
of VNM, which holds constant the utility function among levels of wealth.  Even in 
the case of slightly unfair lotteries, individuals will play the lottery rather than do 
nothing.  According to Markowitz (1952), another implication of their utility curve is 
that individuals with such a curve will prefer “positively skewed distribution (with 
large right tails) more than negatively skewed ones (with large left tails)” (Machina, 
1982). 
 
Markowitz (1952) sustains that changes in wealth cause the utility function to shift 
horizontally.  The utility function does not change according to the level of wealth, 
but according to deviations from present wealth.  Decision makers tend to act more 
conservatively when they are moderately losing and more aggressively when they 
are moderately winning.  According to Markowitz, the decision maker’s preferences 
cannot be defined independently from his current consumption point.  
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) prospect theory, “people perceive 
outcomes as gains and losses rather than final stage of wealth fare”.  The decision 
process involves an editing phase, in which the individual takes into account the 
framing effect, and an evaluation phase, in which the individual formulates a 
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decision (value), based on the potential outcomes and their respective 
probabilities, and then chooses the alternative which has a higher utility.  Another 
aspect of the theory is the decision weight.  The weights are not probabilities but 
they moderate probabilities according to the decision makers’ expectations.  
However, they do not follow any utility maximization rule and the weighting 
establishes a nonlinear effect independent from the underlying probability.  As a 
result of the subjective expectations of the decision makers, the weighting function 
tends to overweight small probability while underweight medium and high 
probability.  The value function of Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory is 
therefore s-shaped, asymmetrical, and centered according to a reference.  The 
three main implications of prospect theory are loss aversion (the function is 
asymmetric in the valuation of losses or gains), diminishing sensitivity (the 
marginal value of gains and losses decreases with increasing size) and reference 
dependence (gains and losses are depended according to a reference point). 
 
Norsworthy et Al. (2003) test the characteristics of Prospect Theory across three 
different time periods: although some periods show stronger results than others do, 
in all of them the investor behaviours hold the same effects.  The experiments 
concisely demonstrated that market behaviours of investors are strongly influenced 
by reference frames according to the behavioural assumptions of the prospect 
theory.  Norsworthy et al (2003) state that a person’s decision in a risky situation is 
dependent on their current frame of reference. 
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Neutrality and risk aversion 
Buchan, Bruce and Levy (2005) showed security selection and weighting decisions 
will be determined with a view to maximising return for a target risk level.  
Alexander and Dimitriu (2002) noted that in order for these securities to offset each 
other, they need to have an element of proven inter-dependence.  This inter-
dependence can take the form of an expectation that a relative price convergence 
between these securities will take place within a certain time period.  Historical 
price behaviour will form the basis of this expectation (Ineichen, 2001).  The 
investment opportunity is provided by the level of pricing before the convergence 
takes place, and is independent of market conditions.  This approach can be 
employed within a sector exposure. Inter-dependence between investments is also 
found across a wide variety of market strategies, such as option arbitrage, merger 
arbitrage and convertible securities arbitrage (Alexander and Dimitriu, 2002). 
 
Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen (2012) noted the introduction of leverage changes 
the predictions of modern portfolio theory.  The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
proposes that investors should hold the market portfolio levered in line with the 
investor‘s risk preference.  However, Risk Parity (RP) proposes that one should 
take a similar amount of risk in different asset classes.  The RP approach uses an 
asset allocation heuristic where the justification is not theoretical but intuitive.  
Given the different risk profiles of different asset classes, an investor is required to 
invest more investable wealth in low risk assets than high-risk assets in order to 
diversify risk.  The attractiveness of the RP theory centres on the appeal of risk 
diversification as the objective of the asset allocation decisions, thus RP does not 
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depend on expected returns which investors have less confidence in predicting 
(Schachter and Thiagarajan, 2011). 
 
Assess, Frazzini & Pedersen (2010) demonstrate that leverage aversion might be 
the link which could result in RP portfolios being optimal.  Their proposition is that 
some investors, such as pension funds, are not in a position to use leverage 
(Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen, 2012).  In order to meet their return targets, 
therefore, they hold riskier asserts instead of using leverage to increase the return 
of the lower risk assets. 
 
Tail risk management 
Wang and Sullivan (2012) noted that modern portfolio management have made it 
possible for investors to be more flexible in the approach they take towards 
maximizing their utility by balancing their risk/reward calculations and their risk 
aversion across a wide array of asset classes.  Xiong and Idzorek (2010) showed 
investors having different levels of risk aversion and utility, and that the risk 
premiums on assets cycle over time within a given market as investors’ appetites 
change.  Vrecko and Branger (2009) highlighted that Interest in tail-risk 
management has increased following the financial crises of 2007-2008 and the 
subsequent European debt crisis, and financial institutions have responded to the 
demand, offering new tail-risk management solutions for investors.  
 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, 2011 challenged popular understandings of tail risks, 
pointing out that the frequency of high impact events in the financial markets has 
far exceeded mathematical expectations build on standard models.  Jiang and 
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Kelly (2012) when examining the returns of over 6000 hedge funds following the 
financial crises of 1998 and 2007-2008 found that tail-risks play a significant role in 
driving hedge fund returns.  The studies made evident the need for investors to 
consider more carefully the managing of the potential risks to their portfolio while 
still trying to preserve the upside. 
3. Objectives of the Second Empirical Chapter 
 
3.1. Second Empirical Chapter 
To the best of our knowledge there is no comprehensive study on the levels of risk 
acceptance on pension fund clients, family offices that allocate into hedge funds 
and investors that use IFAs as way to gather exposure to the market.  The 
objective of the second empirical chapter is to research risk acceptance levels of 
the above market participants. 
 
The main conclusion of the survey is that each market participant has different 
tolerance levels of risk and different interpretations of risk, as we will see in the 
questionnaire discussion. 
 
3.2. Data 
This dataset is focused on European equity type asset managers: Pension funds 
clients, family offices that invest in hedge funds and investors that use IFAs as a 
way to manage their money.  The source used to get the number and assets under 
management of companies that manage traditional equity funds is the database 
FundFile from Lipper Fund Management Information (Lipper FMI).  FundFile is a 
research tool specially designed for the European and Asian fund industry tracking 
over 45,000 funds sold throughout Europe and Asia.  The data is released on a 
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monthly basis with an approximate lag of six weeks, which allows FundFile to have 
all groups reporting their assets at the same date.  
 
The FundFile database does not have sufficient coverage of traditional hedge 
funds - its main strength is the collection of data on traditional open-ended mutual 
funds.  Hence, in order to add a list of hedge fund companies to the sample size an 
alternative source was used - Morningstar Direct as a way to gather the family 
offices IP Publication (2011) that combines a comprehensive list of family offices 
based in UK.  Finally, the list of clients that invest in IFAs was provided directly by 
several IFAs based in London. 
 
3.3. Methodology 
The survey was carried out by one to one interviews where the interviewer had the 
question script in front of him and the interviewees were able to respond.  This 
enabled higher response rates than a mailout would have received, for example 
Levich, Hayt and Ripston (1999) received only a 17.5% response rate from their 
1708 surveys mailed during their study of derivatives and risk management 
practices by U.S. Institutional investors.  Interviews were carried out between 
January and September 2011. 
 
The survey was conducted with 40 Pension Fund clients, 40 Family Offices and 
1000 clients that use IFAs all based in UK 
The survey consisted of 24 questions for Pension Funds, 23 questions for Family 
Offices and 18 questions for the IFAs. 
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4. Results 
 
 
4.1 Pension Fund Survey Results 
This study is based on input from 40 investment management industry participants.  
This input was obtained through surveys of Board Members, Chief Financial 
Officers, and upper management of organisations with pension funds under third-
party management.  
 
Types of Funds 
The investment community members who completed the survey managed the 
following types of funds: 
68% Corporate pension funds – Defined contribution or defined  
benefit plans for corporate employees 
18% Public pension schemes – Defined benefit plans (and some  
defined contribution plans) for public sector employees 
12% Endowments - Funds set up by an institution (often non-profit,  
universities, hospitals, etc.) and funded by donations.  
Regular withdrawals from the invested capital are used for  
ongoing operations or other specified purposes. 
2% Foundations – Funds managed by the trustees or directors of  
a non-profit organization usually created via a single primary  
donation from an individual or business. A foundation  
generates income by investing its initial donation, often disbursing the 
bulk of its investment income each year to desired charitable  
activities. 
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Charts displaying providers’ view 
“Overall” results are equally weighted across asset managers to give participants 
an equal voice. 
 
AUM breakdown 
All survey participants managed assets greater than USD1bn, with 33% managing 
more than USD10bn. 
 
 
 
 
 
Asset Allocation 
The participants surveyed 
indicated that 40% of their 
current total assets were 
allocated to equities, 30% 
to fixed income, and the 
remainder to hedge funds 
and alternative 
investments. 
 
 
 
Investment Strategy 
40% of the participants surveyed “follow the median manager” as an investment 
strategy, 25% employ a mean variance optimisation strategy and 5% use a liability 
driven (LD) investment strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Series1; 
Equities;  
40,30 ; 40% 
Series1; 
Bonds;  29,68 
; 30% 
Series1; 
Property;  9,98 
; 10% 
Hedge Funds 
5% 
Series1; 
Other;  15,05 ; 
15% 
Asset Allocation 
(Percentage of Total Assets) 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 – Investment Strategy 
 
 
 
Market Cap Bias 
As corporate pension funds, public pension schemes and endowments typically 
have considerable assets under management, they tend to have a bias towards 
large cap companies because of their constant need to hold liquid assets.  
 
 
Figure 3 – Market Cap Bias 
 
According to survey results, future allocations of corporate pension funds, public 
pension schemes and endowments will not change significantly from current 
allocations, maintaining a bias towards large cap stocks. 
LD 
5% 
Mean Variance 
Optimisation 
25% 
Follow the Median 
Manager 
 40% 
Other 
30% 
80% 
60% 
80% 
10% 
20% 
10% 
10% 
20% 
10% 
Current Allocations 
Large Cap Medium Cap Small Cap
60% 
60% 
70% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
10% 
Future Allocations 
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The Importance of Risk Management 
Overall, survey participants were proactive in implementing risk management 
strategies. 
 80% were unwilling to make an investment if it did not meet their risk criteria. 
 15% believed risk management and reduction were very important and had a 
risk committee meeting regularly to review each investment over a 5% 
threshold.  
 3% managed risk “naturally” by the investment made in each fund. 
 2% managed risk on an investment-by-investment basis. 
 
 
Willingness to Spend on Risk 
Management 
Accordingly, participants were 
willing to allocate some of their 
overall risk budget towards risk 
management (in terms of people, 
data and analytics). Every 
participant was willing to spend 
≥0.5% of their overall risk budget 
on risk management, with 58% 
willing to spend more than 5%. 
  
 
 
5% 
38% 
58% 
Risk Management as % Overall Risk Budget  
0.5-1%
1-5%
5%+
Figure 4 
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Investment Performance: Absolute or Relative? 
Unlike hedge fund managers, the 
pension fund managers surveyed 
were overwhelmingly more 
concerned about relative 
performance to a benchmark 
than absolute returns. 88% of 
participants responded they 
typically sought performance relative to a specific benchmark, tending to be more 
constrained in their investment process. 
Little Concern for Tail Risk 
Also divergent from hedge fund managers, the majority (88%) of pension fund 
managers surveyed were not concerned about tail risk and 92% did not even 
consider the contribution of tail risk to their overall portfolio (Q#22). Given the 
investment time horizon for pension funds is longer than that for hedge funds, 
pension funds are less susceptible to the impacts (e.g., redemptions) of major 
events that fall into the ‘tail-risk’ category.  
 
Hedging tail risk 
To assess hedging levels, survey participants were asked which instruments they 
use to hedge tail risk. 61% of participants did not hedge their portfolios, and the 
39% who did used a variety of instruments. No single hedging strategy was widely 
used. 
 
Hedging Strategies utilised 
 Equity Option strategies Inflation options 
 Options Variance swaps 
 Credit strategies Tail risk protection indices 
 Commodities Longevity 
 Managed Futures VIX/VSTOXX Futures 
 Treasuries V-stock/Variance swaps 
Figure 5 
 241 
 
 
Prioritising different types of risks  
Participants ranked market risk the most 
important risk to consider when investing, with 
liquidity and counterparty risk also highly 
relevant. 
 
 
The increasing role of risk management 
All participants responded that overall investment risk management has increased 
in importance since the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
Comfort levels with Portfolio Loss 
The corporate pension funds were aware of the volatility of long equity portfolios, 
and 71% of those surveyed were comfortable with potential drawdowns between 
5% and 20%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33% 
27% 
20% 
13% 
7% 
Most Important Risks 
Operational
Credit
Counterparty
Liquidity
Market
12% 
33% 
38% 
15% 
2% 
How much portfolio loss are 
you comfortable with? 
None
<5%
5-10%
10-20%
>20%
Figure 6 
Figure 7 
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This information was corroborated when survey participants were offered a choice 
of investment portfolios to allocate part of their money to. 78% of participants 
indicated they would prefer Portfolio B, corresponding to a partially hedged 
portfolio and reflecting some risk aversion of the clients. 
 
                  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40% 
43% 
8% 
10% 
Cash Position 
10-20% cash
5-10% cash
0-5% cash
Always fully invested
Series1; A; 
10%; 10% 
Series1; B; 
78%; 78% 
Series1; C; 
13%; 12% 
Which portfolio would you invest in? 
A
B
C
None
Figure 8 
 
Figure 9 
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Cash Management 
83% of corporate pension funds surveyed were nearly or fully invested.  
88% of survey participants were more aware of liquidity issues in the assets they 
invested in, a consequence of the 2008 global financial crisis.  
 
Since 2008, 65% of survey participants have not changed the way they invest in 
cash, 25% have implemented new technology for cash management, and 10% 
have increased cash limits. 
 
Measuring liquidity 
Almost 65% of the sample interviewed measure liquidity in one of two traditional 
ways: 1) depth and number of days of trading the investment or 2) the discount of 
the asset when trading 
 
Investing in private equity 
When investing in private equity, all survey participants were concerned with 
valuation sensitivity analysis, liquidity of the investment, and exit strategy. 
Figure 10  
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Strength of pension schemes 
80% of the clients of the corporate pension funds, public pension schemes and 
endowments surveyed considered their pension schemes on average well 
provisioned with no significant shortfalls in the potential liabilities to the pensioners.  
4.2 Family Offices Survey Results 
This study is based on input from 40 investment management industry participants 
who run family offices that invest in hedge funds.  
AUM breakdown 
All survey participants managed assets less than USD500mm, with 30% managing 
less than USD200mm. 
 
Asset Allocation 
The participants surveyed indicated 
that 60% of their current total assets 
were allocated to equities, 20% to 
fixed income, 5% to alternative 
investments and the remainder in 
other.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equities 
61% 
Bonds 
20% 
Alternatives 
5% 
Other 
14% 
Asset Allocation 
Figure 11 
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Geographical Allocation 
The family offices surveyed showed a 
bias towards local investments. 66% 
of assets were invested within Europe, 
10% were invested in the US, 10% in 
the UK, 10% in frontier markets (e.g., 
Africa), and 4% in the remaining 
markets including China, India, Japan, 
South America and Asia ex-Japan.  
 
Investment Strategy 
The family offices surveyed used 
a plethora of investment strategy, 
showing the level of commitment 
family offices have on improving 
their portfolio diversification.  The 
most popular investment strategy 
was Eq Long/Short with 19%. 
Macro was a close second with 
18%, and Systematic third with 
15%. 
 
 
 
Investment Strategy 
EM
Macro
Quantitative
Event Driven
Multi-Strategy
Eq Long/Short
Systematic
Convert Arb
Credit
Figure 13 
 
US 
10% 
UK 
10% 
Europe 
66% 
Frontier 
Markets 
10% 
Other 
4% 
Geographical Allocation 
Figure 12  
 
 246 
 
The Importance of Risk Management 
The family offices surveyed were generally proactive in their approach to risk 
management. 
 43% were unwilling to make an investment if it did not meet their risk criteria. 
 18% believed risk management and reduction were very important and had a 
risk committee meeting regularly to review each investment over a 5% 
threshold.  
 17% managed risk “naturally” with each investment made. 
 12% managed risk on an investment-by-investment basis. 
 10% only did the minimum necessary to comply with regulations. 
 
Willingness to Spend on Risk Management 
Family offices surveyed were willing to allocate more than 5% of their risk budget 
towards risk management (in terms of people, data and analytics). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8% 
15% 
20% 
17% 
40% 
Risk Management as % Overall Risk Budget  
Less than 0.1%
0.1-0.5%
0.5-1.0%
1-5%
5%+
Figure 14 
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Investment Performance: Absolute or Relative? 
Unlike pension fund managers, the majority of family offices surveyed were most 
concerned about absolute return with only 28% concerned about relative 
performance to a benchmark. 
 
Increasing importance on Asset Allocation 
Asset allocation has been considered more seriously in recent years. Although the 
main driver of asset allocation within family offices’ portfolios tends to be absolute 
return today, asset allocation within different asset classes will play an important 
role in the future.  Looking forward 5 to 10 years, 25% of the family offices 
surveyed anticipated an asset allocation move towards long only, 42% towards 
absolute return.  
Significant Concern for Tail Risk 
58% of family offices surveyed expressed concern about tail risk, indicating a 
sophisticated level of family offices’ technical knowledge and significant concern 
around portfolio drawdowns. 
 
Hedging Tail Risk 
Of the family offices who hedged 
tail risk, 30% applied hedging 
strategies to the whole portfolio, 
30% to alternative investments, 
23% to fixed income, 10% to 
equities, and 8% to other investments.  
Figure 15 
 
Instruments to Hedge Tail Risk 
 Equity Option strategies Inflation options 
 Options Variance swaps 
 Credit strategies Tail risk protection indices 
 Commodities Longevity 
 Managed Futures VIX/VSTOXX Futures 
 Treasuries V-stock/Variance swaps 
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To hedge tail risk, the family offices 
surveyed used a variety of financial 
instruments with no single hedging strategy 
widely used.  
 
Prioritising different types of risks  
Participants ranked counterparty and 
operational risk - the more challenging 
aspects to control - as the most important 
risks to consider during the investment process.  Credit risk, market risk and 
liquidity risk were all considered relevant. 
The increasing role of risk management 
All participants responded that investment risks overall have increased in 
importance since the 2008 financial crisis, confirming the findings of the first paper.  
 
Maximum drawdown tolerance 
35% of family offices surveyed were 
willing to accept drawdowns greater 
than 15% from peak to trough, 
demonstrating a relatively low level of 
risk tolerance. 
 
13% 
12% 
30% 
19% 
26% 
Most Important Risks 
Operational
Credit
Counterparty
Liquidity
Market
35% 
35% 
20% 
10% 
Maximum Drawdown Tolerance 
-5%
-10%
-15%
-20%
Figure 17 
 
Figure 16 
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This information was corroborated when 
survey participants were offered a 
choice of investment portfolios to 
allocate part of their money to.  38% of 
participants indicated they would prefer 
Portfolio B, corresponding to a partially 
hedged portfolio and reflecting some risk 
aversion of the family offices.  
 
 
 
Volatility 
The family offices surveyed 
demonstrated a willingness to take on 
risk (in the form of volatility or annualised 
standard deviation) in order to achieve 
high returns. 
 
        
Leverage 
The family offices surveyed also demonstrated a 
willingness to take on leverage in order to 
improve returns. 
 
35% 
45% 
12% 
8% 
Acceptable Levels of Leverage 
0-5%
5-10%
15-20%
20%+
28% 
38% 
28% 
9% 
Which portfolio would you invest in? 
A
B
C
None
40% 
28% 
22% 
10% 
Acceptable Levels of Volatility 
0-5%
5-10%
15-20%
20%+
Figure 19 
 
Figure 20 
 
Figure 18 
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In fact, 90% of all family offices surveyed were considering increasing the leverage 
within their portfolios in the next 12 months. 53% were considering increasing their 
leverage by more than 15% and only 10% were not going to increase their 
leverage. 
 
Cash Management 
All the family offices surveyed carried 
cash, with 66% holding 10% or more of 
their portfolios in cash.  This cash level 
could be attributed to either risk aversion 
or cash reserves held for future 
investments.  
 
63% of family offices surveyed were more aware of liquidity issues in the assets 
they invested in, a consequence of the 2008 global financial crisis.  
 
And since 2008, 35% of survey participants have implemented new technology for 
cash management, 22% have increased cash limits, and 43% have not changed 
the way they invest in cash. 
 
Measuring liquidity 
Almost 64% of the portfolio managers surveyed measure liquidity in one of two 
traditional ways: 1) depth and number of days of trading the investment or 2) the 
discount of the asset when trading. 
 
12% 
22% 
38% 
28% 
Cash Positions 
20%+ cash
10-20% cash2
5-10% cash
0-5% cash
Figure 21 
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Risk tolerance for hedge fund investments relative to overall portfolio 
When asked about their risk tolerance (as measured by drawdowns) for capital 
allocated to hedge funds relative to their own portfolio investments, 70% of family 
offices surveyed said they have the same criteria for both. 
 
4.3 IFA Client Survey Results 
This study is based on input from clients of Intermediate 
Financial Advisors (IFAs) in the UK. 94% of the IFAs 
surveyed managed less than US$100mm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6% 
24% 
40% 
29% 
Age of IFA Clients 
20-30
31-45
45-55
55-65
Figure 23 
 
Figure 22 
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IFA Client Profiles 
Of the IFA clients surveyed, 69% were below the age of 45. Accordingly, 68% had 
a long investment time horizon (beyond 10 years).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Marital Status 
Of the IFA clients surveyed, 67% were married, 25% were living with a partner, 
and 7% were separated or divorced. 
 
Education 
30% of the IFA clients surveyed had a Graduate or Professional degree, 38% had 
a Bachelor’s degree, 25% had an Associate’s degree, and 7% had completed 
some college, trade or vocational 
training. 
 
Financial Security 
Financially, 92% of the IFA clients 
surveyed described their financial 
68% 
25% 
6% 
Investment time horizon 
11+ years
6-10 years
3-5 years
1-2 years
31% 
39% 
22% 
7% 
Current Financial Position 
Very secure
Secure
Somewhat secure
Secure but suffered
recent shocks
Not secure
Figure 24 
 
Figure 25 
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situation as somewhat secure or better.  
 
Emergency Funds 
When asked about emergency funds, 
71% of clients surveyed had emergency 
funds to cover over 3 months. 
 
 
 
 
 
Investment Priorities 
When asked about investment priorities, 93% of IFA clients were interested in 
growth rather than preserving savings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29% 
40% 
25% 
6% 
How long would your emergency 
funds last? 
>1 year
6-12 months
3-6 months
<3 months
70% 
23% 
6% 
Investment Priorities 
To achieve as much
growth as possible
To invest mainly for
growth
To balance between
growth and savings
preservation
To achieve some
growth with a focus on
savings preservation
Figure 26 
 
Figure 27 
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Discomfort with Volatility 
Despite their overwhelming 
appetite for growth, the IFA 
clients surveyed were actually 
quite risk averse. 71% were 
not comfortable with any short-
term ups or downs in the value 
of their investments. Another 
22% were only comfortable 
with small ups and downs.   
 
 
 Risk vs. Return 
 
 
Despite their apparent 
aversion to loss, the IFA 
clients surveyed showed a 
willingness to take on risk to 
improve their investment 
returns.  
6% 
22% 
71% 
Volatility Concerns 
More comfortable with
ups than downs
Concerned with
significant ups and
downs
Comfortable with small
ups and downs
Not comfortable with
any ups and downs
7% 
25% 
38% 
25% 
5% 
How much risk would you take on  
to improve returns? 
A lot more risk with all the
money
A lot more risk with some
of the money
Slightly more risk with all
of the money
Slightly more risk with
some of the money
No more risk
Figure 28 
   Figure 29 
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Sudden windfall scenario 
Even when posed with the scenario of a sudden windfall (e.g., “you suddenly 
inherited £20,000”), the IFA clients surveyed were generally risk averse. Two-thirds 
of respondents took on no risk, choosing to clear their debts and save it as 
emergency funds.  The remaining one-third chose to invest the windfall in bonds 
and capital protection funds. And no participants chose to invest the windfall in 
stocks.  
 
 
Comfort with Financial Instruments 
The IFA clients surveyed were most comfortable with Stocks, Property and 
Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs), moderately comfortable with Bonds, and 
downright uncomfortable with Contract for Differences (CFDs) either due to their 
lack of familiarity with CFDs, the product’s complicated nature, or its use of 
Series1; Invest in 
capital protection 
funds; 8%; 8% 
Series1; Invest in 
investment bonds; 
26%; 26% 
Series1; Pre-payment 
on mortgage, pay-off 
other debts; 35%; 
35% 
Series1; Save in 
savings account for a 
rainy day; 31%; 31% 
How would you spend a sudden windfall? 
Invest in funds and stocks
Invest in capital protection
funds
Invest in investment bonds
Pre-payment on mortgage,
pay-off other debts
Save in savings account for
a rainy day
Figure 30 
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leverage.  IFA clients’ comfort level seemed to depend heavily on familiarity with 
the financial instrument and recent macro-economic factors. 
 
 
Sudden windfall scenario 2 
Again posed with the scenario of a sudden windfall of £20,000, but with the 
condition that they invest it in one of five portfolios, the IFA clients surveyed again 
demonstrated risk aversion and a relatively basic knowledge of the different types 
of financial instruments available. 68% of the IFA clients chose to invest in low-risk 
bonds and funds. 
CFDs
ISAs
Property
Bonds
Stocks
How comfortable are you with these financial instruments? 
Very comfortable Comfortable Not comfortable
Figure 31 
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Attitude towards Financial Risk 
There was a high level of risk aversion and a lack of understanding of financial 
instruments among the IFA clients surveyed. Only 1% knew that taking on more 
risk provided the opportunity to achieve higher returns. 
 
31% 
39% 
24% 
5% 
How long would your emergency funds last? 
Financial risk means opportunity to
achieve higher returns
Investing is only risky if you do not
rely on research
With enough diversification in my
portfolio, I can eliminate risk
Any investment that does not
guarantee capital preservation is not
worth it
The only safe place for my money is
a bank account; I am unwilling to
take financial risk
Series1; 50-100% in CFDs, 
Spread Betting, Day 
Trading, the rest in stocks; 
0%; 0% 
Series1; 100% in stocks 
only, receiving advice; 6%; 
6% 
Series1; 50% in 
stocks having done 
my own research and 
50% in funds; 26%; 
26% 
Series1; 50% in low risk 
investment bonds, 50% in 
funds; 36%; 36% 
Series1; 100% in low risk 
investment bonds; 31%; 
32% 
Which portfolio would you invest a sudden windfall in? 
50-100% in CFDs, Spread Betting,
Day Trading, the rest in stocks
100% in stocks only, receiving
advice
50% in stocks having done my own
research and 50% in funds
50% in low risk investment bonds,
50% in funds
100% in low risk investment bonds
Figure 32 
 
Figure 33 
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Excess income to invest 
The majority of IFA clients surveyed demonstrated a relatively stable source of 
income to invest (at the very least “from time to time”) allowing for a predictable 
and sufficient periodic investment. 
 
 
 
Acceptable Investment Losses 
Over a 12-month period, the IFA clients surveyed were not terribly willing to take a 
loss (in absolute terms) on their investments with only 6% willing to take a loss of 
more than 20%. Oddly, over a 3-month period, the IFA clients surveyed were even 
more risk averse with only 6% willing to take a loss of more than 10%. 
7% 
24% 
37% 
24% 
8% 
How predictable/stable is your income? 
Predictable and sufficient to allow for
periodic investment
Somewhat stable with enough to invest
from time to time
Constant, but I rarely have anything left
for investing at the end of the month
Not stable, I find it difficult to budget
month-to-month
Figure 34 
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Inflation concerns 
71% of IFA clients surveyed were not concerned about inflation when investing. 
 
When survey participants were 
offered a choice of investment 
portfolios to allocate part of their 
money to, they demonstrated risk 
aversion but with the desire to 
achieve growth. Less than one-third 
of the participants chose portfolio A, 
which was not hedged. 
6% 
24% 
39% 
31% 
Acceptable Levels of Loss 
over 12 months 
6-10%
11-20%
21-30%
Column1
6% 
26% 
68% 
Acceptable Levels of Loss 
over 3 months 
0-5%
6-10%
11-20%
31% 
37% 
26% 
6% 
Which portfolio would you invest in? 
A
B
C
None
Figure 36 
 
Figure 35 
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5. Measuring Risk Tolerance / Preliminary conclusions 
 
Pension Funds and Family Offices Comparison 
 
There are several questions that are common to the Family Offices (FO) and 
Pension Funds’ (PF) surveys.  The same cannot be said about the Independent 
Financial Advisors (IFA) survey.  Hence, we are going to compare relevant questions 
in FO and PF surveys in order to better understand their approach towards risk 
management. 
 
Question: Do you have a strategy in place to hedge tail risk? 
The answer for this question is 0 for yes and 1 for no.  The results for the 40 PF 
clients and for the 40 FO managers surveyed was 
  
  
 
The results show that PF do not hedge tail risk and the majority of FO uses some 
hedging tools.  
 
Question: What are your average cash levels? 
The different answers for this question are 
Always fully invested 0-5% cash 5-10% cash 10-20% cash 20%+ cash 
1 2 3 4 5 
The answers for the survey were the following 
 
FO PF
mean 43% 98%
stdev 49% 16%
FO PF
mean 3,80      1,88      
stdev 0,98      0,93      
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This means that, on average, FO have high cash levels than PF.  This is also a 
natural result: FO are more risk aware and use cash as a hedging lever. 
  
Question: Are you more concerned about absolute returns relative to a 
benchmark over the next 12 months? 
The answer for this question is 0 for absolute and 1 for relative.  The results for the 
40 PF managers and for the 40 FO managers surveyed was 
 
PF are typical investors with a benchmark.  On the other contrary, FO trade more 
like a Hedge Fund, concerned about preservation of capital or absolute returns, 
which is confirmed by the answers obtained in the surveys. 
  
Question: How important is risk management/risk reduction to you? 
 The different answers for this question are 
 
The answers for the survey were the following 
 
Both PF and FO are on average risk aware.  However, the standard deviation of the 
answers shows that FO have a big variation concerning the answer: some are more 
risk aware than others. 
 
FO PF
mean 28% 88%
stdev 45% 33%
1
Risk is managed naturally 
by the invsetments made 
in each fund
Risk management and reduction is 
very important; each investment 
above a threshold of 5% is 
approved by a risk committee that 
meets regularly
If an investment does not 
meet our risk criteria, we 
will not make the 
investment.
5 4
We will do the minimum
 necessary to comply with 
regulations
This is managed on an 
investment by investment 
basis
3 2
FO PF
mean 1,35      1,28      
stdev 1,49      0,63      
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Question: Since 2008, has your institution 
The different answers for this question are 
 
The answers for the survey were the following 
 
Once again, the answers are similar.  However, FO tend to be more aware of cash 
management than PF, which was demonstrated on the question regarding the cash 
levels. 
 
Question: What is your current geographical asset allocation as a percentage 
of total assets? 
The answer for this question is 1 for Developed Markets and 0 for Emerging 
Markets.  The results for the 40 PF managers and for the 40 FO managers surveyed 
was 
 
Both PF and Family Offices are more into Developed markets with a more 
pronounced bias towards Developed Markets coming from FO.  These answers 
come naturally, as FO are more concerned with liquidity and risk management 
issues. 
 
 
 
Increased your cash limits
Implemented new technology for 
cash management
None of the above
1 2 3
FO PF
mean 2,20      2,55      
stdev 0,78      0,67      
FO PF
mean 87% 75%
stdev 3% 2%
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Conclusions: 
The answers to the survey demonstrated that FO are more risk aware than PF.  PF 
use traditional asset managers, following a benchmark and their main concern is not 
to deviate from this benchmark.  On the other hand, FO are typically hedge fund 
customers, and hence, their main task is capital preservation.  FO trade on more 
liquid markets, have higher cash levels, are concerned with tail risk events. 
  
We further researched changes in risk aversion during the financial crisis. Ideally, 
one wants to have the same survey repeated several times before, during and after 
the financial crisis.  This line of work was pursued by several authors (Graham and 
Harvey, 2006).  Unfortunately, we were not able to do a similar research since our 
survey was conducted once, and hence, we do not have a time variation aspect of 
the variables in interest.  However, there are some questions in the survey that might 
help us explain and measure the impact of the financial crisis on the risk aversion. 
 
We are going to use the same questions that we analysed in the previous section: 
 Do you have a strategy in place to hedge tail risk? 
 What are your average cash levels? 
 Are you more concerned about absolute returns relative to a benchmark over 
the next 12 months? 
 How important is risk management/risk reduction to you? 
 Since 2008, has your institution change your cash limits 
 What is your current geographical asset allocation as a percentage of total 
assets? 
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The variables in question are discrete and we assume that changing towards risk 
aversion means for each question: 
 Having a strategy to hedge tail risk means more risk aversion: the answer to 
this question is 0 for yes and 1 for no; 
 To have more cash means more risk aversion: the answer to this question is 1 
to 5, the largest the value the more cash it has; 
 Concerns about absolute returns means more risk aversion: the answer to 
this question is 0 for absolute and 1 for relative; 
 Importance of risk management/risk reduction means more risk aversion: the 
answer to this question ranges from 1 to 5, the smallest the value the more 
risk aware it means; 
 Since 2008, has your institution increased your cash limits (1), implemented 
new technology for cash management (2), or none of the above: (1) or (2) 
means more risk aversion; 
 What is your current geographical asset allocation as a percentage of total 
assets? The answer is 1 to developed markets and 0 for emerging ones: 1 
means more risk aversion; 
 
The research is to see the statistically significance of the answers.  
 
Q1: Do you have a strategy in place to hedge tail risk? 
Yes No 
0 1 
 
In this case, a statistically significant value that is lower than 0.5 indicates risk 
aversion. 
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Q2: What are your average cash levels? 
Always fully invested 0-5% cash 5-10% cash 10-20% cash 20%+ cash 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
In this case, we are going to assume risk aversion as 3-5.  Therefore, we are going 
to transform the answer in 0 for 1 and 2 and 1 for 3-5.  A statistically significant value 
greater than 0.5 indicates risk aversion 
 
Q3: Are you more concerned about absolute returns relative to a benchmark 
over the next 12 months? 
Absolute Relative 
0 1 
 
In this case, a statistically significant value that is lower than 0.5 indicates risk 
aversion. 
 
Q4: How important is risk management/risk reduction to you? 
5 4 3 2 1 
We will do the minimum 
 necessary to comply with 
regulations 
This is managed on an 
investment by investment 
basis 
Risk is managed naturally by 
the investments made in each 
fund 
Risk management and reduction is 
very important; each investment 
above a threshold of 5% is 
approved by a risk committee that 
meets regularly 
If an investment does not meet 
our risk criteria, we will not 
make the investment. 
 
In this case, we are going to assume risk aversion as 1-2. Therefore, we are going to 
transform the answer in 1 for 3-5 and 0 for 1 and 2.  A statistically significant value 
lower than 0.5 indicates risk aversion. 
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Q5: Since 2008, has your institution changed your cash limits 
Increased your cash limits 
Implemented new technology for cash 
management 
None of the above 
1 2 3 
 
In this case, we are going to assume risk aversion as 1-2.  Therefore, we are going 
to transform the answer in 0 for 3 and 1 for 1 and 2.  A statistically significant value 
greater than 0.5 indicates risk aversion 
 
Q6: What is your current geographical asset allocation as a percentage of total 
assets? 
Developed Markets Emerging Markets 
1 0 
 
In this case, a statistically significant value that is greater than 0.5 indicates risk 
aversion  
 
Results 
We are going to apply a simple t-test for the means of the answers to see if the PF 
have a different behaviour than FO. 
 
 
We can clearly see that FO are more risk averse than PF.  In fact, excepting for 
question 5, the results show exactly that.  Question 5 has the opposite meaning.  
t-Stat
FO PF
Q1 0,43 0,98 -6,30 
Q2 3,80 1,88 8,79
Q3 0,28 0,88 -6,96 
Q4 1,35 1,28 0,28
Q5 2,20 2,55 -1,93 
Q6 0,87 0,75 19,94
mean
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The differences in means are statistically significant (except for question 4), meaning 
that the behaviour towards risk aversion is different. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In Chapter 4 we used a unique survey to gather a comprehensive analysis of the 
level of risk that pension fund clients (Board Members, Chief Financial Officers, and 
upper management of organisations with pension funds under third-party 
management), family offices that invest in hedge funds and Intermediate Financial 
Advisors (IFAs in UK) are willing to accept.  We tried to understand “how much risk 
are you willing to accept”?  In particular, we found evidence suggesting that there are 
different levels of risk acceptance between pension fund clients, family offices and 
IFAs.  Family offices are more risk aware than pension fund clients since pension 
fund clients use traditional asset managers (long only) following a benchmark, and 
their main concern is not to deviate significantly from the benchmark and therefore 
willing to take higher volatility levels but always with a benchmark as a reference 
rather than on an absolute bias.  On the other hand, family offices are typically 
invested in hedge funds (alternative asset managers), and hence, their main task is 
capital preservation trading in more liquid markets, have higher cash levels and are 
more concerned with tail risk searching for absolute returns and less willing to take 
higher levels of volatility.  Finally, Independent Financial Advisor clients are like 
Family Offices more concerned with capital preservation, unwilling to take significant 
drawdowns and volatility on the returns and but less sophisticated in terms of 
understanding financial instruments but with a more absolute attitude towards 
returns. From this unique research it was interesting to understand how different the 
levels of risk that pension fund clients (Board Members, Chief Financial Officers, and 
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upper management of organisations with pension funds under third-party 
management), family offices that invest in hedge funds and Intermediate Financial 
Advisors (IFAs in UK) are willing to accept and the reasons behind that behaviour. 
 
 
7. Conclusions from Chapter 2, 3 and 4 
 
In Chapter 2 we provided a comprehensive analysis of the current risk management 
practices (literature review) of active European equity long only and hedge funds 
which highlighted the limited literature in subject.  In Chapter 3 using a unique survey 
we revealed many important issues for the industry.  In particular, we find evidence 
to suggest that there is an insufficient financial commitment to risk management; that 
risk managers may not be independent enough; that important risk types may be 
ignored, that asset managers tend to use the same risk system and therefore 
analysing similar risk factors and that portfolio holdings are assessed on an 
infrequent basis.  However, we also find that efforts have been made by funds to 
allocate more resources to risk management since the start of the 2008 financial 
crisis.  Further, we find that hedge funds tend to be more ‘risk aware’ than their long 
only counterparts and finally that spending more resources on risk management is 
likely to improve fund performance rankings.  
 
In Chapter 4 using a unique survey we gather a comprehensive analysis of the level 
of risk that pension fund clients (Board Members, Chief Financial Officers, and upper 
management of organisations with pension funds under third-party management), 
family offices that invest in hedge funds and Intermediate Financial Advisors (IFAs in 
UK) are willing to accept.  We try to understand “how much risk are you willing to 
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accept”? In particular, we found evidence suggesting that there are different levels of 
risk acceptance between pension fund clients, family offices and IFAs.  Family 
offices are more risk aware than pension fund clients since pension fund clients use 
traditional asset managers (long only) following a benchmark, and their main 
concern is not to deviate significantly from the benchmark.  On the other hand, family 
offices are typically invested in hedge funds, and hence, their main task is capital 
preservation trading in more liquid markets, have higher cash levels and are more 
concerned with tail risk, they search for absolute return.  Finally, Independent 
Financial Advisor clients are more concerned with capital preservation, unwilling to 
take significant drawdowns and volatility on the returns and less sophisticated in 
terms of understanding financial instruments but with a more absolute attitude 
towards returns. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, Chapter 2, 3 and 4 are the first comprehensive 
analysis of the level of risk within portfolio management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 270 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusions 
This research focused on the risk management processes among active European 
equity asset managers as well as the current most effective practices.  
The research was divided in three main parts, which together contribute to the 
conclusions taken in this section. Firstly, we investigated the available literature of 
risk management in financial institutions. Considering it, we developed a study about 
how risk management is currently used in European funds to identify the current 
approaches and the needs for improvement within the industry. The basis of this 
analysis was a survey of 200 asset managers and hedge funds, undertaken by face-
to-face interviews with key decision makers in the asset managers studied. 
Afterwards we used a unique survey to build up a comprehensive analysis of the 
level of risk that pension fund clients (Board Members, Chief Financial Officers, and 
upper management of organisations with pension funds under third-party 
management), family offices that invest in hedge funds and Intermediate Financial 
Advisors (IFAs in UK) are willing to accept. 
The first conclusion of this research is that there is a lack of specific risk 
management literature dedicated to this specific topic. There is limited literature on 
this subject and most authors agree risk management could and should be improved 
upon.  
In Chapter 3, a survey of 200 asset managers and hedge funds was implemented to 
identify current approaches to risk management and what might need to be improved 
by asking several key questions: 
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• What are the consequences of past financial crises? 
• Is risk management taken seriously inside financial organizations? 
• Are funds with fewer assets under management expected to spend 
(proportionally) less on risk management? 
The key findings were that risk management functions have been neglected for 
some time and smaller funds spend less (proportionally) in risk management 
functions. Another very interesting conclusion is that companies are currently more 
aware of risk problems and they are taking risk management more seriously.  They 
are starting to spend more on resources and give risk departments more power 
inside their organizations. Moreover, considering the risk systems used, one obvious 
conclusion is that the industry seems to be highly correlated in terms of the tools 
used by the asset managers. In fact, the great majority of the fund managers in the 
sample use Barra’s Risk Management system.  
A conclusion we found from the survey was that, even if all the respondents are 
considered as active portfolio managers, only one fifth of the long only portfolio 
managers look at their active positions and tracking error on a very frequent basis. 
Therefore, although the universe of portfolio managers defines themselves as active 
managers, they do not analyse their active money as frequently as expected.  
Moreover, with the recent credit crisis and the actual debt problems in Europe, 
country and sector exposure are important risk factors to be considered. Another 
unexpected conclusion we took from the survey was that only 47.7% of the 
respondents claimed to consider relative geographical exposure frequently and 
18.6% rarely consider country exposure. Therefore, even if it is known that given the 
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interconnectedness of the global economy and the recent increase in the volatility of 
sovereign government debt, portfolio managers still need to improve their risk 
diligence.  
In Chapter 4 we developed a unique survey to gather a comprehensive analysis of 
the level of risk that pension fund clients (Board Members, Chief Financial Officers, 
and upper management of organisations with pension funds under third-party 
management), family offices that invest in hedge funds and Intermediate Financial 
Advisors (IFAs in UK) are willing to accept. The answers demonstrated that family 
offices are more risk aware than pension funds.  To illustrate this, when we asked 
Pension Funds and Family Offices regarding their strategies to hedge tail risk, the 
conclusion was that Pension Funds do not have such a strategy while Family Offices 
use some hedging tools. Pension funds use traditional asset managers following a 
benchmark, and their main concern is not to deviate from this benchmark. Therefore, 
they are willing to take higher volatility levels but always with a benchmark as a 
reference rather than on an absolute bias.  On the other hand, family offices are 
typically hedge fund customers, and hence, their main task is capital preservation.  
They trade in more liquid markets, have higher cash levels and are concerned with 
tail risk events. Finally, Independent Financial Advisor clients are like family offices, 
more concerned with capital preservation, unwilling to take significant drawdowns 
and volatility on the returns and but less sophisticated in terms of understanding 
financial instruments but with a more absolute attitude towards returns.  
Generally, this research is a strong contributor for understanding the industry as it 
adds valuable conclusions to the limited available studies on risk management. The 
original primary data collected from the surveys is a key element, which may have a 
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meaningful impact on the regulator’s vision and action by following the evolution of 
the industry’s main players. After the global economic crisis, the asset management 
industry has been struggling to cope with the regulatory reform, as dealing with 
continuous change in regulations is remarkably demanding and uncertain. The main 
contribution of this research is that the regulator may develop new appropriate 
policies and promote a most effective industry, avoiding fat tails and conflicts of 
interest.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study of current risk 
management practices within active European equity asset managers.  
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Appendix Chapter 3 
 
 
Questionnaire: 
 
1. Which Risk Management tool do you currently use? 
 
Barra 
AllegroDev 
Mega 
Other: Specify: 
 
 
2. How often do your Portfolio Managers use the system? 
 
Daily 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Semi-annually 
Other: Specify: 
 
 
3. Is your Institution characterized by being predominantly: 
 
Long only 
Hedge Fund 
Passive 
Other: Specify: 
 
 
4. How frequently does a Risk Manager meet with the Portfolio Manager to 
discuss risks within a portfolio?  
 
Daily 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Semi-annually 
Other: Specify: 
 
 
 
 
 
Section – 5.1. to 5.5 
 
 
How often do you analyse the following parameters to detect the risks within the 
portfolio? 
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Please select from: 
 
1= very frequently; 2= frequently; 3= rarely; 4= never; 5= not applicable 
 
 
5.1. Portfolio Liquidity 
 
Number of days to liquidate portfolio           1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
Number of days for the institution to liquidate portfolio    1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
Sector weight position vs. previous month         1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
Sector weight position vs. previous quarter        1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
 
 
5.2. Active Positions Over quarter 
 
Overweights vs. benchmark              1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Underweights vs benchmark              1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Ex-Ante Tracking Error (%)              1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
 
 
5.3. Country Positioning Summary 
 
Country breakdown vs previous quarter          1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Sector weight position vs. previous year          1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Country relative weights               1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
 
 
5.4. Top 10 / Bottom 10 Bets since Portfolio Tenure 
 
Cumulative Contribution of top 10            1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
 
 
5.5. Quarterly Stock contribution 
 
Relative contribution for Top 20, Bottom 20        1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Active Money vs. Beta                1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
 
 
6. Cumulative contribution from Stock selection: 
 
Breakdown by market cap               1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Market cap distribution                1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
 
7. How frequently do you analyse the cash position? 
 
Daily                       1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Weekly                      1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Monthly                     1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
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Quarterly                      1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Semi-annually                   1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Other: Specify: 
 
 
8. How often do you analyze the Emerging Markets Relative Bet to index  
       
1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
  
 
9. How often do you analyze the portfolio turnover? 
 
Daily                       1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Weekly                      1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Monthly                     1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Quarterly                      1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Semi-annually                   1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Other: Specify: 
 
 
10. How often do you analyze the portfolio performance vs. peers? 
 
Monthly                     1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Quarterly                      1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Semi-annually                   1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Other: Specify: 
 
 
Other questions: 
 
 
11. How often do you analyse the following parameters to detect the risks 
within the portfolio? 
 
Active Money                   1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Stocks Outside the Benchmark             1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Tracking Error                   1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
 
Beta: 
% of TE from Top 10 stocks              1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
How much relative performance comes from Beta      1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
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12. How often do you analyze the following risk decomposition parameters? 
 
Stock Specific Risk                 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Country Risk                    1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Industry Risk                    1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Risk Index                    1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Currency Risk                   1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Other – Specify: 
 
 
13. Sector Top 10 Bottom 10 Risk Contributors: 
 
as Percentage of Tracking Error            1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
 
 
14. Countries – Top 10 Risk Contributors: 
 
as Percentage of Tracking Error            1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
 
 
15. How often do you analyze the following risk contributors as % of tracking 
error: 
 
Volatility                     1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Size                        1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Momentum                    1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Value                      1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Liquidity                     1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Financial Leverage                 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Growth                      1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Tail Behaviour                    1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
 
16. Do you use Style Research Ltd. tool? 
Yes – No 
Other – Specify: 
 
If Yes 
 
17. How often do you use the above system? 
 
Daily                       1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Weekly                      1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Monthly                     1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Quarterly                      1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Semi-annually                   1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Other- Specify:  
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18. Who has the final decision regarding changes to the portfolio when the 
portfolio is outside the risk parameters?  
      (please tick appropriate box) 
 
CIO  
Head of Equities  
Risk Manager  
Portfolio Manager  
Other –Specify  
 
 
Risk Management Process 
 
 
19. How many people are in your Risk Management Team? 
      (please tick appropriate box) 
 
1-5  
6-10  
10+  
 
 
20. Does your Risk Manager accumulate other roles? 
      (please tick appropriate box) 
 
Yes  
No  
 
 
21. Who does your Head of Risk Management report to? 
      (please tick appropriate box) 
 
CIO  
Investment Risk Oversight Committee  
Other – Specify  
 
 
22. How much do you spend on Portfolio Asset Risk Management on an 
annual basis? 
      (please tick appropriate box) 
. 
Below $5mn  
Between $10 to $20mn  
Above $20mn  
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23. Has this amount increased vs: 
      (please tick appropriate box) 
 
 YES NO 
Last year   
Last 3 years   
Last 5 years   
 
 
24. Are the above parameters within the Survey checked now on a more 
frequent basis than in the last: 
      (please tick appropriate box) 
 
 YES NO 
Last year (2009)   
Last 3 years   
Last 5 years   
 
 
 301 
 
Appendix Chapter 4 
 
Questions for Pension Funds 
1. What is your Assets Under Management (AUM)? 
2. What is your current asset allocation to equities, bonds, property, hedge funds 
and other as a percentage of your total assets? 
3. What instruments will you use to hedge tail risk? 
4. What is your institution type: corporate pension, public pension, endowment or 
foundation? 
5. What type of strategy do you follow: liability-driven, mean variance optimisation, 
follow the median manager or other? 
6. What type of bias do you have in your portfolio in terms of large cap, mid cap and 
small cap allocations in A) emerging market indices, B) developed market 
indices, C) thematic? 
7. What are your plans for future large cap, mid cap and small cap allocations in A) 
emerging market indices, B) developed market indices, C) thematic? 
8. How much are you willing to spend on risk management in terms of people, data 
and analytics as a percentage of your risk budget? 
9. How important is risk management/risk reduction to you? 
10. Are you more concerned about absolute returns or returns relative to a 
benchmark over the next 12 months? 
11. Do you have a strategy in place to hedge tail risk? 
12. If you have a strategy in place for hedging tail risk, in which asset classes does it 
apply? 
13. What instruments will you use to hedge tail risk? 
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14. Rank the following risks in order of importance: operational, credit, counterparty, 
liquidity and market risks. 
15. Have the above risks increased or decreased in importance since 2008? 
16. How much loss would you feel comfortable with in your various equity portfolios? 
17. What are your average cash levels? 
18. Since 2008, has your institution: A) increased your cash limits? B) Implemented 
new technology for cash management, or C) none of the above? 
19. Since 2008, are you more aware of liquidity issues within the assets that you 
invest? 
20. How do you measure the liquidity of your investments? 
21. When investing in private equity, do you consider liquidity of the investment, exit 
strategy, valuation sensitivity, all of the above, or none of the above? 
22. Do you consider the contribution of the tail risk to your overall portfolio? 
23. If a pension scheme, how would you characterize the strength of your pension 
scheme? 
24. Which of the sample investment portfolios would you feel most comfortable 
allocating part of your money 
 
Questions for Family Offices 
1. What is your Assets Under Management (AUM)? 
2. What is your current asset allocation to equities, bonds, property, hedge funds 
and other as a percentage of your total assets? 
3. What is your current geographical asset allocation as a percentage of total 
assets? 
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4. In what strategies do you invest: credit, convert arb, systematic, eq long/short, 
multi-strategy, event driven, quantitative, macro? 
5. How much are you willing to spend on risk management in terms of people, data 
and analytics as a percentage of your risk budget? 
6. How important is risk management/risk reduction to you? 
7. Are you more concerned about absolute returns or returns relative to a 
benchmark over the next 12 months? 
8. In 5 to 10 years from now, will your asset allocation move towards funds within 
long only, absolute return or allocation? 
9. Do you have a strategy in place to hedge tail risk? 
10. If you have a strategy in place for hedging tail risk, in which asset classes does it 
apply? 
11. What instruments will you use to hedge tail risk? 
12. Rank the following risks in order of importance: operational, credit, counterparty, 
liquidity and market risks. 
13. Which of the risks mentioned in question 12 increased or decreased the most 
since 2008? 
14. What was your maximum drawdown tolerance from peak to trough? 
15. How much volatility (annualised standard deviation) can you take on your 
investment portfolio? 
16. How much leverage are you currently using within the portfolio? 
17. Are you considering increasing the leverage within the portfolio during the next 12 
months? 
18. What are your average cash levels? 
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19. Since 2008, has your institution: A) increased your cash limits? B) Implemented 
new technology for cash management, or C) none of the above? 
20. Since 2008, are you more aware of liquidity issues within the assets that you 
invest? 
21. How do you measure the liquidity of your investments? 
22. When allocating your capital, do you have the same limits on the drawdowns to 
the hedge funds you invest vs. your own portfolio? 
23. Which of the sample investment portfolios would you feel most comfortable 
allocating part of your money? 
 
Questions for IFA Client  
1. How old are you? 
2. Approximately how many years until you might want to start using the money you 
are investing? 
3. When investing, what is most important to you: To achieve as much growth as 
possible, to invest mainly for growth, to balance between preserving savings and 
growth, to achieve small growth, or to preserve your savings? 
4. How would you describe your financial situation? 
5. Do you have emergency funds? 
6. Are you comfortable experiencing short-term ups and downs in the value of your 
investments? 
7. If you could increase your chances of improving returns by taking more risk, what 
are you likely to do? 
 305 
 
8. If you suddenly inherited £20,000 what are you most likely to do: Invest in funds 
and stocks, invest in capital protection funds, invest in investment bonds, prepay 
on mortgage/payoff other debts, or save in savings account for a rainy day? 
9. For each of these financial instruments (stocks, bonds, property, ISAs, CFDs), 
how comfortable are you with how they work? 
10. If you were given £20,000 that you HAD to invest in ONE of the following ways, 
what would you choose? A) 50-100% in CFDs, Spread betting, day trading, the 
rest in stocks, B) 100% in stocks only, receiving advice, C) 50% in stocks having 
done my own research and 50% in funds, D) 50% in low risk investment bonds, 
50% in funds, E) 100% in low risk investment bonds.  
11. Which statement best describes your attitudes towards of financial risk? A) 
Financial risk means opportunity to achieve higher returns, B) Investing is only 
risky if you do not rely on research, C) With enough diversification in my portfolio, 
I can eliminate risk, D) Any investment that does not guarantee capital 
preservation is not worth it, E) The only safe place for my money is a bank 
account; I am unwilling to take financial risk. 
12. How predictable/stable are your sources of income? 
13. What is your marital status? 
14. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
15. How much loss (in absolute terms) are you prepared to take on your investment 
on a 12-month basis? 
16. How much loss (in absolute terms) are you prepared to take on your investment 
on a 3-month basis? 
17. When investing your money, is inflation a concern? 
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18. Which of the sample investment portfolios would you feel most comfortable 
allocating part of your money? 
